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Abstract 
 
In recent years, many scholars in the field of political communication have 
discussed professionalisation of election campaigning in dealing with the 
development of mass media and technology as well as the increased demand for 
external campaign professionals in the political process. It is true that parties 
have struggled to manage these on-going alterations efficiently as well as 
scientifically to attract more voter attention within their limited budget. Naturally, 
political parties need to seek external campaign professionals’ helps to make a 
more professionalised election campaign.  
 
Accordingly, this research utilises two different dimensions – external and 
internal- to figure out the notion of professionalisation in election campaigning. 
Firstly, this research aims to demonstrate how and by how much political parties’ 
presidential election campaigns in South Korea have become more technically 
sophisticated in mass media mobilisation and the adaptation of new technologies. 
Secondly, this research will look at how the relationship between external 
campaign professionals and political parties has been changed and how political 
parties have made their organisation more ‘systemic’ and ‘tactical’ using 
communication technologies.  
 
To answer these research purposes, this research will choose three presidential 
elections (1997, 2002 and 2007) and two major parties –the Grand National Party 
and the Democratic Party - in South Korea. This will enable the researcher to 
look at historical alterations and compare election campaign strategies between 
each of the parties to figure out whether they seek different campaign strategies, 
and, if so, why they choose differently. Therefore, this research will analyse the 
data of 25 semi-structured interviews conducted with campaign managers who 
either were or are inside one of the party organisations and of external campaign 
professionals who are outside the party organisations in three different periods to 
answer the research questions.  
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As a result of the above, this research found that professionalisation of Korean 
election campaigns is underway because both parties have tried to adopt new 
campaign practices and manage their organisation in a more efficient way. 
However, due to strict campaign regulations in South Korea, this finally led to 
the situation that parties cannot invest money into designing competitive 
campaign strategies through the liberal use of mass media and campaign 
technology. In addition to this, it is confirmed that both parties have increased 
the number of external campaign professionals in order to deal with new 
campaign practices and the relationship between parties and external campaign 
professionals has become a business relationship. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Research background   
 
The establishment of a healthy democracy has become of global concern. Many 
academic observers have explained that it can be realised through the 
participation of citizens in free and fair elections and open competition between 
political organisations (Dalton, Shin, and Jou, 2007). Amongst various political 
activities, the election is typically deemed as ‘an essential component of 
representative democracy’ (Norris, 2000, pp.1), creating a legitimate political 
competition for parties and candidates to acquire political authority to hold 
public office by voting (Webb, Eula, and Gibbons, 2013), and connection 
between voters and political actors. For this reason, parties and candidates try to 
maximise the voter’s political support based on the concept of persuasion and 
mobilisation of the public. In particular, these endeavours by parties and 
candidates to garner political support and to achieve their goal during elections 
emerge as the process of election campaigning (Farrell, 1996).  
 
Election campaigning is considered as one of the key activities for political 
parties since it has a major impact in determining electoral outcome (Butler and 
Ranney, 1992; Webzine, 2010). To be specific, the importance of election 
campaigning has been the focus of an immense amount of academic interest in 
recent years because societal and electoral changes brought about by the arrival 
of a modernised society have rapidly influenced the political process (Swanson 
and Mancini, 1996; Mancini, 1999). Unlike previously where a high level of 
party loyalty and party attachment existed, nowadays, political parties have to 
woo voters via various kinds of methods in order to survive in the world of 
politics (Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Mair, Müller, and Plasser, 2004). This 
means that political parties have to devise a method to prolong their political life 
through all the creative skills they have in designing election campaigns. 
Naturally, such efforts by political parties or candidates are portrayed by means 
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of the efficient management of election campaigns, which consist of various 
types of campaign professionals, and scientific campaign skills such opinion 
polling, telemarketing, narrowcasting, and structured and efficient party 
organisation (Katz and Mair, 1994; Farrell, 1996; Gibson and Römmele, 2009; 
Tenscher, Mykkänen and Moring, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, designing of distinctive campaign strategies using the latest 
campaign techniques seems to be important nowadays (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 
2002). Hence, this has led to the dramatic growth of campaign professionals and 
political consultancy markets, and of private sectors to provide help for parties, 
such as the designing of political advertising, image-making consultation and so 
on. This has clearly been evident especially in the USA where the industry of 
political consultancy and businesses regarding election campaign management 
have been successfully established since the 1930s (Mancini, 1999) as well as in 
some Asian countries. In other words, the cooperative relationship between 
parties and campaign professionals, who can help parties or candidates in 
conducting campaign activities through their specialised skills - including media 
consultants, advertising companies, pollsters, and image coordinators for election 
campaigns - is more essential nowadays, even if the level of its intensification 
will differ according to the socio-political environment in a particular country.  
 
Drawing on these observation, many scholars in the field of election campaigns 
agree on the increased use of campaign professionals and efficient campaign 
strategies, including the adoption of new campaign tools and new media as a key 
features of contemporary campaigning (Herrnson, 1994; Mancini, 1999; Thurber, 
2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Scarrow, 2004). In addition, they concur with 
the fact that political parties have continued to review campaigning practices and 
have improved campaign strategies to correspond with the ever-changing 
electoral environment. As a result, academics have begun using the term 
'professionalisation' to understand these current alterations of election campaigns 
in modern society (Mancini 1999). 
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Similarly, Rawnsley's (2006) maintains that social liberalisation and political 
democratisation, including constitutional reforms and liberalisation of the media, 
has led to far-reaching changes in election communication, which in turn has led 
to "a growing of professionalisation of election campaigning that is evident in the 
way candidates communicate with the voters, mobilize their supports and 
respond to changes in public opinion" (pp.114). That is, it can be assumed that 
the meaning of professionalisation in the election campaign arena is connected to 
the improvement of campaign strategy, including the phenomenon of the 
extensive use of campaign professionals, in response to ever-changing electoral 
environment because liberalised media do no longer serve as a mouthpiece of 
political elites.  
 
In particular, given that an election campaign is defined as the process by which 
a campaign organisation such as candidate, parties, and special interest groups 
approach their final aims (Farrell, 1996, pp.161), designing a strategic election 
campaign is a principal requirement for political parties to meet their goals such 
as the maintenance of their political lives. Put more descriptively, Butler and 
Ranney (1992) explained that it is notable that parties should consider not only 
what voters want and need, but also how their chosen political issues and 
arguments should be presented to the public to maximise votes when creating 
election strategies. Besides this, they have to think about how their organisation 
could be the most efficiently structured and which media and other techniques 
will help to transmit their message most directly. That is, ultimately, the most 
decisive factor – on which victory or failure can depend – is how well the parties 
produce strategies and how well they utilise the newest campaign techniques.  
 
Taking all things into consideration, it is important to examine the phenomenon 
of the professionalisation of election campaigns from the perspective of party 
organisation. In particular, when the professionalisation of election campaigns is 
examined, two important matters should be considered. Firstly, understanding the 
process of political and media development in a given country is essential for 
investigating professionalisation of election campaigns, as these elements are 
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important factors that lead to the alteration of election campaigns (Plasser and 
Plasser, 2002; Karlsen, 2010b; Rawnsley, 2006; Karslen, 2010). Secondly, it is 
important to investigate how individual parties differ in their response to ongoing 
changes in the electoral environment, because they do not try to adopt new media 
and campaign skills at the same time (Gibson and Römmele, 2001).  
 
Therefore, this research aims to analyse the historical changes in campaign 
practices and organisational structure adopted by political parties and the impact 
of campaign professionals on party organisation in South Korea over a 10-year 
period. Furthermore, this study investigates whether the alteration of election 
campaigns in South Korea could be explained in the context of 
professionalisation theory. In doing this, this research focuses on two different 
parties-the Grand National Party (GNP) and the Democratic Party (DP) – to 
study the professionalisation of election campaigns in South Korea. The research 
involves semi-structured interviews with campaign managers inside party 
organisations and campaign professionals, and an analysis of campaign material 
used by the two main parties in three elections between 1997 and 2007.  
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
The current studies of professionalisation of election campaigns tend to be more 
focused on the alterations in election campaign activities caused by the 
development of mass media and campaign technology and the extensive use of 
campaign professionals, rather than the inside changes of party organisation, e.g. 
the alteration of relationship between parties and campaign professionals, and of 
the organisational map (Agranoff, 1976; Butler and Ranney, 1992; Sparrow, 
2004; Schaffer, 2006). Although a few studies of changes to party organisation in 
relation to the growth of campaign professionals in election campaigns have been 
accomplished (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Gibson and Römmele, 2009), these 
studies seem far away from the common occurrences in explaining the process of 
alteration of election campaigning from a broad perspective. For example, some 
academics have stated their concerns about party decline as a final consequence 
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of professionalisation (Green and Smith, 2003), especially in the USA where 
candidate-focused campaigns have intensified; whereas other scholars have 
insisted that the phenomenon of party decline would not happen in some 
European countries such as the UK, which has a strong party-focused campaign 
style (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Norris, 2000; Kolodny and Dulio, 2003). This 
means that the results of some studies, which focused on several cases in the 
USA and in European countries, cannot be applied to other countries, such as 
those in Asia, which do not have a similar political- and economic- system.  
 
With the aforementioned research interests, this research will address the 
growing effect of mass media and new technologies and the accompanying 
influx of campaign professionals into party organisations whilst discussing the 
professionalisation of election campaigns in South Korea. Therefore, it will 
firstly demonstrate how and by how much Korean parties’ presidential election 
campaigns have become more sophisticated as a consequence of mass media 
mobilisation and the adaptation of new technologies. Secondly, it will investigate 
how much Korean parties have increased the use of campaign professionals to 
improve their campaign skills, and how the relationship between political parties 
and campaign professionals has changed. Thirdly, it will analyse how and by 
how much political parties have made their organisation more ‘systemic’ and 
‘tactical’ by using communication technologies in the context of a more 
professionalised model of party communication.  
 
Amongst the studies which deal with both alteration of campaign activities and 
party organisation, Gibson and Römmele (2009, p.267-268) identify four 
different campaign activities where professionalisation might frequently occur:  
 
 
‘Firstly, the adoption of new tools (high-tech and computerised) 
and intensification of existing methods (opinion polling, focus 
groups); Secondly, a shift in the overall style of campaigning 
to a more capital-intensive and continuous mode; Thirdly, a 
re-orientation in the relationship with the electorate toward a 
more interactive and individualised engagement; Finally, the 
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re-structuring of power relations between national party and 
local party with an increasing centralisation of power’.  
 
 
Given this classification, the main research questions and hypotheses are 
designed to identify the degree of professionalisation of election campaigns in 
South Korea, and to do so within the context of overall alteration of election 
campaigning. The questions are classified according to two dimensions of 
professionalisation, external and internal, which we may assume as the major 
changes in campaign activities and party organisation. In particular, 
professionalisation theory in this research will be divided into two different 
dimensions, external and internal alteration of professionalisation, through an 
analysis of underlying theoretical frameworks: the external dimension will 
include the alteration of campaign practices caused by the adoption of 
developing mass media and technologies in designing election campaign, whilst 
the internal dimension will focus on the alteration of political parties as campaign 
organisations resulting from the influx of campaign professionals. Therefore, 
each dimension leads to its own hypotheses:  
 
The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning  
 
Q1. The adoption of new tools and intensification of existing methods: 
What and how differences in campaign activities were accomplished by the 
utilisation of mass media and new campaign technology in each presidential 
election? Has this finally led to the alteration of campaign style? How have the 
Korean parties responded to these new tools of communication? 
 
H1-1: Political parties will try to approach their work differently especially after 
an election defeat, including using contemporary communication technologies 
and campaigning practices. 
 
H1-2: New campaign styles caused by media and campaign technology 
developments will therefore become more capital-intensive.  
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The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning  
 
Q2. The influx of campaign professionals: 
What kind of campaign activities have campaign professionals performed in the 
presidential election campaigns between 1997 and 2007? How has the 
relationship between party personnel and campaign professionals changed? 
 
H2: Political parties will try to increase the engagement of campaign 
professionals to improve their campaign strategies, especially in the adoption of 
new campaign skills and electoral environment.  
 
H2-1: The hierarchy in decision-making for election campaigns will change from 
a top-down structure to a more flat hierarchy because of the growing influx of 
external campaign professionals.  
 
Q3. The alteration of political parties as campaign organisations:  
Does the increased influx of professional consultants into the party organisation 
result in centralisation of the party organisation? How have parties changed their 
organisation since the introduction of campaign professionals?  
 
H3-1: Political parties will be centralised to manage their resources efficiently as 
well as effectively.   
 
H3-2: Political parties will be focused on training their party personnel to be 
more ‘professional (or skilful)’ in managing mass media and new technology 
efficiently. 
 
H3-3: Political parties will expand their organisation to deal with mass media and 
new technology, and will therefore concentrate investment on developing these 
departments within their organisation.  
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1.3. The process of democratisation and the changing media environment in 
South Korea 
 
This study selects South Korea as a single-case study to investigate 
professionalisation of election campaigns. Accordingly, it is important to explain 
why this study chooses South Korea rather than other countries. According to 
Yin (2009), it is most important to select a case in which the phenomena that lead 
to theoretical conception can be observed extensively. Although Merkens (2004) 
stated the accessibility of a case is the most important factor in choosing a 
suitable case, this section concentrates on an explanation of why South Korea 
was chosen for a single-case study and why this case is suitable to examine 
professionalisation of election campaigns.  
 
Before starting to explore the South Korean case, it is worth knowing what kinds 
of factors will be important to examine professionalisation theory. Mancini (1999) 
explains that the term professionalisation has been popular due to the results of 
telecommunication development, which could affect the change of social systems. 
In particular, he argues that professionalisation in the field of campaigning can 
be divided into areas where campaign professionals are engaged. Moreover, it is 
important to acknowledge the process of democratisation in South Korea to 
understand the alteration of election campaigns. Thus, this section explains 
briefly about the three main points regarding to South Korea such as the process 
of democratisation, media-oriented campaigning, and use of campaign 
professionals.  
 
Democratisation in South Korea  
 
Democratic elections in South Korea were held from the 1987 presidential 
election onward. Although presidential elections prior to the 1987 presidential 
election appeared to take on the form of a democratic election, these elections 
had the basic structure of non-democratic elections (Jeong, 2002).  
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Political power of the ruling party (GNP) was still strong in the 1987 election due 
to the bias in seats of proportional representatives of local constituencies rather 
than the other parties. Many difficulties plagued minor parties, whereas entrance 
into politics having been easy for lager parties, which discharged many 
assemblymen to local districts. Such problems in the political system caused 
many disadvantages for minor parties.  
  
Although a change in the political system proceeded slowly, the ruling party, 
which was able to monopolise funds prior to the period of military regime, could 
not maintain its exclusive access to funds, as post-transition regulations 
incorporated an equal distribution system as a matter of principle starting with 
the 1987 presidential election (Seo, 2008).  
 
Until the 1997 presidential election, strong regionalism
1
 in South Korea enabled 
one party (GNP) to be able to rule for a prolonged period of 40 years, starting 
from the previous republic era. However, the GNP, which advocated an 
autocratic rule for the following 40 years, initiated a historical political change in 
the 1997 presidential election. The 1997 presidential election is therefore 
considered an important period of regime transition and a milestone in the 
democratization process. At the same time, the government widely allowed 
campaign activities using mass media. As a result, these political and media 
developments created a new electoral environment for political parties. Although 
a change in government occurred again in the 2007 presidential elections, it 
cannot be denied that such political development and liberalisation of mass 
media largely affect the alteration of election campaigns. 
 
 
 
                                            
10
 In the context of political communication, regionalism means that voters in a particular region 
are supportive of a particular candidate or political party, depending on their political ideology. 
However, the meaning of regionalism in South Korea differs slightly, because a sense of party 
belonging is expressed strongly depending on a region rather than political ideology. 
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Media-oriented election campaigning  
 
With so many rapid changes in the political and electoral environments, parties 
and candidates in South Korea have radically overhauled their campaign 
strategies recently. Academics in South Korea are worried that parties are 
weakening gradually, transforming into the type of electoral-professional party 
that highlights election success over everyday practice and requires an ever-
increasing number of campaign professionals to co-ordinate responses to the 
ever-changing electoral environment (Park and Jang, n.d.; Sun, 2009; Park, 
2006). Furthermore, election campaigns in South Korea are tending to become 
more media-oriented (Lee and Lee, 2004; Kim and Kim, 2005). According to 
Lee and Lee (2004), South Korean parties have invested huge amounts in the use 
of mass media, whilst an official election research document by the Korean 
National Election Commission (1998, 2003 and 2008a) states that most voters 
are influenced by mass media, especially television and newspaper. As seen in 
Figure 1.1, TV was chosen by voters as the first main route to obtain political 
information in each presidential election and newspaper was the second one. In 
this graph, the important thing is that the proportion of the use of newspaper as a 
main route in obtaining political information has gradually decreased whilst the 
percentage of the Internet has steadily increased.  
 
In particular, since 2000, the strong effects of the mass media on voters and their 
rapidly evolving use of and response to that mass media have caused an increase 
in the level of unpredictability during a campaign. Accordingly, the advance of 
the information society in South Korea has prompted many news articles to 
comment that the influence of mass media goes beyond mere information 
communication. These news articles also argue that the Internet will soon be 
acknowledged as one of the main communication tools in election campaigns, 
given the characteristics of the Internet such as the power of interactivity and the 
freedom of networking without geographical limitations (Sun, 2009; Lee, 2006; 
Kwon, 2006; Kang, 2002; Lee, 2009). 
 
11 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The main political information route of voters
1 
 
1Source: The official reports of the Presidential Election, KNEC (1998, 2003, and 2008a)
 
 
More specifically, in South Korea, there are reasons why online campaigns are 
considered so essential even though the Internet only featured for the first time in 
the 2000 general election. Firstly, this is the fastest growing Internet industry in 
Korean society. The number of Internet users in South Korea exceeded 24 
million in 2000, which is three-quarters of Korean voters, and over 7,000,000 
households are now accessing super-speed communication networks. The spread 
of the Internet in Korea is the fastest among Asian countries and, according to a 
recent report of the Korea Internet & Security Agency, the number of Internet 
users per household is the largest in Asia. 
 
Secondly, in the 16
th
 presidential election in 2002, 55.7% of candidates running 
for the National Assembly had Internet websites: presidential candidate Rho Mu-
hyun, Rho was supported by an Internet community called Rosado, whose 
activities produced effects as powerful as other ordinary election campaigns, 
spotlighting the importance of Internet media (Kang, 2002; Lee, 2009). Such 
communities are different from candidates’ websites in that supporters of a 
specific candidate gather out of ideological and voluntary intention to carry out 
advertising, mobilisation and fundraising activities. This type of community was 
quite effective as they had a high level of solidarity, clear political goals and 
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shared political information among their members. With these characteristics, 
they succeeded in engaging in activities equivalent to ordinary election 
campaigns and in increasing support for their candidate. This phenomenon 
stemmed from an attempt to increase voter turnout among the younger 
generation, who are increasingly uninterested in politics (Kang, 2008; Hwang, 
2006; Yun, 2008). As a result, almost all South Korean parties have invested 
money in online political activities, and political parties’ awareness of the 
importance of the Internet as one of the primary mass media tools which can be 
used in election campaigns has increased. Consequently, all these changes have 
led to an increase in the rate of employment of skilful Internet professionals (Sun, 
2009). 
 
However, these changes in the electoral environment caused by the development 
of mass media require parties to be more accurate in targeting their campaigns 
because voters have much greater access to political information. As seen in 
Figure 1.2, for instance, voters in a 20-30 age group use the Internet as a major 
source of political information, more so than the older generation. Hwang (2006) 
suggests that a large number of the voters, who often visit parties or candidates’ 
websites and are politically active on the Internet, are probably of the younger 
generation. Therefore, the parties need to consider more sophisticated campaign 
strategies based on their own detailed target research since the emergence of the 
digital divide between generations. Consequently, online campaign strategies, 
have received much attention from parties, candidates, and political science 
theorists as their latent efficiency has become increasingly clear. 
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Figure 1.2. The difference of Political Information channels between generations
1 
 
   1 Source: The official report of the Presidential Election (KNEC, 2007) 
 
Use of campaign professionals 
 
Since election campaigns became media-oriented in 1998, South Korean parties 
have had to face new problems, deal with many new difficulties, and be 
evermore creative in their strategic planning. These parties have naturally sought 
out experts in various fields such as politics, media, and even computer science 
in order to create efficient election campaigns. Political consultants in the US 
have been working actively since the 1980s (Sabato, 1981); the current situation 
in South Korea seems to be that of a transition period from the initial to the 
middle stages, but not the mature stage, in the use of such campaign 
professionals in party organisations. 
 
Therefore, there was relatively little academic discussion about the problems, 
effects or the change of campaign strategies that resulted from the influx of 
Korean campaign professionals. Another reason for the absence of academic 
discussions about these subjects before the 1997 presidential election, which was 
focused on the style of a traditional campaign, is that voters at least had strong 
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party identification: political parties could easily mobilise voters when required, 
and campaign professionals were needed only to work on the production of 
political advertising during the election period. Consequently, the influence 
caused by the influx of campaign professionals into the political process was 
excluded as a major consideration by the parties. However, the development of 
mass media and technology in the late 1990s and the growing use of campaign 
professionals in election campaigns have radically altered the campaign process 
in South Korea. Since then, campaign styles have become ‘media-oriented’ and 
‘image-oriented’ and so more volatile than traditional campaigns that could 
assume stable voting behaviour (Jeong, 2002). 
 
There were two landmark changes in the electoral environment, which are 
directly related to the growth of campaign professionals in party organisations, in 
South Korea in the 21
st
 century. Firstly, the revision of electoral law has given 
parties and candidates more freedom to use opinion polls during campaigning 
(Kim and Kim, 2005; Sun, 2009). Importantly, since the DP
2
 attempted to open 
the primary election for the 2002 presidential election, the importance of the 
pollster as one type of campaign professional has increased. Secondly, the arrival 
of the Internet facilitated improvements to communication systems within parties 
and in campaign strategies, intensifying the need to hire campaign professionals 
(Kang, 2002; Kang, 2008). 
 
Therefore, even though the influx of campaign professionals into party 
organisations is relatively recent in South Korea, it is true that their influence and 
the speed of development is as fast as ever (Weekly Han kook, 04/Apil/2007; 
Weekly kyunghyong, 17/July/2007). Furthermore, according to the recent 
documents of the National Election Commission in South Korea (2007), it is 
reported that parties have been increasing their budgets for the employment of 
skilled campaign professionals such as media consultants, advertising companies, 
pollsters, and image coordinators for election campaigns.  
 
                                            
2
 The official name of DP in the 2002 presidential election was New Millennium Democratic 
Party (NMDP). 
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On the other hand, a lot of research about election campaigning in South Korea 
has concentrated on the fragmentary results such as the utilisation and the effect 
of media (Kim, 2002; Jeong, 2003; Jang, 2008), the effect of political advertising 
(Kim and Kim, 1998; Kim and Kim, 2005; Lee, 2008; Choi, 2008) and negative 
campaigns (Kim, 2004; Kang, 2009a), rather than looking at the evolution of 
election campaign in a broad sense. Although they explain that some changes of 
election campaign style were caused by on-going electoral environment, this was 
as one of the elements in the explanation of the current problems or situations in 
South Korea rather than detailed information of how Korean campaign style has 
been altered and how parties have improved their campaign strategies in a 
historical context. This is clearly shown in Song and Park’s research (2007). 
They reviewed studies on election campaign activities conducted thus far and 
proposed suggestions for election campaign studies as follows: 1) theoretical 
framework or reasoning tools should be developed for the purpose of explaining 
the mass media effect in a systematic and detailed way, and 2) a systematic 
theory is needed, which can explain how a voter's selection of a candidate 
depends on the type of campaign message from a wider perspective.  
 
In particular, the most remarkable alteration in Korean campaign studies is that 
many studies have focused on the way of developing candidate image and the 
analysis of political TV advertising from the 2000s onwards because of the 
strong effects that TV has had on election campaigning. For example, Lee (2006) 
examined a cognitive mechanism inducing concrete feelings in voters towards a 
certain candidate and analysed how mass media campaigns affect the role of such 
a mechanism in elections. Accordingly, this study used five cognitive assessment 
factors (issue proximity, political interest, leadership evaluation, morality 
evaluation, inner political efficacy) to find out voters’ emotional response to 
candidates, based on the cognitive evaluation theory of psychology. This study 
found that voters’ feelings are based not on unreasonable elements, but on their 
cognitive evaluation of a candidate, which was analysed to have an important 
effect on the selection of a candidate and political participation in existing 
theoretic discussion on voting practices.  
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Curiously, despite the scholars’ increased interest in scientific tools and effective 
strategy in election campaigns, few Korean scholars have attempted to explain 
the evolution of election campaigning. Although there are some arguments that 
Korean campaigns have become modernised and Americanised, these studies do 
not provide specific information about how each party has responded to these 
modern technology and communication tools, or about how they have continued 
to improve their campaign skills to achieve their aim. Instead, most electoral 
research in South Korea has focused on the possible effects of modern 
campaigning such as political cynicism and the change of political participation, 
and the method of campaign strategies such as the efficient design of campaign 
messages via analysis of voters’ behaviour. Especially, such studies applying 
professionalisation theory in explaining the evolution of election campaign are 
very hard to find in South Korea. Thus, this study will provide a different 
perspective to look at the historical changes of election campaign, such as how 
political parties’ campaign activities have been changed in response to the on-
going development of media and technology and how a changed electoral 
environment affects political parties’ organisation.  
 
1.4. The definition of key terms in this study 
 
Professionalisation of election campaign 
 
The rapid changes in election campaigning and the large variety of new 
campaign strategies and tools have made it necessary to develop new theoretical 
concepts to systemically describe and explain these developments. Naturally, 
research agendas have developed the concept of professionalisation to explain 
this phenomenon (Blumer, Kavanagh, and Nossiter 1996; Farrell and Webb 2000; 
Lilleker and Negrine 2002)
3
. Therefore, this study will employ the concept of 
professionalisation to analyse the changes that are going on in election 
campaigning in South Korea.  
                                            
3
 Alternative concepts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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In general, the scope of professionalisation in election campaigns can be 
interpreted from different perspectives. For instance, some scholars point out that 
the professionalised campaign is connected to the increased use of campaign 
professionals by political parties (Mancini, 1999; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). 
Other academics look at professionalisation as strategic vote management 
(Plasser and Plasser, 2002) or as the essential changes in the relationship between 
political system and media system (Holtz-Bacha, 2007). From another point of 
view, Negrine and his colleagues (2007) argue that changes in campaign practice 
stem from notions of modernisation, a continual process that naturally tends to 
replicate across borders. In this sense, professionalisation is a kind of 
modernisation and is a natural process that does not stress one particular field 
such as growth of new communication technology. They also stated 
professionalisation allows chasing the changes that have been presented from 
thoughts, activities and concerns of a party in the past. Although each scholar has 
a somewhat different viewpoint in giving a definition of professionalised 
campaign, they agree that professionalised campaign should be linked with the 
process of change in party organisation. That is, it can be generally interpreted 
that using the concept of professionalisation in election campaigning it is 
possible to detect a relationship between evolution of the use of a campaign 
practice and the alteration of a party organisation. Therefore, professionalisation 
of election campaigns is defined for this research as a continuous review process 
of each party to design a competitive campaign in response to the alteration of 
socio-political environments and the parties’ unceasing efforts to deal with new 
mass media, campaign technology and campaign professionals.  
 
The key dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning 
 
Based on an investigation of previous research in professionalisation of election 
campaigning, two different dimensions are deduced by which to examine 
professionalisation theory throughout the South Korean case. Briefly, the 
external dimension is about the results of the alteration of election campaigning 
caused by the adoption of mass media and campaign technology, whilst the 
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internal dimension is about the results of the alteration of party organisation 
resulting from the increased use of campaign professionals. Accordingly, these 
two dimensions have three main features respectively (See more details in 
chapter 2).  
 
1.5. Chapter structure 
 
This research is composed of a total of six chapters and each one represents an 
entire process used to approach the aim of this research. 
 
The second chapter discusses alternative concepts of modern political campaigns 
such as Americanisation and modernisation. In addition, the chapter provides 
arguments about why the notion of professionalisation is most effective in 
conceptualising the different dimensions of the current election campaigning 
strategy. Accordingly, this literature review will help strengthen the argument of 
this study through providing academic evidence from existing studies.   
 
Chapter 3 will cover the information about South Korea as a case study, 
including political and media systems, electoral paradigm, and campaign 
regulation, which are all necessary for this study to discuss. To be specific, a 
brief history of Korean democratisation and of the establishment of political 
parties will be presented. In particular, the history of each of the parties is the 
most important section in order to understand the results of this research. 
Furthermore, this chapter will provide the information about media systems such 
as historical alteration and development of the utilisation of mass media. Finally, 
given that all campaign activities are strictly controlled by campaign regulations, 
an explanation about campaign regulation, which is affected conducting 
campaign activities in South Korea, will be presented.     
 
Chapter 4 will deal with the details of the research methodology used for this 
study, and, therefore, it will be divided into four sub-sections. At first, an 
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explanation of the advantages of case study and the purpose of semi-structured 
interview with campaign professionals and campaign managers inside the party 
organisations as a main methodology for this study will be provided. Then, the 
explanation of why it is sensible to investigate the Korean case in this research 
will be presented. Afterwards, detailed information about the process of semi-
structured interviews such as the scope of interviewees, the interview guide, the 
process of interview, and ethical considerations will be described. Lastly, this 
chapter will introduce the CAMPROF index as a tool by which to present the 
results of the alteration of external dimensions of professionalisation focused on 
the utilisation of mass media and campaign technology in a historical context.   
 
Chapter 5 will demonstrate in detail the results of the investigation into South 
Korea’s case in order to answer the research questions and hypotheses. 
Accordingly, this results chapter is broadly divided into two large parts based on 
two different dimensions, internal and external, as stated in the literature review 
chapter. In presenting the results of the external dimension of professionalisation 
of election campaigning, the four sub-sections are composed of the main 
campaign activities in South Korea. On the other hand, the results of the internal 
alteration of professionalisation will be divided into four separated sections – the 
influx of campaign professionals including the change of their role and power, 
the alteration of the relationship between campaign professionals and campaign 
managers inside party organisation, centralisation of parties and the change of 
party structure.  
 
Chapter 6 as the conclusion will summarise the empirical results of the study in 
the light of the research questions and hypotheses that have guided it. In addition, 
the conclusion will reflect on the effectiveness of the concept of 
professionalisation and whether it helps us to understand the alterations of 
Korean election campaigns. Lastly, this chapter will provide the summary of 
limitations of this study and suggest further challenges for future research.   
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter will concentrate on the conceptualisation of professionalisation of 
election campaigning through discussion of the current academic arguments. 
From different perspectives of academic scholars, the current research focusing 
on professionalisation theory in the election campaign field can be summarised 
as three viewpoints: 1) the natural alteration of election campaign style caused by 
modernisation of society (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Papathanassopoulos et al., 
2007; Holtz-Bacha, 2007), 2) the sophisticated campaign strategy using 
campaign technology and new media (Scammell, 1998; Gibson and Römmele, 
2001; Negrine 2007), and 3) the alteration of party organisation resulting from 
the influx of external campaign professionals and of the relationship between 
parties and these external campaign professionals (Mair, Müller, and Plasser, 
2004; Gibson and Römmele, 2009; Tenscher, Mykkänen, and  Moring, 2012). 
Given that parties still play a main role in conducting election campaigns, this 
research will suggest that professionalisation theory can be interpreted as the on-
going process of political parties reviewing and improving their campaign 
strategy in accordance with modern technology and mass media. To strengthen 
the argument, this research will show different perspectives on 
professionalisation theory through reviews of the current academic research.   
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, there were many dynamic changes in 
political communication around the world. Amongst these current changes, one 
of the most serious considerations between scholars is the decline of the 
traditional function of political parties caused by the central role of mass media 
in the political process (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Farrell and Webb, 2000; 
Plasser, 2001; Espíndola, 2002; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004). There is no 
doubt that political parties need various kinds of mass media to communicate 
with the voters, and, therefore, the relationship between mass media and political 
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parties is indispensable nowadays. In particular, since the arrival of TV in the 
political process, it is true that the relationship between these two areas is closer 
than ever before. That is, it has informed the arrival of media-driven democracy, 
in other words, ‘mediatisation’ of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999).  
 
Although there are many debates over the positive or negative effects of its 
phenomenon, it can be said that the development of mass media has had much 
influence on all political processes, especially in the areas such as political 
campaigning and party PR in general, which are mainly in need of the support of 
mass media. Moreover, it has been much more important since the final goal of 
political parties has become more focused on raising the possibility of winning 
elections through voter maximisation rather than by other means, such as party 
policy and ideology advocacy, due to the alteration of the electoral environment. 
For instance, the unfavourable conditions surrounding the electoral environment 
such as a growing political apathy, a decreased level of party attachment, and 
increased floating voters have encouraged the evolution of election campaigning 
in certain ways (Farrell, 1996). Naturally, political parties need to obtain a great 
deal of support from the electorate and this has consequently set the stage for the 
creation of a scientific as well as a professionalised election campaign through 
the careful adoption of new campaign techniques and new media.  
 
As a result, these changes in the political arena have allowed the influx of 
campaign professionals who can deal with campaign practices efficiently as well 
as professionally much better than political parties or politicians can (Thurber 
and Nelson, 2000). This is because the development of mass media and 
technology has happened at too fast for non-professionals; furthermore, these 
latest campaign techniques have made campaign management too complicated 
for politicians (Sabato, 1981). In addition to this, some unpredictable factors, 
such as voters’ highly volatile behaviour and the repaid distribution of political 
information especially related to bad things, e.g. rumours and scandals caused by 
new media and technology developments, would require political parties to 
handle these crises with professionalised campaign skills.  
 
22 
 
 
Therefore, this chapter will firstly present in general the current central 
arguments related to the evolution of election campaign literature in order to 
conceptualise professionalisation of election campaigns. Afterwards, it will 
concentrate on a discussion of what the general trend is from the perspective of 
globalisation, and of the differences between the other concepts, especially 
‘Americanisation’ and on ‘Modernisation’, and professionalisation of election 
campaigns. It will be worth discussing here to avoid the criticism that 
professionalisation is just a concept like Modernisation and Americanisation, 
which are often argued to describe the current features in modern election 
campaign. Furthermore, it will be also worth to justify why the 
professionalisation concept would be a reasonable one for this study to use to 
examine the alteration of election campaigns in South Korea. Finally, the specific 
dimensions of the phenomenon of professionalisation that will be examined 
throughout the case study will be demonstrated through academic arguments.  
 
2.2. The growth of professionalisation in election campaigning 
 
2.2.1. The evolution of election campaigning 
 
There have been academic efforts to investigate the evolution of election 
campaigns in the past decades in the West: ‘pre-modern, modern, post-modern’ 
(Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002), ‘phase 1, 2, 3’ (Farrell and Webb, 
2000)’, ‘labour-intensive and capital intensive’ (Farrell, 1996), ‘inter-system and 
intra-system’ (Bowler and Farrell, 1992), ‘the Newspaper Age, the Television 
Age, and the Digital Age’ (Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic, 2001), ‘mass 
propaganda, media campaigning and political marketing’ (Wring, 1996), and ‘the 
decades of the pollster (1960s), the advertising agency (1970s–1980s) and the 
political party professional (1990s)’ (Harrow, 1990). Despite the use of different 
terminologies, the authors are all agreed that various kinds of changes in election 
campaigning have been mainly influenced by mass media revolution and the 
development of campaign technology. Although the strategy of election 
campaigning is not just composed of mass media and campaign technology, the 
arrival of TV in politics has led to a complete transformation in the method of the 
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management of election campaigning.   
 
These alterations in election campaigning were first found in the USA and this 
trend has been observed elsewhere (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). To be specific, 
US campaigns in the 1970s were transformed by the effect of television, which 
shifted the focus from the party to the candidate (Farrell, 1996). This has proved 
to be an essential change, with the growth of individual campaigns that are more 
focused on candidates' image than on party image, and the increasing importance 
of paid television advertising with consequently rising campaign budgets 
(Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). In addition, the influence of the mass media has led 
to parties having to become more scientific and efficient as voters become less 
passive and more able to access a much wider range of useful information from 
home. Therefore, it is assumed that the dominance of television was the strongest 
factor in the evolution of campaign strategies during the 1970s.  
 
The trend that receives the second most attention is that of the increase in use of 
sophisticated campaign techniques such as opinion polls and focus group as 
scientific methods to gauge public opinion, and of the latest techniques such as 
narrowcasting to help distribute campaign messages. These techniques have 
tended to evolve with the development of technology and communication 
channels (Agranoff, 1976; Butler and Ranney, 1992). Therefore, the questions 
generally asked by academics concerning this topic are mainly about which 
campaign techniques are most effective in the design of election campaigns 
(Katz and Mair, 1994; Farrell, 1996; Plasser, 2001).  
 
Thirdly, the change relating to the second trend is the phenomenon of an increase 
in political consultancy in the political process. In fact, the development of 
technology and mass media has led to the creation of a new breed of campaign 
professionals such as media specialists and political consultants who have a 
broad sense of politics and mass media. Consequently, researches have paid 
attention to how deeply these external campaign professionals should be 
embedded within the party organisation, how far the effects of consultants are 
accepted inside a party, to what extent party members recognise the need for 
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such consulting works, and how parties can create beneficial relationships with 
them (Farrell, 1996; Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Plasser, 2001; Ward and 
Gibson, 2003; Negrine, 2007). However, there are many debates between 
scholars due to the differences of each nation in the use of campaign 
professionals. In effect, the extensive use of campaign professionals is found in 
the USA, where the industry of political consultancy has been well developed 
(Thurber and Nelson, 2000; Johnson, 2001). According to Plasser and Plasser 
(2002), there are some differences in the degree of professionalisation of 
European and USA campaign professionals because of different media and 
political systems. They explained that ‘communication channels in Europe are 
significantly more fragmented, more informal, and more strongly aligned along 
ideological and programmatic party alliances’ (Plasser and Plasser, 2002, pp.253). 
Moreover, the industry of political consultancy is segmented by party loyalties 
and campaign professionals’ political background.  
 
Fourthly, there is the adoption of business marketing concepts into election 
campaigning; that is, the arrival of political marketing concepts. Political 
marketing is a relatively recent phenomenon, which involves a strategy of design, 
rationalisation and conveyance of modern political communication, (Lilleker and 
Lees-Marshment, 2005; Savigny, 2003). In this sense, political marketing helps 
to apply sophisticated marketing frameworks, which can be developed from a 
survey of demands of the electoral market, target segmentation, and political 
behaviours, to election campaigns for political parties (Lilleker and Lees-
Marshment, 2005). Briefly, in order to adapt effectively to the changing political 
environment and administer an election campaign in a systematic way, political 
marketing has an urgent need for an efficient management of resources and a 
persuasive communication technique. Therefore, the reasons for introducing such 
a marketing concept to politics are: 1) the increasing costs of political campaigns 
require efficient management of resources; 2) an enhanced recognition of voters 
and development of the decision-making process requirements for parties’ 
systematic strategies and approaches; 3) the efficient management of available 
media has become vital; and, 4) election campaigns have gradually changed from 
being candidate-centred to scientific and systematic strategy-centred. 
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Finally, the current features of election campaigning have led to the emergence 
of what has become known as the ‘personalised campaigning’ (Swanson and 
Mancini, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Römmele, 2003; Schultz and his 
colleagues, 2005) and the ‘permanent campaigning’ (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 
2002; Norris, 2000) in the context of thematic change in election campaigning. 
The personalised campaigning is defined as the growing trend for the candidate’s 
personality to be located at the heart of the campaign message. It often happens 
in candidate-centralised election campaigning rather than in party-centralised. On 
the other hand, Norris (2000) notes that post-modern campaigns involve a shift 
from the ‘long’ towards the ‘permanent’ campaign. In addition, she points out 
that many political consultants in post-modern campaigns (such as 
communications consultants, pollsters and market research analysts) are involved 
in politics on a regular basis, rather than just during the ‘official’ campaign. 
 
The five above-mentioned features have been regarded as typical alterations of 
election campaigns in contemporary society, especially in media-centralised 
countries, despite the difference of speed of development of mass media and 
technology between the countries. From this point of view, the effects of on-
going development of media and campaign technology seem to be decisive 
factors leading the alteration of the election campaign paradigm in a broad sense.  
 
2.2.2. Americanisation and Modernisation in election campaigning literature 
 
Many academics in the field of election campaigning have recently suggested 
that similar changes to election campaigns take place around the world, despite 
many differences in the various political systems, electoral culture and media 
systems (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Without a 
doubt, many countries demonstrate similar features and common concerns in the 
context of historical changes in election campaigns although the extent and pace 
of this evolution varies according to the country. In order to explain the alteration 
in each case, many studies have adopted the concept of ‘Americanisation’ or 
‘Modernisation’. Although the perspectives of looking at alterations in election 
campaigning slightly differ between the two concepts, they are commonly 
26 
 
 
regarded as synonyms for the concept of professionalisation (Mancini, 1999) 
because its central argument focuses on how to understand the current alterations 
of election campaign style. Accordingly, this sub-section will explore literature 
on Americanisation and Modernisation to make clear their differences compared 
to professionalisation theory before conceptualising the professionalisation 
concept. 
 
The concept of Americanisation in election campaigning  
 
The theory of Americanisation has attracted attention because of the 
phenomenon of the close resemblance of USA electoral practices to those in 
other countries. In general, the USA is treated as a leader of electioneering 
innovation (Blumler, Kavanagh, and Nossiter, 1996) because of its developed 
industry of political consultancy and accompanying export of their skills to other 
countries, government educational support to promote the industry, an 
accumulation of experience and knowledge, and the burgeoning literature about 
their know-how in dealing with election campaign, etc. In addition, scholars who 
advocate the Americanisation theory argue that the increased use of scientific 
methods and American campaign practices have modernised every area of 
campaigns globally to a previously unseen level (Epstein, 1967; Sabato, 1981; 
Mouser, 1983; Luntz, 1988; Butler and Ranney, 1992; Newman, 1994; Swanson 
and Mancini, 1994; Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Norris, 2000).    
 
Such high demand for USA know-how and political consultants has led to an 
argument that election campaigning around the world is being ‘Americanised’. 
Plasser and Plasser (2002) point out that Americanisation could be divided into 
two different approaches: Modernisation and Diffusion (see Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1. Two approaches to the concept of Americanisation
1
 
Modernisation Approach Diffusion Approach 
Americanisation as a consequence of the 
Modernisation of media systems and 
voter-party relationship 
Americanisation as a consequence of the 
transnational diffusion and 
implementation of US concepts and 
strategies of electoral campaigning 
   
1
 Source: Plasser and Plasser (2002, pp.17) 
 
More specifically, they indicate that Americanisation, under the diffusion 
approach, can be deemed ‘directional convergence’ between the USA and other 
countries such as European and East Asian ones. Therefore, it can be interpreted 
as a kind of adoption of USA campaign practices and campaign skills by other 
countries, and eventually the style of election campaign becomes similar to that 
of the USA despite a different political system and culture. With regard to this 
point, many scholars highlight that the concept of business marketing is 
beginning to be used more in political communication and the adoption of 
political marketing has been indispensable in the management of election 
campaigning like in the USA (Harrow, 1990; Wring, 1996; Scammell, 1997; 
Savigny, 2003; Lees-Marshment, 2001). Thus, the USA, which is a pacesetter of 
innovative campaign tactics and a leader in sharing its knowledge and 
experiences with other countries, has become a standard model for other 
countries who might want to adopt or learn from its practices.  
 
The concept of Modernisation in election campaigning  
 
The modernisation approach differs from diffusion in the respect of 
understanding changes. This concept is based on the modernisation theory: all 
kinds of changes in political communication occur due to fundamental on-going 
alterations in politics, society, and media systems (Mancini, 1999; Norris, 2000; 
Papathanassopoulos et al., 2007). Therefore, some similarities in election 
campaigns between countries are not due to the influence of the USA but, rather, 
that the consequences of modern society and the phenomenon of modernisation 
in society have caused progressive modifications of traditional styles and 
strategies of political communication. The academics supporting this approach 
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point out that alterations in election campaigns could be presumed differently 
depending on political culture and system-specific elements although their 
pattern might seem to be similar between countries at the beginning of the 
adaptation of a new electoral environment. For example, Norris’s (2000) 
terminology has been often cited by many researchers looking at the evolution of 
election campaigning in respect of modernisation. She points out that the process 
of evolution of election campaigning could be understood as the ‘evolutionary 
process of modernisation’ which transforms party organisation, mass media 
system, and the electorate. Thus, she insists that the process of alterations in 
election campaigning could not be the same between nations because of different 
political and media systems, the electoral culture and so forth.  
 
Swanson and Mancini(1996) define the modernisation process as ‘increasing 
functional differentiation within society that leads to growing numbers of 
subsystems of all kinds that develop to satisfy the specialised demands of 
particular groups and social actors’ (pp.253). From this perspective, the 
modernised election campaigns can be driven by parties’ combined efforts to 
deal with the changing election environments and create a common strategy 
through the mobilisation of scientific tools in current society. In effect, the 
discussion of Modernisation began as an attempt to widen the definition of 
Americanisation in order to overcome restrictions in describing the changes of 
election campaign practices (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Butler and Ranney, 1992; 
Swanson and Mancini, 1996). Thus, Modernisation can be described as a general 
social process that is adopted or adapted in countries which have similar features 
of ‘social complexity’ (Swanson and Mancini, 1996), even if the degree of 
modernisation appears differently in given countries. Accordingly, 
Modernisation in election campaigns can be said to be the natural result of 
parties wanting to re-define their purpose (Negrine, 2007), and is interpreted as 
globalisation in the modern election campaign (Swanson and Mancini, 1996).  
 
However, critical scholars in this field state that the concept of modernisation 
tends to offer an oversimplified perspective in the explanation of modern 
campaign changes due to placing too much stress on general alteration of 
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election campaigns. In particular, the discussion of modernisation began by 
supporting a much broader description of the changes in political communication 
rather than specific changes in election campaigning. Thus, it is useful in tracing 
a general trend of the alteration of election campaigns from a macro perspective; 
more to the point, however, it does not seem enough to support direct evidence of 
how individual political parties have transformed their organisations and why 
they have specifically as well as strategically improved their campaign skills and 
strategy in response to socio-political and technological changes. Furthermore, in 
consideration of two arguments that parties have changed their structures 
according to their own specific factors such as party organisation culture and the 
historical outcomes of elections (Hamel and Jana, 1994), and all parties do not 
try to adopt the new campaign skills at the same time (Gibson and Römmele, 
2001), the two theories discussed above are not enough to offer a rich 
interpretation in the explanation of the difference between each individual party. 
Therefore, given this research is focused on the comparison of each individual 
party under the same electoral systems in dealing with the on-going alteration of 
election campaigning in a historical context, looking at only the two theories 
seems not to be sufficient to meet the requirements of this study.  
 
2.2.3. The conceptualisation of professionalisation in election campaigning  
 
In order to conceptualise the concept of professionalisation of election 
campaigning, it is important to investigate what arguments have been made in 
the existing studies and what elements have been examined in order to 
comprehend the concept of professionalisation of election campaigning. In 
particular, this will help make a strong argument for why it is preferable for this 
research to choose the concept of professionalisation over other terminologies to 
explore the alteration of election campaigning in South Korea. Furthermore, this 
will provide academic evidence to develop the framework for the explanation of 
the dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning for this research. 
Therefore, the following sub-section will focus on explaining the definition and 
dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning through an 
investigation of the underlying literature.  
30 
 
 
The definition of professionalisation of election campaigning  
 
With such rapid changes in the political environment, there is an increasing 
demand for effective approaches to elections in response to the development of 
mass media and new communication technology. Moreover, the growth in the 
influx of campaign professionals into political parties – due to the parties’ needs 
within the political process – seems to forecast the arrival of a new style of 
election campaigning. Naturally, academic interests in the area of election 
campaigning have concentrated on discerning its changing process and many 
scholars agree that election campaigning has been professionalised in many 
aspects (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Farrell, 2002), especially since the age of 
telecommunication began (Farrell, 1996; Mancini, 1999; Strachan, 2003).  
 
In earlier research, academic observers have endeavoured to explain how to 
understand an ambiguous term such as professionalisation in the context of 
political communication (Blumler, Kavanagh, and Nossiter, 1996; Lilleker and 
Negrine, 2002). From amongst these, Lilleker and Negrine (2002) explain that 
‘professionalisation is about the changing nature of political campaigns’ (pp.98). 
However, they also argue that it can raise a question about whether the use of the 
terms professionals or professionalism or professionalisation is useful for 
understanding the current alterations of the whole political campaign process. 
This is because the interpretation of the evolutionary process of political 
campaigning involves an element of historical context as changes - especially in 
political campaigns - occur every day regardless of the degree of their impacts in 
different countries of origin. Thus, it is claimed that we should be careful in 
using the term of ‘professionalisation’ when demonstrating the changing process 
of political campaigning (Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). 
 
Following on from this, some researchers have tried to provide more descriptive 
definitions of professionalisation based on the wider spectrum of evidence of 
each case study. As seen in Table 2.2, in order to investigate the notion of 
professionalisation of election campaigning, some researchers concentrate on the 
alteration of election campaigning caused by the proliferation of technological 
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and media developments (Mancini, 1999; Sparrow, 2002; Negrine, 2007). For 
this reason, these studies seem to focus on one particular area which has been 
most influenced by these developments, such as election campaigning and 
governing communication skills. Mancini (1999, pp.231) explains that 
‘professionalisation as the trend of globalisation can be understood in relation to 
the result of telecommunication development’. Moreover, Negrine (2007, pp.10) 
points out that professionalisation of election campaigning is ‘a process of 
adaptation of new technologies and new mass media’. Thus, these studies in the 
context of political communication tend to draw more attention to the 
improvement of campaign strategies in the way of the adoption of new campaign 
technology and new media. Naturally, the aim of these studies is to trace the 
differences and continuities in the historical context of election campaigns. 
 
In addition to this, recent researchers tend to be more focused on the growth in 
the use of campaign professionals in the political process, such as highly 
qualified technicians in dealing with the latest technology, media consultants, 
even political consultants, as a following result of the adoption of the 
developments of mass media and campaign technology (Herrnson, 1998; Norris, 
2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; De Verse, 2011). Therefore, they generally 
explain how election campaigns have been changed, and then, present how these 
on-going developments of the electoral environment have led to the alteration of 
party organisation. Herrnson (1998) states that professionalisation of election 
campaign is the increased number of specialised campaign activities conducted 
by campaign professionals. In a similar line, Norris (2000, pp.146) indicates ‘the 
move from amateur to professional campaign is marked by more frequent use of 
specialist consultants, public-relation experts, and fund-raisers’ influencing 
decisions made by candidates or party officers. Plasser and Plasser (2002, pp.344) 
also explain that professionalisation can be found in the phenomenon of ‘the 
cooperation with professional advertising agencies and the inclusion of external 
marketing and communication experts in the strategic planning process’. Table 
2.2 summarises the definition of professionalisation of election campaigning 
through an investigation of the underlying literature explained above.   
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Table 2.2. The definition of professionalisation of election campaigning 
Scholars Definition 
Lilleker and 
Negrine  
(2002, pp.98) 
‘Professionalisation is about the changing nature of political 
campaigns’ 
Mancini  
(1999, pp.231) 
‘Professionalisation as the trend of globalisation can be understood 
in relation to the result of telecommunication development’ 
Negrine 
(2007, pp.10) 
‘A process of adaptation of new technologies and new mass media’  
Herrnson 
(2000, pp.859) 
‘The number of specialised campaign activities performed by 
professional political consultants’ 
Norris 
(2000, pp.146) 
‘The move from amateur to professional campaign was marked by 
more frequent use of specialist consultants, public-relation experts, 
and fund-raisers influencing decision formally made by candidates 
or party officers.’ 
Plasser and 
Plasser  
(2002, pp.344) 
‘The cooperation with professional advertising agencies and the 
inclusion of external marketing and communication experts in the 
strategic planning process’ 
De Verse 
(2011, pp.128) 
‘The increase of campaign personnel, more sophisticated targeting 
of key voters, increased expenditure on publicity, the growing use 
of campaign techniques’ 
 
 
Nowadays, it is assumed that academic scholars all concur with the arguments 
that professionalisation of election campaigning started from the fast-growing 
adoption of new mass media and campaign technology and the increased need 
for campaign professionals, who are good at dealing with mass media and new 
campaign technologies (Norris, 2000), as a following consequence. Accordingly, 
the US campaign seems to be typically considered a highly professionalised one, 
due to a dominant position in performing a sophisticated campaign strategy using 
the latest technology and a well-developed industry of campaign professionals.  
 
Unlike these speculations, Scammell (1998) insists there is no evidence that the 
USA election campaigning has been professionalised. Along with the use of her 
term ‘political folk wisdom’ (pp.10), she explains that US campaign managers 
tend to use their experiences and observations from the previous election 
campaigns as the most important sources in the creation of new campaign 
strategies. Thus, the US election campaign can be defined by commercialism 
rather than professionalism because of a growing tendency of common 
knowledge, the educational training for campaign professionals, and the 
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production of self-conscious campaign practices to export to other countries. She 
argues that the term professionalisation can be interpreted as having predominate 
features such as ‘unique body of campaign knowledge and consummate 
propagandistic skills considered essential to electoral success’ (pp.5), rather than 
just performing high-technological campaign skills. In other words, the central 
argument of professionalisation can be accompanied with a deep consideration of 
the cultural and institutional factors in a given country rather than just applying 
common technical knowledge about campaign strategy. From these perspectives, 
she concludes that US campaigning may be at a low level of professionalisation 
than in other democratic countries. Similarly, some academics insist that the 
process of political democratisation such as constitutional and electoral reform 
can lead a meaningful alteration of political communication including election 
campaigning strategy (Martz, 1990; Rawnsley, 2006).    
 
In addition to this, Gibson and Römmele (2001) point out that previous research 
in the field of professionalisation of election campaigns tends to place too much 
focus on some changes such as voter volatility, political cynicism, and 
technological developments. Consequently, they argue that it has failed in the 
explanation of why each of the political parties has a different style of campaign 
and creates different campaign tactics to mobilise voters, even though they are 
under the same political and media system. Furthermore, election campaigns are 
the process by which political organisations pursue maximum votes as their final 
aim (Farrell, 1996). Given this, Gibson and Römmele insist the term of 
professionalisation can be understood as a concept that leads to the systematic 
reformation of party structure in the use of scientific campaign practices. From 
the same aspect, Negrine (2007) explains that the distinct field of 
professionalisation in political communication is currently seen as the process of 
adaptation by an individual party organisation to make better election 
campaigning in accordance with on-going social transformation and 
technological developments. Thus, the alteration of a party organisation itself as 
a consequence of the process of adaptation of new mass media and campaign 
technology should be considered when the phenomenon of professionalisation is 
examined.  
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Taking all the perspective discussed-above into consideration, there are three 
principal elements in conceptualising the professionalisation of election 
campaigns: 1) ‘party organisation’ as a main agent of campaign management, 2) 
‘campaign professionals’ who are taking a vital role in dealing with new 
campaign practices, and 3) ‘a series of changing processes’ which often occur in 
the course of the adoption and the adaption of new electoral environments. 
Accordingly, professionalisation of election campaigning can be defined for this 
research as a continuous review process by each party to design competitive 
campaigns in response to the alteration of socio-political environments and each 
party’s unceasing efforts to deal with new mass media and campaign technology 
and campaign professionals.  
 
2.2.4. Dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning   
 
As explained above, in order to investigate the evolution of election campaigning 
from the perspective of professionalisation, Gibson and Römmele (2009, p.267-
268) identify four different party activities where professionalisation might 
frequently occur:  
 
‘Firstly, the adoption of new tools (high-tech and computerised) 
and intensification of existing methods (opinion polling, focus 
groups); Secondly, a shift in the overall style of campaigning 
to a more capital-intensive and continuous mode; Thirdly, a 
re-orientation in the relationship with the electorate toward a 
more interactive and individualised engagement; Lastly, the 
re-structuring of power relations between national party and 
local party with an increasing centralisation of power’ (p.267-
268) 
 
In addition, Farrell and Webb (2000) explain that the professionalisation of 
election campaigning could be divided into three different dimensions: technical 
development, resource development, and thematic development. According to 
them, technical development is directly connected to the use of mass media and 
new campaign technology such as telemarketing, e-newsletters and so on. On the 
other hand, resource development is related to the alteration of party organisation 
itself. Thus, it generally includes the use of campaign professionals, the 
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campaign agencies that could help out political parties, the relationship between 
these and the party organisation and feedback from voters. Lastly, thematic 
development is associated with campaign events and campaign communication 
strategy.  
 
Based on the arguments about professionalisation of election campaigning, the 
topic can be divided into two different dimensions: the external and internal 
alteration. At first, as seen in Table 2.3, the external dimension of 
professionalisation is about all results of the alterations of election campaigning 
in dealing with new campaign practices conducted by political parties. Thus, it 
consists of three different features: the alteration of use of new mass media and 
campaign technology, the alteration of campaign activities through the 
intensification of new and existing campaign practices, and the alteration of 
campaign style, whether new campaign styles caused by new mass media and 
campaign technology developments would lead to a capital-intensive style. 
Therefore, these features will help examine how each of the political parties 
accommodates the new campaign practices, and how they have improved their 
campaign style.  
 
In contrast, the internal dimension of professionalisation focuses on the results of 
the alteration of party organisation caused by the influx of campaign 
professionals. In particular, it is argued in this research that professionalisation of 
election campaigning should be dealt with at party organisation level itself 
because every election campaign is based on party organisation and on the use of 
internal resources, even if their strategies change according to the current 
environment and their current needs, inward or outward. Accordingly, the party, 
whether or not it is weaker than before, still exists at the centre of the political 
process, and it has to adapt to changing circumstance (Farrell and Webb 2000). 
As a result, the internal dimensions is composed of three features: the influx of 
campaign professionals, the alteration of the relationship between campaign 
professionals and political parties from ambiguous to conflict such as the 
alteration of the role of campaign staffers inside the party organisation, and the 
36 
 
 
centralisation of political parties as providing campaign organisation caused by 
the efficient management of campaign practices.  
 
Table 2.3. The dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning
1 
The Dimensions Main features 
External dimension Professionalisation of 
campaign communication 
1) Use of new mass media and 
campaign technology 
 
2) The alteration of campaigning 
activities through the intensification 
of new and existing campaign 
practices 
 
3) The alteration of campaign style 
from labour-intensive to capital-
intensive 
Internal dimension Professionalisation of 
party organisation 
1) The influx of campaign 
professionals 
 
2) The alteration of the relationship 
between campaign professionals and 
political parties from ambiguous to 
conflict 
 
3) The centralisation of party 
organisation caused by the efficient 
management of campaign practices  
1 The analysis tool to be used for this research has been modified from previous professionalised election 
campaign research (Norris, 2000; Mancini, 1999; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; 
Mair and his colleagues, 2004; Negrine and his colleagues, 2007; Gibson and Römmele, 2009). 
 
Therefore, this is about how much campaign managers, especially the group of 
campaign managers inside party organisations such as politicians and paid 
internal party campaign staffers, can reach a high level of competence in dealing 
with election campaign practices. For instance, in the past, only campaign 
professionals were fully aware of the importance of the establishment of an 
efficient campaign strategy using mass media and campaign technology. Thus, 
all roles in relation to publicity, such as how to produce campaign issues as well 
as how to transmit them to voters, and what the public’s concerns or interests are, 
were only fulfilled by campaign professionals in the past. Naturally, the only 
thing that politicians could do at that time was to establish firm party policies. 
Therefore, it meant that the role between campaign managers and campaign 
professionals was generally separate, and they might not need to know each 
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other’s areas. However, contemporary society forces the internal party campaign 
staffers to be external campaign professionals more and more. Naturally, 
campaign managers inside party organisations would try to learn about how to 
deal with mass media.  
 
2.3. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning 
 
Drawing on the broad spectrum of academic observers’ arguments about the 
professionalisation of election campaigning, the proliferation of technological 
developments such as mass media and campaign technology is a decisive factor 
of professionalisation of election campaign (Mancini 1999). Accordingly, these 
studies are focused on the alteration of campaign strategies by way of the 
adoption of new campaign technology and new media. As Farrell (1996) points 
out technology development has had an influence on the changes in election 
campaigns because technology development can provide new campaign tools for 
the intensification of old campaign practices.  
 
As another example, Scarrow (2004) points out that German parties have 
continued to centralise and professionalise their campaign practices. In particular, 
he explains that the growth of political parties’ expenditure and the use of new 
campaign technology have led to the arrival of the professionalisation of election 
campaigning. Naturally, these circumstances in Germany have allowed parties to 
increase their employment of campaign professionals and the level of the party’s 
reliance on them has become intensified. As a result, he insists that the power of 
campaign professionals has been expanded at all levels of campaign operations.  
 
Moreover, Strachan (2003) explains that the arrival of telecommunication tools 
including radio, television, computers and the Internet can give candidates 
‘efficient ways of communicating across time and space’ (pp.4). Thus, Strachan 
argues that the main difference between these new tools and old practices in 
election campaign is the difference of effectiveness in dealing with new 
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campaign practices because new campaign practices require the mastery of new 
skills.  
 
In addition to this, academics in the field of election campaigning point out that 
election campaigning tends to change from labour-intensive campaigning to 
capital-intensive because of increased expense in dealing with new media, new 
campaign technologies and the employment of campaign professionals (Farrell, 
1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Wlezien, 2002). To be specific, Farrell (1996) 
explains that election campaigning is divided into two different stages: labour-
intensive campaigning and capital-intensive campaigning. That is, the style of 
labour-intensive campaigning is the time for the reliance on mass public meetings, 
volunteers, and whistle tours whilst the style of capital-intensive campaigning 
leads to ‘television-centred, highly specialised and money- and message-driven 
form of campaigning’ (Plasser and Plasser, 2002, pp.84). Thus, modern election 
campaigning seems to be towards capital-intensive campaigning due to increased 
use of mass media and high-tech campaign techniques.  
 
2.4. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning  
 
2.4.1. The definition of campaign professionals in election campaigning  
 
There are some notable critiques of ‘professionalisation’ such as a weakening of 
party identification and party decline caused by the increased use of new 
communication technology and the fast growth of campaign professional power 
(Nord, 2006). Amongst those critiques, the most vigorous academic discussion is 
that the definition and scope of campaign professionals remains unclear; that is, 
many have raised questions about who can be called campaign professionals 
(Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). This may be directly related to the matter of 
whether the previous campaigners, who worked in the time when traditional 
campaigns were prevalent, were called campaign professionals, and how they 
can be defined in the context of the current research typologies. Perhaps this is 
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due to the ambiguous definition of campaign professionals and its injurious use 
without providing any definite descriptions. In effect, many people point out that 
the ambiguous understanding of who campaign professionals are and what they 
actually do in election campaigns has added to the confusion in conceptualising 
the concept of professionalisation in election campaigns (Sabato, 1981; Medvic, 
2003). Therefore, it is worth clarifying here the identity of campaign 
professionals and the range of their activities in the election campaign process. 
 
The successful definition of the concept of ‘campaign professionals’ is not an 
easy task: it has been used in many different fields such as medicine, education, 
and engineering. Especially in these fields, the word ‘professionals’ as a 
sociological term is adopted in general in order to refer to a group of people who 
have prestige and power because of specialised skills, which are authorised by 
qualified officers such as doctors and lawyers (Succi and Walter, 1999). In 
addition, Buttery and Wright (1997, pp.8) defined professionals as a group of 
people ‘who are undoubtedly recognising their ‘professionals’ adherence to a 
code of ethics designed to place’. From these points of view, it may make sense 
to say that professionals are a specialised group of people who have exceptional 
ability in relation to one particular area. Accordingly, if this is applied to the 
election campaign field, campaign professionals are the people who have the 
ability to deal with sophisticated techniques that can be applied to campaign 
activities such as surveying, the production of political adverts, telemarketing 
services, developing campaign messages, political advices, and so on. Although 
there still remains a sensitive issue of how their skills are authorised without any 
certification, it is clear that they are people who provide specialised skills to 
parties or candidates for payment (Medvic, 2003). Therefore, workers inside 
parties may not be called campaign professionals in the context of Medvic’s 
definition.  
 
On the other hand, the definition of campaign professionals has been used in a 
slightly different way in election campaigning studies. In the earliest studies, 
campaign professionals in election campaigning are defined simply as the people 
who have specialised skills and experience in dealing with mass communication 
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(Kelley, 1956). Following this, they are also defined as ‘a specialist in political 
communication’ (Napolitan, 1972, pp.2) or ‘campaign professionals’ who serve 
campaign activities, such as providing general advice, polling services, direct 
mailing, and so forth, to candidates or political parties or any kind of political 
organisation (Sabato, 1981). However, these concepts cannot avoid criticism due 
to the reason that the scope of campaign professionals tends to be limited. Even 
though the latter definition seems to be much closer to reality and more specific 
in defining the campaign professionals’ role, these definitions primarily focus on 
political consultants’ activities.  
 
More detailed studies have recently taken place, such as Johnson’s (2001), which 
compared the meaning of amateur and campaign professionals in the field of 
election campaigning. First of all, he defined amateurs as a group of people who 
have personal ties with candidates or political parties. Thus, they might 
individually work for political parties or candidates and be rewarded after their 
candidates are elected. Thus, almost of them have their own private job and they 
tend to work for the political party on a part-time basis. Conversely, the group of 
campaign professionals surely differs. He points out the people in the group of 
campaign professionals have objective perspectives about candidates and 
election campaigning itself. Accordingly, their final aim is to make their 
candidates or political parties win. Even though his research contributes a good 
answer to the difference between amateurs and campaign professionals in 
election campaigning and gives an attention to a consideration of the identity of 
campaign professionals, it also tends to simplify the classification of their role.  
 
In a more developed study, Plasser and Plasser (2002) indicate that there are two 
different types of campaign professionals: party campaigners and external 
consultants. The former are people who are engaged in party organisations and 
are paid by the political parties themselves. Conversely, the latter group literally 
means people who are paid by the parties as well as having an individual income 
from outside the political party. Thus, the authors argue that external consultants 
can be defined as ‘the people who act as principals or senior partners of their 
respective firms, or campaign experts working for advertising, marketing or 
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survey research companies’ (pp.9). 
 
Medvic (2003) developed these definitions into a more specific one. He argues 
that the definitions in previous research were still vague in explaining about who 
can be included into professional groups. He insists that research (Kolodny and 
Logan, 1998; Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Plasser, 2001) based on the membership 
lists of particular political consulting groups like the International Association of 
Political Consultants (IAPC) or published lists from the magazine of ‘Campaign 
and Elections’ results in the possibility that other people, who work as political 
consultants but do not want to pay an expensive membership fee, could be 
excluded from their research. Moreover, it is possible to confine research to the 
people who participated in countries where the industry of political consultancy 
is prominent, such as the USA or Western Europe. In addition to this, he argues 
that there are many non-consultants such as academics and internal party 
campaign staffers. Thus, he suggests the method of how to define campaign 
professionals has to be changed, with the inclusion of more specific criteria. 
Firstly, campaign professionals in election campaigns are people who are paid by 
political parties in order to serve campaign skills and provide tactics to promote 
the electorate. Secondly, they must be involved in more than two election 
campaigns, but it does not matter which kind of election (local, general or 
presidential elections). Moreover, he explains that academic advisors who are 
paid by political parties may be included in the category of campaign 
professionals. However, he argues that academic advisors are not campaign 
professionals if they are friends of candidates who are running a campaigning. 
Thus, he insists that those advisors who work for several candidates can be called 
campaign professionals. Finally, the experience of campaign professionals 
regarding election campaigning is also important. Thus, he suggests that those 
who can be called campaign professionals should have worked at least one 
election cycle. From his perspective, campaign professionals can be defined as 
the people who are paid by political parties for their specialised campaign skills 
and are - the people with wide experience regarding election campaigns.  
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2.4.2. The relationship between campaign professionals and political parties 
 
There has been much research focusing on the discussion about the relationship 
between political parties and campaign professionals, with many cases especially 
in the USA where the industry of political consultancy has been fully developed 
(Kolodny and Logan, 1998; Thurber and Nelson, 2000; Farrell, Kolodny, and 
Medvic, 2001; Plasser, 2001). In particular, since the ever-changing electoral 
environment and the increase of unexpected electoral factors such as unstable 
voter behaviour and of the importance of campaign roles, many academics have 
paid attention to the matter of how political parties have responded to these 
changes (Mair, Müller, and Plasser, 2004). In general, these academic interests 
are largely divided into two aspects: positive and negative. First of all, scholars 
in the positive line indicate that campaign professionals can help parties or 
candidates in conducting campaign activities efficiently as well as effectively 
through their specialised skills (Kolodny, 2000). Indeed, the relationship between 
the two groups is described as a cooperative one (relationship) because the 
campaign professionals assist with some campaign activities parties or 
candidates are unable to carry out (Luntz 1988; Henson, 1994; Kolodny and 
Logan, 1998). Conversely, scholars who advocate a negative effect argue that the 
power of political parties has seriously weakened due to the influx of campaign 
professionals into party organisations and the growth of their power (Thurber and 
Nelson, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Kolodny and Dulio, 2003; Mair, Müller 
and Plasser, 2004). Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the current political 
parties have continued to need the help of campaign professionals, whether it is 
in a negative or positive way, in order to map out a creative as well as a 
competitive campaign strategy, although the level of the use of these people 
differs according to different systems in the country of origin. 
 
Accordingly, a number of studies have suggested various perspectives of how to 
examine the relationship between external campaign professionals and parties. 
Kolodny and Logan (1998) explain that the relationship can be classified into 
two perspectives: ‘allied view’ and ‘adversarial view’. First of all, in the case of 
the ‘allied view’, political parties, in general, employ campaign professionals and 
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have total control over all campaign activities performed by them. Naturally, 
campaign professionals’ value and respect the aim of the specific political parties. 
Parties have an important role to play in mediating opinion between candidates 
and campaign professionals. Thus, Kolodny and Dulio (2003) noted that ‘in the 
allied view, political consultants may be more properly viewed as part of the 
party ‘network’, that is, as party-connected actors who are surrogates for the 
larger permanent staffers that the parties once had’ (pp.733).  
 
On the other hand, campaign professionals concentrate on campaign activities 
that parties cannot deliver in the aspect of ‘adversarial view’. From this 
perspective, campaign professionals examine the value of their products 
(candidates) and the electoral market, and consider how to make their products 
appeal to the voters. Thus, Kolodny and Dulio contend that the original aim of 
campaign professionals of this type is to win as many elections as they can, and 
then they believe that the number of successes will be directly related to the 
increase in the number of clients. That is, this view is similar to the perspective 
of ‘exchange process’ as argued by Plasser (2001) in examining the relationship 
between external campaign professionals and parties. Overall, it can be inferred 
that, from the allied view, parties may see external campaign professionals as a 
subordinate partnership whilst the partnership between external campaign 
professionals and parties maintains an independent relationship looked at from 
the adversarial view. 
 
There is another interesting study focused on in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s 
research (2001, p.12-15) about the relationship between political parties and 
political consultants in the USA. They indicate that the relationship can be 
divided according to ‘the background of political consultants and the type of 
clients that consultants are taking on’ (pp.13). They emphasise the importance of 
technical skills in managing modern campaign practices, and raise a question of 
how parties have continued to improve and develop their skills, especially in the 
digital age. As argued by Kolodny (1998), parties can be arranged according to 
two options: firstly, they serve some campaign activities that candidates want 
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through the improvement of their own skills, or, secondly, they have to rely on 
campaign professionals to conduct modern activities instead of performing these 
themselves. Whatever it is, there is no doubt that their relationship has been 
essential to cope with the on-going electoral environment.  
 
Therefore, on the basis of the arguments in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic (2001), 
the background of political consultants is divided into four types (see Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1. Different type of political consultants
1 
 
1 
Source: Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic (2001, pp.14) 
 
As seen in Figure 2.1, the first type is the group of strategists. They are described 
as a new form of political consultant and ‘take on commercial clients for 
government affairs work such as lobbying’ (pp.13). However, it is expected that 
this type may only appear in the US, where the industry of political consultancy 
is firmly developed or its influence is strong. The second type is called traditional 
politicos. Political consultants who are in this group form their own companies 
after leaving their job in government and political parties. Thus, these people 
have some knowledge about political issues and party matters as well as the 
necessary know-how regarding the political process. The type of vendor in the 
45 
 
 
third group is the group of political consultants who provide technical skills to 
political organisations, such as web-designing and computer software companies. 
Naturally, they do not have any political background and concentrate on using 
cutting-edge technology to help the party to become visible to voters. Finally, 
there are the marketers. They come from non-government areas and mainly work 
for non-government clients. Therefore, this type of political consultant could 
keep a distance from political parties and maintain an independent position far 
away from them. If these types of political consultants are applied to Kolodny 
and Logan’s typology (1998), political consultants who are involved in the 
second type, known as ‘tradition politicos’, can be understood in the context of 
the allied view as they could highly possibly be to considered as part of the party 
network and would respect the purpose of political parties. In this sense, the 
‘vendors and marketers’ groups can also be directly related to the adversarial 
view as they have more independence in working with parties and their job 
provides their specialised skills to parties.  
 
However, Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s typology (2001) will not fit every 
country especially considering important points that this research focuses on 
regarding the US case, where the industry of political consultancy has developed 
and political consultants vigorously work for any political parties’ activities such 
as fundraisings and lobbying, not just for election campaign activities. 
Nonetheless, taking the background of campaign professionals into account is 
important in investigating some questions of how they come to be involved in the 
political process, and, further, of how they keep their relationship in the historical 
context (Karlsen, 2009). For instance, if campaign professionals worked for 
certain parties and then, set up independent political consulting companies after 
leaving the parties, it is highly likely that they would end up working for the 
party in which they were based. However, this is just only an expectation, and, 
we cannot be sure whether those campaign professionals would really work for 
the party they left. Therefore, this means that those campaign professionals are 
hard to be described in terms of Kolodny and Logan’s research (1998). Therefore, 
the inference about the relationship between political parties and campaign 
professionals discovered from investigating the background of campaign 
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professionals is necessary in order to understand how they have built on their 
relationship, what type of campaign professionals parties prefer, and, furthermore, 
to understand how their relationship has changed in terms of historical context.  
 
2.4.3. The alteration of political parties as campaign organisations: 
centralisation  
 
It is noticeable that election campaigns cannot be designed without large-scale 
support from party organisations and their extensive internal resources (Herrnson, 
1988). Although the extent to which the degree of the power of party 
organisations is somehow different according to their own system – for instance, 
there will be a difference between countries where there are candidate-centralised 
electoral systems, like the USA, and countries which are party-centralised, like 
the UK. Many academics agree on the phenomenon of a weakening of the power 
of political parties, further on party decline (Thurber and Nelson, 2000). The 
central argument of those studies is that the current negative changes of electoral 
environment, such as the decline of party identification and the increase of party 
apathy, as well as a high reliance on external campaign professionals rather than 
on party organisation, have raised a question about the loss of the power and 
authority of party organisations compared to the past (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). 
Especially, Plasser (2001) argued that the phenomenon of the decline of party 
organisations has been raised in countries which have candidate-centred 
democratic systems, like the USA. On the other hand, other researchers insist 
that parties always consider how they deal with such rapid electoral changes as 
one of the main agents of political process, although it is true that their power has 
weakened as a negative result of media-centralised democratic systems. 
Therefore, this has led to the evolution of party organisation rather than the 
decline of the party, if anything (Cotter and Bibby, 1980; Paterson, 1996; Farrell 
and Webb, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Kolodny and Dulio, 2003). 
 
In particular, Kolodny (2000, p.112-116) argued that the academic debates 
relating to the theory of party decline come from the lack of understanding about 
the role of party organisation. To give a clear classification, she explains that 
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party role can be divided into three different perspectives: ‘party in electorate, 
party in government, and party as organisation’. Apart from the concept of ‘party 
in government’, the other two concepts are deeply connected to the role of parties 
as campaign organisations. First of all, in the case of the concept of ‘party in the 
electorate’, she explained that there is no doubt that parties devote much of their 
time to courting voters’ attention through various kinds of publicity methods, 
even if the rate of party identification has been increasingly down. Moreover, the 
extensive use of campaign professionals that is pointed out as a decisive factor of 
party decline does not actually affect the alteration of party organisation and 
party ideology. This is because almost all of those campaign professionals are 
generally unknown to the public, except for some campaign professionals who 
have had a high profile. Moreover, their role is not for a long-term period, but for 
a short-term period, especially in election time. Therefore, she argued that it 
would be more beneficial if campaign professionals engage in the process of 
political coalition between parties rather than a matter of how long they have 
been together with candidates or party organisation. In effect, it is hard to find a 
case in which campaign professionals or political consultants can engage and 
express their opinions regarding the intrinsic matter of politics such as the 
establishment of political policy, except in the USA where the industry of 
political consultancy and its education system has been highly developed. Thus, 
it may be said that the extensive use of campaign professionals will not have too 
much influence on the alteration or the role of party organisation if they act as 
advisers or assistants to give useful information to the candidates and political 
parties using their specialised skills.  
 
As for the second concept, this is ‘party as organisation’, which emphasises the 
nature of party organisation itself. Aldrich’s study (1995) insists that parties’ 
executives tend to strengthen their solidarity (or cohesiveness) to approach a 
fixed purpose such as a campaign task. However, Aldrich argued that party 
organisation functions tend to be more like service providers than resource 
providers. The biggest difference between the two concepts concern how much a 
party organisation has power in designing campaign activities. To be specific, in 
the view of service provider, candidates considered party organisation as a 
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subordinate partnership to them because they consider party organisation as an 
institution, which provides services they want; whereas, from the perspective of 
resource providers, party organisations have an independent power and provide 
efficient services for candidate. However, Kolodny argues that party 
organisations seem to provide a transactional service (Herrnson, 1988) by 
matching candidate to resource providers. In addition to this, she insists that the 
importance of parties being able to choose their function from two options: 
developing their skills using new campaign techniques or maintaining their 
original functions such as mobilisation of the voters and management of party 
members. From her argument, it can be assumed that the role or the function of 
party organisation can be changed according to their own choice rather than by 
the increased use of campaign professionals. Moreover, it can be inferred that the 
party organisations have continued to fit their functions into an ever-changing 
electoral environment rather than losing their power. Therefore, the alterations of 
campaign activities by political parties can be seen as part of their endeavour to 
respond to ever-changing political environments (Katz, Müller & Plasser, 2004) 
under the assumption that parties continually review and reformulate their 
practices to meet different circumstances (Katz and Mair, 1995). Overall, it can 
be seen that the party, whether or not it is weaker than before, still exists at the 
centre of the political process, and it has to adapt to changing circumstances.  
 
2.5. Summary of this chapter 
 
This section has tried to conceptualise the concept of the professionalisation of 
election campaigning through a review of previous academic studies. The section 
first provided an overview of previous election campaigning studies and 
introduced five important features for examining historical trends in election 
campaigning. These features were: the influence of mass media, the increased 
use of sophisticated campaign techniques and scientific methods, the growth in 
use of campaign professionals, the adoption of marketing concepts into election 
campaign strategy, and the emergence of personalised and permanent 
campaigning.  
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Secondly, the section discussed the concepts of Americanisation and 
Modernisation, which are commonly introduced into studies on the evolution of 
election campaigning to highlight differences with professionalisation theory. 
Americanisation was defined as a specialised term to refer to the increased use of 
scientific methods and the adoption of American campaign techniques in a 
globalised form; Modernisation was defined as a natural result of election 
campaigning caused by social and technical developments.  
 
Based on these definitions, the section thirdly tried to provide more detailed 
information to aid the conceptualisation of professionalisation theory. To this end, 
the different arguments about the professionalisation of election campaigning 
were introduced; professionalisation of election campaigning was then defined as 
an on-going process undertaken by political parties to review their old campaign 
practices and develop new, improved ones in accordance with the ever-changing 
electoral environment. In addition to this, this research emphasises that 
institutional and cultural factors could affect professionalisation of election 
campaigning in a given country. Therefore, it means that the level of 
professionalisation of election campaigning would differ between country and 
even party. From these perspectives, two different dimensions to the 
professionalisation of election campaigning were also introduced – external and 
internal. In brief, the external dimension focuses on professionalisation of 
campaign communication, for example in terms of the use of mass media and 
campaign technology, the alteration of campaign activities, and overall 
alterations in campaign strategy; the internal dimension concentrates on 
professionalisation of party organisation, for example in terms of centralisation, 
or the influx of campaign professionals and the relationship between these 
professionals and parties.  
 
Finally, this section gave more detailed information about the main features of 
the two different dimensions analysed for this research. The section explained 
why the main features chosen for this study, and outlined different academic 
perspectives in defining campaign professionals. Two relevant studies on the 
relationship between parties and campaign professionals were introduced – 
Kolodny and Logan (1998) and Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic (2001).  
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Chapter 3 Case study: South Korea 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
As touched upon earlier in Chapter 2, many academic observers agree that the 
alteration of election campaign style has been as a natural consequence of 
modernised society (Farrell, 1996; Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). 
Therefore, they explain that it is deeply connected to the level of societal changes 
and electoral environments. Even though there are somehow different 
perspectives on the understanding of the evolution of election campaigning, the 
central points of these views clearly show that the style of election campaigning 
has altered in response to the changes of electoral environments in a given 
country (Webzine, 2010). Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to give 
information about the case of South Korea before discussing the phenomenon of 
the professionalisation of election campaigns in the context of professionalisation 
theory.   
 
All kinds of changes in political communication occur based on the structural 
systems each country has such as its political system, media system, electoral 
system and so forth (Farrell, 1996; Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In particular, the 
field of election campaigning is largely influenced by these systems as well as by 
campaign regulations (Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Webzine, 2010; De Verse, 
2010). It may be true that in some countries where campaign regulations are 
loose, such as the USA, it could be possible to mobilise and to develop their 
campaign practices more easily than in others which are restricted by electoral 
law, such as South Korea and Japan. Therefore, it is objectively important to 
understand those political and media systems and campaign regulations at first 
before exploring the research interests of this study. Accordingly, this chapter 
will attempt to give a detailed explanation about: 1) political/electoral system, 2) 
media system, and 3) campaign regulations in South Korea.  
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3.2. Political system 
 
3.2.1. The history of democratisation in South Korea: Military dictatorships 
until 1987 
 
The history of democratisation in South Korea has lasted over 25 years since the 
end of the military dictatorships in 1987, which began after the Second World 
War in 1945. As a result, the Korean Peninsula gained independence from Japan 
and was placed under a four-power trusteeship – the USA, UK, China and the 
Soviet Union – on the 28th of December 1945. Citing demilitarisation as the main 
reason, the USA arrived in Seoul and the Soviet Union in Pyongyang. The Soviet 
Union insisted that political parties and any kinds of political organisation in 
Korea against the agreement of trusteeship in the Korean Peninsula should be 
excluded from the establishment of interim government in the country. However, 
the USA adhered to the opposite opinion on it because they had to occupy the 
Korean Peninsula to keep the Soviet Union in check
4
. Consequently, their 
negotiations broke down in 1947 and this led to the division of Korea into north 
and south based on the 38
th
 parallel. Afterwards, the USA decided to bring this 
matter to the attention of the UN. The UN General Assembly announced a 
general election in the Korean Peninsula to establish a unified government in 
February 1948. However, the Soviet Union, which had insisted on unification 
through communisation, rejected it and eventually the Korean peninsula was 
divided into two different independent countries, The Republic of Korea, known 
as South Korea, and The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, known as 
North Korea.  
                                            
4
 According to McCune (1947), it was expected that military occupation would not last for a long 
period when Korea was occupied by Russian and United States troops. However, this was 
delayed because it took a long time to establish governing commissions. While Russian and the 
United States discussed the plan about the establishment of governing commissions for Korea, 
they agreed two premises: ‘1) the American and Russian commands in Korea would work 
together for the ultimate independence of Korea, and 2) the Korean people would accept the 
imposed plan and that their leaders would cooperate with one another and with the occupying 
power’ (p6). However, they did not cooperate and Koreans, especially South Koreans, 
desperately objected because they wanted to establish an independent government.   
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Following intervention by the UNTCOK
5
 (the United Nations Temporary 
Commission on Korea), South Korea held a general election on the 10
th
 of May, 
1948 and Rhee Seung-man from the JaYu party was elected as the Chairman of 
the National Assembly later that month, in respect of his previous political career 
later. The Republic of Korea was established on the 15
th
 of August in the same 
year. At that time, Rhee Sung-man and Rhee Si-young, who was an 
independence activist, were elected as president and vice president respectively. 
Since then South Korea has been led by three dictators –Rhee Sung-man (1948-
1960), Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), and Jeon Doo-hwan (1980-1987) - until the 
establishment of a new era of the 6
th
 Republic on the 25
th
 of February 1988. Even 
though there were around 50 political parties from 1945 to 1948, the USA, as 
occupying power during this time, instructed all parties to inform them of their 
property and membership. In consequence, the number of political parties 
dropped suddenly from 50 to around 14 at this point. Afterwards, the few 
surviving parties such as the HanMin Party and JaYue Party tended to depend on 
the political and social elite - except for one party, called the GongSan Party, 
which took the form of a mass party in Weber’s(1880-1960) typology, growing 
out of the labour movement to recover workers’ rights (Sim and Kim, 2006). 
 
The main features of the era of the 1
st
 Republic, led by Rhee Sung-man, were the 
cultural split across the country between urban and rural areas and the political 
spilt between the democratic and the anti-democratic forces (Kim, 2008). 
According to Kim (2008), the influence of American methods of education and 
the diffusion of USA culture into South Korea awakened a yearning for liberal 
democracy around the urban areas and it eventually caused an imbalance in the 
culture. In addition to this, Sung-man tried to retain his political power over 15 
years through amendments to constitutional law and political stratagems. As a 
result, the voice of instigation against his dictatorship rose from the people, 
especially those living in urban areas. On the other hand, these societal changes 
and the people’s agitation led to the launch of a new Democratic Party, known as 
the MinJoo Party, in 1955. Although touted as an alternative, in fact, they turned 
                                            
5
 UNTCOK was organised to watch and to manage free and fair elections in Korea after the 
Second World War in 1945.  
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out to be exactly the same as other political groups who just wanted to acquire 
political power after the natural death of Rhee Sung-man in 1965. Therefore, the 
establishment of the MinJoo Party was an epoch-making contribution to the 
history of political parties because the political structure of democratic verse 
anti-democratic was newly formed in South Korea; however, it is true that the 
struggle of the MinJoo Party against the Jay Party – who were supported by the 
dictatorship of Rhee Syng-man - was inadequate at that time because their 
political activities were passive (Kim, 2008). In 1960, in order to extend their 
political power, Jayue Party fabricated an election to elect Rhee Sung-man’s 
supporter Rhee Gi-boung as the next vice-president. This led to the organisation 
of a democratic revolution, known as the ‘April 19 Revolution’, which was 
orchestrated by students in order to annul the election result. This eventually led 
to the end of the era of the 1
st
 Republic in South Korea.  
 
The 2
nd
 Republic started in June 1960 and the political system changed from a 
presidential system to a parliamentary system to prevent the return of a 
dictatorship. However, these efforts ended up collapsing because of the 5.16 
military coup d'état in 1961. It was led by General Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), 
a military commander, who decided to take over the government because of 
dissatisfaction at his slow promotion and the corruption of senior officers in his 
military group. As a result, the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Republic eras were born, which lasted 
for over 10 years, until the assassination of General Park Chung-hee on the 26
th
 
of October 1979. 
 
Great agricultural policies and the image of General Park Chung-hee as the ‘son 
of a farmer’ gave strong support to the MinJoo GangHwa Party, which was led 
by him. However, as the major industry altered quickly from agriculture to light 
industry because of the industrialisation in South Korea, they seemed to lose 
their supporters gradually (Kim, 2008). As an alternative, the MinJoo GangHwa-
Party started to devote themselves to reviving particular areas of the economy 
especially in Gyeong-Sang Province - which is in the south-east part of South 
Korea, as well as being the hometown of General Park Chung-hee - rather than in 
Jeolla Province, which is in the western part of South Korea. As a result, the 
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imbalance of economic development between the two provinces led to serious 
regionalism and it was the beginning of the regionalism of politics in South 
Korea (Kim, 2008).  
 
After the death of General Park Chung-hee in 1965, Choi Kyu-hwa was chosen 
as his successor. Then Chun Doo-hwan seized political power on the 12
th
 of 
December 1979. However, the people and the opposition parties criticised the 
morality and the quality of President Chun, who was elected by indirect election, 
and it resulted in the declaration of democratisation on the 29
th
 of Jun 1987, 
known as the 6.29 declaration of democratisation
6
. It was announced by Roh 
Tae-woo, as a candidate of the Minjoo Justice Party, and the content was about 
an acceptance of the system of direct election of the President in the 1987 (13
th
) 
presidential election. However, the procedure for its agreement was not led by 
the public but by the political elites, to put out conflicts in civil society before the 
1988 Olympic Games. In addition, political parties had to reach an agreement in 
a short period of time due to the intervention of the USA (Kim, 2008). 
 
From a historical perspective, the 6.29 declaration of democratisation in 1987 is 
understood as an important event, transferring the role of the political sphere 
from the conflicts between civic society and government to the conflicts between 
political elites (Kim, 2008). Besides, the collapse of a unified MinJoo Party, a 
party organisation whose members had democratic inclinations, was to imply a 
failure of the 1987 presidential election. Since then, Korean parties have been 
established according to three political elites - ‘Kim’ Jong-phil, ‘Kim’ Young-
sam and ‘Kim’ Dae-joong - based on their hometown. 
 
                                            
6
 Saxer (2003, p49) points out a total of eight points of importance with regard to the 6.29 
declaration of democratisation: ‘(1) speedy constitutional revision through agreement between 
opposition and ruling camps, leading to direct presidential elections before February 1988; (2) 
revision of laws to guarantee free and fair presidential elections; (3) amnesty for Kim Daejung 
and restoration of his civil rights, and all political prisoners, except those charged with violent 
crimes, to be released; (4) guaranteed respect for human rights; (5) a free press, including 
allowing newspapers to base correspondents in provincial cities, and a withdrawal or revision of 
the Basic Press Law; (6) the institution of local autonomy, with principles of independence and 
self-reliance guaranteed for all levels of society; (7) guarantees that political parties could carry 
out legal activities in an unfettered way, and the fostering of a political climate in which dialogue 
and compromise prevail; and (8) a nationwide campaign against violent crime and corruption’. 
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3.2.2. The history of political parties and political regionalism  
 
Korean politics is characterised by frequent political coalitions between parties, 
and the formation of new parties, according to their political interests. Since the 
progress of democratisation in 1987, several new parties have been formed, often 
out of the remains of older parties. 1987 also saw the beginning of what has been 
called the golden age of the three Kims: ‘Kim’ Jong-phil, ‘Kim’ Young-sam and 
‘Kim’ Dae-joong, who maintained political hegemony and powerful leadership 
(Kang, 2009; Shim and Kim, 2005; Shim, 2004).  
 
Since then, Korean parties have firmly established the current political party 
structure with these three politicians as the central figures and this has 
consequently caused the intensification of regionalism of politics in Korea. 
Strong regionalism in the actions of voters gave the Grand National Party (GNP) 
the opportunity to rule for a prolonged period of 40 years, starting from the 
previous republic era. In 1997, the GNP caused an historical regime change in 
that year’s presidential elections. In addition to this, such regionalism of politics 
has led to an imbalance in regional development: in the past, most of the rich 
classes resided in the Gyeong-sang province, the south-east part of Korea, while 
the middle-lower class lived in Jeolla province, in the west. Inevitably, such 
economic imbalances have influenced the political system, as well as deflecting 
voting preferences towards one party, the GNP. Furthermore, Gyeong-sang 
province holds a more dominant position than Jeolla province in the total number 
of voters due to its size, and this might be one of the additional reasons for 
prolonged GNP rule, as seen in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1. The number of voters in two regions in South Korea 
1
 
 The 1997 (15
th
) 
presidential election 
The 2002 (16
th
) 
presidential election 
The 2007 (17
th
) 
presidential election 
Gyeongsang 
province 
26.2 %
2
 25.4% 24.5% 
Jeolla province 11.7% 11.1% 10.5% 
1 Sources: KNEC (1998, 2003 and 2008a) 
2 Each percentage is calculated on the total size of vote divided by the number of actual local electoral vote.  
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Even though it is impossible to say that all voters in the same district support the 
same party, the majority tend to vote for one particular party. This phenomenon 
has been confirmed several times, as witnessed by the outcomes of presidential 
elections (Horiuchi and Lee, 2008). As seen in Table 3.2, for instance, in the 
1997 presidential election, candidate Lee Hoi-change of the GNP garnered an 
average of over 50% of the vote from Gyeong-sang Province whereas his vote 
from Jeolla Province was just over 5%. Conversely, Kim Dae-Joong as the 
candidate of the DNP incredibly received over 90% of the vote from Jeolla 
Province even though he just gathered below 5% of the Gyeong-sang Province 
vote. The outcomes of the 2002 and the 2007 presidential elections showed 
similar results for the parties’ candidates and therefore political regionalism is 
considered as the most important factor for parties when managing election 
campaign strategy (Kim, Choi and Cho, 2008). 
 
Table 3.2. Vote share of each candidate of the GNP and DP
1
 
Year The candidate name 
Gyeong-sang Province Jeolla Province 
Pusan
2 
Daegu
2 
Other Kwangju
2 
Other 
1997 
Hoi-chang, Lee 
(GNP) 
53.3% 72.6% 57.1% 1.7% 3.8% 
Dae-joong, Kim 
(DP) 
15.2% 12.5% 12.3% 97.2% 93.4% 
2002 
Hoi-chang, Lee 
(GNP) 
66.7% 77.8% 69.2% 3.6% 5.3% 
Mu-hyun, Rho 
(DP) 
29.9% 18.7% 24.1% 95.2% 91.4% 
2007 
Myung-bak, Lee 
(GNP) 
57.9% 69.4% 62.8% 8.6% 9.0% 
Dong-yeong, Jeong 
(DP) 
13.5% 6.0% 7.5% 79.8% 79.5% 
1 Source: KNEC (1998, 2003 and 2008a) 
2 Gyeong-sang Province and Jeolla Province are largely divided into two parts, north and south respectively. 
To give more details, Gyeong-Sang Province has three metropolitan cities, Pusan, Daegu and Ulsan. 
Amongst them, Pusan and Daegu are well-known areas which mainly support the GNP. Meanwhile, Jeolla 
Province has one metropolitan city, Kwangju.  
 
Due to the dominance of political regionalism in South Korea, parties - with the 
exception of the GNP and DP - cannot survive long due to a lack of support from 
voters in an historical perspective, although South Korea is a multi-party system
7
. 
Therefore, the other parties often form coalitions in order to survive and to 
                                            
7
 For this reason, some scholars tend to think that the political system in South Korea is closer to 
a two-party system rather than to a multi-party system (Hsieh, 1997). 
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challenge the two major parties. In fact, the matter of political coalition does not 
just belong to minor parties. In the historical perspective, the typical structure of 
Korean parties is that they are formed by one particular politician, which give 
politicians and parties a chance to form a coalition and break the relationship 
easily according to their interests (Kim, 1969). For this reason, parties do not 
have any definite political ideological differences between them
8
 (Kim, 1995) 
and politicians’ desires often focus on their own successful career or promoting 
good fellowship between politicians rather than party matters such as 
strengthening party ideology. Naturally, politicians tend to just concentrate on 
the outcome of the election to assure their future (Kim, 1995) and sometimes 
they leave the party if they are not sure about the election result. In particular, 
parties who have less party members try to form a coalition to win an election in 
spite of different political perspectives. This phenomenon explained above is 
clearly presented in Figure 3.1, which shows that the DP was split into two 
different parties in 1995 because the party leader, Kim Dae-joong, returned to the 
political world after announcing he was retiring from political life in 1992. Some 
politicians who supported Kim Dae-joong followed him to establish a new party, 
Kukmin Hoei, and the others joined the GNP when it was first established in 
1997. Afterwards, Kukmin Hoei was split again due to the new establishment of 
the Uri party, which was formed by politicians who insisted on political reform. 
Consequently, this has led to a weakened party structure with a short party 
history and absence of strong partisanship (or party affiliations).       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8
 According to Kim (1995), Korean parties seem to have a conservative disposition in the 
perspective of party ideology because they aim for a gradual change under a system of liberal 
democracy rather than for entire changes in the current situation.  
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Figure 3.1. The history of party structures since 1990 in South Korea
1 
 
   
 1 Source: Kim (2008) and Ahn (2009)  
   2 GNP was renamed the Saenuri Party in February 2012. 
 
3.2.3 The historical alteration of party structure 
 
Changes in political parties have been studied in Western countries since the 19
th
 
century, but in South Korea research on changes and crises in political parties 
only started in the 1960s (Kang, 2002). This is because those earnest studies on 
changes in political parties were made only after the democratisation movement 
in South Korea, although Korean political parties began to be established just 
after Liberation in 1945. In addition, the recent development of mass media and 
new technology and its increased use, electoral alterations caused by the impact 
of modernisation of society such as electoral volatility, and the low level of party 
loyalty in election campaigns have heightened the need for the discussion of 
party crises.  
 
Therefore, since the demonstrations of the 1960s, many efforts have been made 
by Korean scholars to explore how Korean parties have dealt with an ever-
changing political environment that might define their characteristics. Moreover, 
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Korean scholars discussed the subject of party decline and the political crisis in 
South Korea much more than in the West because of the weakness of the 
institutionalisation of political parties and a growing political mobility (Kang, 
2009). More specifically, according to the public polls and official documents 
that were produced by the National Election Commission in South Korea (1998, 
2003, and 2008), these problems have become more serious since the mass media 
became engaged with politics.  
 
Meanwhile, there is no doubt that many studies about the alteration of party 
structure in South Korea have focused on the typical Western/European 
typologies – cadre (Duverger, 1951), mass (Weber, 1880-1960), cartel (Katz and 
Mair, 1970-), catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1945-), and electoral professional party 
(Panebianco, 1998-) to explain the Korean party cases (Kang, 2005; Joo, 2009) 
(see Table 3.3). As briefly presented in Table 3.3, the typology of political 
parties is broadly divided into 5 terminologies. Firstly, a cadre party, the concept 
of which was introduced by Duverger, is characterised by the facts that most 
political party members were from the elite class, and that such parties relied on 
the members’ donations for their finances. Secondly, a mass party is defined as 
the opposite term to a cadre party and, as the major difference in the functions of 
political parties is whether or not they mobilise and involve the public and 
interest groups in their internal processes. Janda and Colman (1998, pp.612) 
explain that the ‘mass party model defines party organisations with reference to 
their relationships with civil society’. Thirdly, a catch-all party type has been 
introduced by Otto Kirchheimer (1945) due to the effects of social changes in 
politics, such as internal separation between labours caused by the economic 
developments and the easy acquirement of political information caused by the 
improvement in education and the development of mass media. As a result, 
parties transformed into a catch-all party type to represent all social community 
members regardless of social class. Fourthly, in the case of the cartel party, it is 
defined as large-size political parties, which rely on national subsidies and 
cooperation with other parties in order to get subsidies from the government 
(Katz and Mair, 1995 and 1997). Finally, Panebianco (1982) introduced an 
electoral-professional party type. He points out that organizational change occurs 
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due to social structural changes and technological changes. Therefore, he 
explains that  
 
‘The electoral-professional party may turn out to be but a 
transitory and comparatively short-lived phenomenon. 1) the 
electoral-professional party will turn out to be an intrinsically 
unstable institution, foretelling the dissolution of parties as 
organizations. 2) the second possibility is that an ideological 
backlash will take place, i.e. an attempt by the existing parties 
to resume their traditional expressive functions and former 
identities, returning to the extremism (leftist or rightist) of their 
far-off origins. 3) real political innovation: more often it enters 
from the outside and is brought into the system by new 
organizations and political leaders who enter into competition 
with organisation already in power’ (pp.274).  
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Table 3.3. Political Party Typology
1
 
Characteristics 
Cadre Party 
(Duverger, 1951) 
Mass Party 
(Weber, 
1880~1960) 
Catch-all Party 
(Otto Kirchheimer, 
1945~) 
Cartel Party 
(Katz & 
Mair,1970~) 
Electoral-
Professional Party 
(Panebianco, 1988~) 
Central role By the Elites By the bureaucracy By the central office By the central office By the professionals 
Type Elite Party Membership party 
A medium between 
States and Interest 
groups 
Representatives of 
States 
Electoral Party 
Financing By the Elites 
Membership and 
Collateral Activities 
Various kinds of 
contributions 
National funds 
Interest Groups and 
Public Fund 
Party channel of 
communication 
Interpersonal 
networks 
Party’s own 
channels of 
communication 
Competition for 
accessing non-party 
channels 
Privileged access to 
government 
channels 
Mass media and 
interpersonal contact 
Campaigning 
Personal networking 
& 
Irrelevant 
 
Labour-intensive 
Mobilisation 
campaigning 
 
Labour and Capital-
intensive 
Campaigning 
& 
Persuasion 
campaigning 
 
 
Capital-intensive 
campaigning 
Capital intensive 
& 
Personalised and 
Targeted 
& 
Candidate-centred as 
well as issue-oriented 
Institutionalisation Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak or strong 
Hierarchy between 
ordinary member 
and party elite 
Top-down Bottom-up Top-down 
Mutual-autonomous 
stratocracy 
Mutual-autonomy 
Party Leadership Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak or strong 
Representative style Trustee Delegate Entrepreneur Agent of state 
Representatives of 
interest groups 
within the 
organisation 
1Source: Duverger (1954), Katz and Mair (1995, p18), Mair (1998), Panebianco (1998) 
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However, some Korean political studies by academics have insisted that it is 
difficult to explain the alterations to Korean political parties with this typology, 
due to the very different histories and political cultures involved (Shim and Kim, 
2004; Kim, 2008b; Kang, 2009; Lee, 2009). They even suggest that the closest 
definition of the Korean party model is that of the ‘hodgepodge party’ (Kim, 
2008, pp.74), which shows every characteristic of each party in the typology, 
rather than conforming mainly to just one, as seen in the European model. This is 
because parties must pursue essential changes and adaptations to reflect 
themselves according to the particular voting climate and circumstances of the 
country they are operating in, rather than correspond to typology developed for 
the West. Therefore, Korean scholars still argue about how Korean parties can be 
defined and how their form will be changed.  
 
Nonetheless, many researchers in South Korea believe the power of party and 
identification has been weakened in the electoral process, and traditional 
characteristics and means of parties have faded in modern society since parties 
have adopted new systems - such as primary election in 2002 (Kim, 2008a; Lee, 
2008). Nowadays, party identity is easily changed by voters’ interests and the 
parties have a tendency to follow the public’s opinions too much without 
consideration of their own political beliefs. Related to this issue, some Korean 
scholars criticise that there are no differences of party ideology and identity 
between parties and, more seriously, that the parties are only interested in how to 
consolidate their political power. Therefore, most studies at a party level are 
focused on how to produce candidate and party images rather than on 
competitive political issues and how to use the newest, most advanced tools in 
their campaigns.  
 
Taking all the above into consideration, it may be hard to define Korean parties 
using the Western model of political party types. Nevertheless, the next sections 
will firstly demonstrate how Korean parties have conformed to the Western 
model, and will then analyse a definition based on the historical background of 
party development to give more understanding about the alteration of party 
organisation.  
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1948 – 1981 (1st - 12th presidential election) 
 
As explained above, around 50 political parties, which resembled the cadre party, 
which is organised by a few political elites and has a weak linkage between 
political elites and voters in Duverger’s (1954) typology, appeared after 1945. As 
a result the US, as an occupying power from 1945 to 1948, instructed all parties 
to inform them of their property and their membership. In consequence, the 
number of political parties dropped suddenly from 50 to around 14 at this point. 
Afterwards, the few surviving parties tended to depend on the political and social 
elite, similar to the characteristics of the cadre party. Otherwise, there was one 
party (called the GongSan Party), which took the form of a mass party in 
Duverger’s (1954) typology, growing out of the labour movement to recover 
workers’ rights (Sim & Kim, 2006). 
 
However, the GongSan Party could not survive because of the situation at that 
time: oppression by other political parties and by the USA meant that most 
parties established after 1948 were a type of cadre party. This is clearly 
evidenced by the fact that most political party members were from the elite class, 
and that such parties relied on the members’ donations for their finances. In the 
subsequent changes to the political environment, the HanMin Party and JaYu 
Party, which were both cadre parties, faced difficult situations which were 
caused by a loss of support. However, their oppression of the GongSan Party 
meant that the Korean political system could not achieve transition from cadre 
parties to mass parties (Kang, 2002; Shim, 2008). The failure of the GongSan 
Party was also due to internal conflict between the old and new generations, and 
consequent frequent coup d’états. Subsequently, these problems not only 
threatened the survival of the party but also incurred people’s distrust. Despite 
the GongSan Party’s efforts to unify the old and new generations, these situations 
allowed political power in Korea to be maintained by a small number of political 
elites until the 1990s (Jin, 2004). 
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1984 – 1997 (13th - 15th presidential election) 
 
Firstly, until 1984, cadre parties seemed to be transforming into a mixture of 
mass and cartel parties. For example, the SinHan-MinJoo Party was formed as a 
mass party in 1985. They participated in the democracy movements and tried to 
mobilise the public to campaign for their rights. In this sense, they were 
definitely different from the other political parties, which still depended on a few 
political elites rather than mobilisation of the masses. However, this new party 
still featured a top-down hierarchy (Shim and Kim, 2004) and still depended on 
an elite minority for their finances, rather than on a party membership fee. 
Despite this, they found support among the public and became the fastest-
growing party in South Korea.   
 
Cartel parties began to be arranged in 1987. According to Katz and Mair (1995 
and 1997), they are defined as large-size political parties, which rely on national 
subsidies and cooperation with other parties in order to obtain subsidies from the 
government. In South Korea, cartel parties introduced because of the difficulty of 
raising political funds. Thereafter, all political parties agreed to depend on a 
national subsidy to maintain their organisations.  
 
After this event it was possible for even minor parties to create national 
structures and have local offices, just like the ruling party, which had previously 
monopolised political power, because every party had an equal subsidy 
opportunity (Shim and Kim, 2005). A further consequence of this new political 
environment was that the issues of competition between parties and their 
opinions were moderated like Katz and Mair’s explanation (1995).   
 
Given such alterations in South Korea’s political landscape after 1987, Korean 
parties tended towards the cartel model. However, full transformation from cadre 
to cartel party model was not achieved because the management of political 
parties by ‘the three Kims’ in this period was totally undemocratic in intra-
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democracy. This is because political parties still kept a top-down hierarchy rather 
than introduced an autonomous stratocracy.  
 
In general, cartel parties operate as a mutually autonomous system, and depend 
on fairly distributed national subsidies (Katz and Mair, 1995 and 1997). However, 
the reality is that all political processes were controlled by just a few major 
political parties and national subsidies were distributed to just a few major parties 
that monopolised political power. Therefore, it can be seen that the party system 
in South Korea was still in the cadre mode even if some parties seemed to be 
transforming into mass parties (Jin, 2004; Joo, 2009). As Katz and Mair (1995) 
note, particular types of party tend to outlive the circumstances that facilitate 
their initial emergence. That is, two types of party model may coexist at the same 
time: in the South Korean case, the 1985 to 2002 period saw cadre, cartel and 
mass parties all competing together. Therefore, each of the Korean parties in this 
period had very different management and organisational styles according to 
their unique ideologies and aims.  
 
Despite their differences, almost all party organisations commonly operated in a 
non-democratic, costly, and factional way. In particular, high election costs were 
inevitable for parties because they had to mobilise their party members in 
election campaigns, although they did not do so when it came to electing party 
leaders and candidates for government officials (Kim, 1994; Jin, 2005; Kang, 
2009). 
  
The 2002 -2007 (16
th
-17
th 
) presidential elections 
 
From 2002, the three Kims’ influence on South Korean politics declined, and this 
power vacuum created a demand for reform of political parties. This change of 
regime was a major event for the GNP, never previously defeated in an election, 
and it caused huge changes in all political parties as well as in the political 
system - particularly since the DP won the presidential election in 2002 in a new 
candidate selection process, similar to a primary in the USA. It was a new 
challenge to elect a candidate of the DP for presidential election by the masses. 
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Following this new attempt by the DP at modernisation of the electoral process, 
political parties have recognised the importance of the mobilisation of the public. 
Besides, problems in the current political environment, such as the political 
cynicism and decline of party identification already mentioned, have forced 
parties to focus more on elections than on other activities. The current political 
system, in which parties are judged by election results, requires parties to 
mobilise large numbers of supporters in order to survive. 
 
Political parties can be regarded as representatives of the masses and as mediums 
to resolve the conflicts of interest groups (Duverger, 1954). This means that the 
masses can support and be supported by one particular party according to their 
political interests, and that political parties can exist thanks to this support. 
Therefore, the most important factor in the typology of mass parties is the 
mobilisation and participation of the masses. As such, the new candidate 
selection method chosen by the DP was successful in mobilising voters, 
especially young voters, and in boosting party membership.  
 
On the other hand, a mass party is seen as the opposite of a cadre party and the 
major difference in the functions of political parties is whether or not they 
mobilise and involve the public and interest groups in their internal processes. 
Given these characteristics of the typical mass party, the new attempt by the DP 
in 2002 is definitely the first evidence of the existence of a true South Korean 
mass party.  
 
However, a simple explanation of South Korean political parties as taking the 
form and attributes of a Western mass party is also difficult because of a few 
different features compared to the European typology such as finance system. 
Besides, all the previously mentioned problems that characterise the South 
Korean political landscape still remain. Therefore, Korean academics are saying 
that the only way forward is for political parties to take an electoral-professional 
form (Joo, 2009; Park, 2010). Furthermore, they agree that parties are actually 
likely to naturally transform into the electoral-professional model because they 
are spending so much time on publicity or on stimulating voters rather than other 
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activities. They say that a special time for preparing publicity or campaigning 
does not now exist, and that parties now have to do this every day in order to 
maintain support: this new urgency is a consequence of the impact of mass media 
and new technology. 
 
3.3. Media system 
 
Many studies have already reported that the influence of mass media goes 
beyond information communication and reaches the information receivers’ 
socialisation process (Gerson, 1966; Adoni, 1979; McLeod and Lee, 2012). In 
particular, the socialisation function of mass media can be found easily in 
political areas. This is because mass society is formed as the scale of society 
expands and, in such a mass society, communication through media can achieve 
more effective information communication between senders and receivers than 
can direct political interaction between politicians and citizens. Especially in the 
election period, media can play not only a mediating role between candidates and 
voters but also a role for promoting participation. In this sense, there is no doubt 
that mass media have practically an inseparable connection to politics; therefore, 
it is worth investigating media systems in Korea before exploring the interests of 
this research.  
 
Like the historical alteration of utilisation of mass media in the West, the core 
feature of election campaigns in South Korea was characterised by the 
introduction of TV into the political process in the late 1990s. Television was 
brought to Korea in 1961 but was not available to all citizens at that time (Jeong, 
2002). Besides, as mentioned before, this was the transition period to democracy 
in South Korea which continued until 1972 (Jeong, 2002); therefore, the role of 
TV in politics was not as effective as it is nowadays.  
 
Despite the late introduction of TV compared to in the West, South Korea has 
achieved a high-level growth of information society in a short period. To be 
specific, HLKZ-TV was the first commercial TV station, introduced in 1956, and 
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it was ranked 15
th
 in the world and 4
th
 in Asian countries at that time. A colour 
TV service started in 1980 and this was followed by the arrival of Cable TV in 
1995 and of digital terrestrial television broadcasting in 2005. The government 
planned to end the analogue broadcast service on the 1
st
 January 2013. 
 
In particular, South Korea is considered as one of the leading countries in terms 
of access to the Internet. Access has become accelerated due to government 
policies for digital information age such as Cyber Korea 21 (1999-2002), the e-
Korea Vision 2006 (2002-2006), and the U-Korea Master Plan (2006-2010) since 
Kim Dae-joong’s government in 1997 (Kim, 2009; Freedom house, 2012). 
Especially in 1997, the government encouraged citizens to have and access a 
computer as well as publishing a policy for the dissemination of computers to 
ward against computer illiteracy. For this reason, many observers indicated that 
one reason for rapid growth of the Internet in Korea has been accomplished by 
government-led initiatives (Freedom house, 2012). Since then, Korea has become 
a national power in the information industry field, especially in the area of the 
Internet.  
 
To give more details, the first attempt of connecting the Internet in Korea was 
achieved in 1982 and general dissemination of the Internet has been conducted 
by the ‘KORNET’ service of Korea Telecommunication Authority since 1994. 
By 2000, the number of Internet users had exceeded 24 million, which is three-
quarters of Korean voters, and 7,030,000 households were accessing super-speed 
communication networks. Recently, the age range of the Internet user has widely 
expanded and Internet-based activities such as e-government, e-commercial, 
Internet banking and shopping have been well utilised in many ways. In 
particular, government programmes about the swift establishment of high-speed 
Internet access and its cheap price has allowed South Korea to achieve an 
advanced information society in the world. 
  
The spread of the Internet in Korea is the fastest among Asian countries, and 
Korea is ranked 1
st
 in the Asian region and 17
th
 (82.7%) across the globe in 
access to the Internet, according to the KISA’s (Korea Internet & Security 
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Agency) recent report and Internet World Stats as seen in Figure 3.2. This 
phenomenon was reported in other countries and CNet news.com, a worldwide 
magazine of the IT industry, published articles titled ‘South Korea’s digital 
dynasty’ in 2004 (Kanellos, 2004). According to these articles, the popularity of 
online communication and political discussions via the Internet has been growing 
in spite of the government’s controlled media regulations. Furthermore Korea is 
considered as one of the most ‘wired’ countries because local Internet companies 
normally show off their power rather than global companies such as Google, 
Yahoo and Facebook, unlike in most other countries (Freedom house, 2012). For 
example, NAVER, as the top local search engine (portal) in Korea, is much more 
popular than Google. In the same line, Cyworld and KAKAO story are being 
welcomed as online communities as opposed to Facebook. Especially the 
function called Minihompy on the website of Cyworld, which is a personalised 
website, had an eighth of the population as registered users in 2011 (eMarketer, 
2012). Consequently, this means that big companies such as Google, Yahoo and 
MSN which provide various kinds of the Internet-based services are still trying to 
compete with local companies. 
 
Figure 3.2. Internet usage rate and Internet users in South Korea
1 
 
1 Source: KISA (2012) 
 
 
70 
 
 
Moreover, many observers expect a rise in the Internet usage due to fast growth 
in the Smartphone market (Freedom house, 2012). According to KISA’s recent 
survey (2012), the growth of Internet usage via Smartphone has been 
dramatically increased and it has allowed Koreans to appreciate the value of the 
Internet as an important tool in their daily life.  
 
3.4. Campaign regulations 
 
Many scholars explain that campaign regulations in each country are one of the 
most important elements in understanding historical alteration of election 
campaigning in a given country (Schafferer, 2006; Lee, 2008). In fact, campaign 
regulations vary according to their own electoral system, political system and the 
degree of development of mass media, etc. Nonetheless, campaign regulations 
could explain about how mass media and campaign technology has been adopted; 
therefore, it is valuable as a definitive yardstick to measure the extent to which 
election campaigns have been modernised.  
 
In South Korea, up until 1987 the election regulations had been changed several 
times by previous presidents who wanted to retain political power (Jeong, 2002). 
This was because the political system also claimed to stand for democracy, but it 
looked like anti-communism rather than democracy. Moreover, the presidents 
before 1987, Rhee Seung-man and General Park Jeong-hee, were always busy 
working out how to prolong their power and they did not hesitate to go through 
electoral reform. This is clearly presented in the historical event, known as the 
‘Yushin Constitution’, in 19729. At that time, General Park Jeong-hee declared a 
prohibition on political advertising via mass media (Jeong, 2002). Needless to 
say, this played a kind of defence mechanism to protect them against any kind of 
                                            
9
 The Yushin Constitution is the constitution of the Fourth Republic. General Park Jung-hee 
introduced this constitution on 17
th
 October, 1972 for the purpose of political innovation backing 
up the reunification of the fatherland which is a supreme task for South Korea. The basic 
characteristics of the Yushin Constitution at the time of amendment was claimed as ‘Orientation 
to peaceful reunification of fatherland, localization of democracy and reconfirmation of practical 
economic equality’ but in fact it was an amendment for the long-term seizure of power by 
General Park. It allowed violation of people’s basic human rights and dictatorship by the 
president because of an overgrowth of presidential authority in power organization. 
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opposition force. Strictly speaking, there is no doubt that campaign regulation as 
the authentic meaning of democratic format came into force with the 12
th
 
presidential election in 1987 after the 6.29 declaration of democratisation in 
Korea
10 . Thus, Act 1 of the electoral law clarifies that that ‘Under the 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Local Government Act, the 
election is carried out by the public’s voluntary basis and democratic procedure 
and it also aims to contribute to the advancement of a democratic form of 
government against preventing corruption related to election’. 
 
Since then, with the strong effect of mass media on modern society and the 
advance of the information society in South Korea, new media and the latest 
technology have been rapidly introduced in political campaigns. As a result, the 
Public Office Election Law was launched in 2004 and it has been changed 
rapidly in response to these developments, in particular against the election 
pattern of low efficiency and high expenditure (Kim and Kim, 2005). It was 
further altered several times for several reasons under the purpose of applying it 
flexibility. When looking at regulations with regard to election campaigns until 
now, they are mainly focused on the matter of adoption of new media and of 
public opinion poll. This means that the swift actions of the Public Office 
Election Law reflect the powerful influence of media-centred election, which 
means the provision of information by mass media, on elections in Korea and 
resultant changes (Kang, 2009).  
 
Taking this into consideration, the reason that the Public Office Election Law is 
considered more important in South Korea than in other countries is that the 
country adopts the positive system, which enumerates all election campaign 
methods one by one (Shim & Kim, 2006). For this reason, the Public Office 
Election Law is amended promptly whenever a new instrument that may 
influence election campaigns emerges. For example, since the recent 2010 local 
election, changing provisions on the period for the distribution of election 
                                            
10
 The 6.29 declaration of democratisation has a deep meaning to Koreans. It was announced by 
Roh Tae-woo, who was a leader of the Democratic Justice Party as well as a presidential 
candidate in 1987, to give democratisation for the people and to accept a formal request for a first 
direct election on 29
th
 of June 1987.  
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bulletins has been under discussion. According to the current Public Office 
Election Law in South Korea, election bulletins can be distributed five days 
before the Election Day but, considering the time for delivery to the voters’ hand, 
the period is considered too short. Hence, many studies have pointed out the 
inefficiency of this campaign regulation (Jang, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, it is being discussed to amend the Public Office Election Law in 
connection to the Internet media, which has been settled as a major instrument of 
election campaigns, and election campaigns using mobile phones, a newly 
emerging electronic medium. In particular, the power of interactivity and 
networking free of spatial limitation in the Internet media distinguishes the 
Internet clearly from conventional media, and, therefore, it is considered 
extremely necessary to revise the Public Office Election Law adequately.  
 
To be more specific, regulations on political TV advertising and TV discussion in 
South Korea are stipulated in detail in Chapter 7 Article 82 of the Public Office 
Election Law, amended on 4
th
 August, 2005 (See the more details in Appendices 
A and B). According to these articles, in the case of TV discussion, television and 
radio broadcasting systems can invite one or more candidates or debaters during 
an election period, ask about the political party’s platforms and policies, and 
present and discuss their opinions (Kim, 2003). Moreover, according to Article 
59, which is about days available for political discussions during the election 
campaign period, political discussions can be held from the last day of candidate 
registration to the day before the Election Day. However, the period for 
discussions is different according to election type. For example, discussions are 
allowed from 120 days before the Election Day in the presidential election, and 
from 60 days before the Election Day in the general election.  
 
In South Korea, and particularly in the presidential election, political discussions 
are allowed to candidates endorsed by a political party with five or more 
members of the National Assembly, those endorsed by a political party that won 
over three-hundredths of valid votes in the previous presidential election or the 
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previous election for the proportional representative members of the National 
Assembly, and those whose average support rate in opinion polls during the 
election period is over five-hundredths.  
 
3.5. The review of the style of previous election campaigns before the 1997 
presidential election 
 
The history of political newspaper and TV advertising  
 
The history of political newspaper advertising in Korea can be traced back to the 
days of the Liberal Party in 1952. In the previous presidential elections for the 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 Republics, political advertising could not appear due to the 
overwhelming power of Lee Seung-man. As the starting point of political 
advertising, candidates Lee Si-yeong and Cho Byeong-ok advertised their seven 
major policies including the establishment of democracy, the reform of 
administration, national defence, financial and economic policies, the 
development of rural areas, and social policies under the headline ‘Our Stands 
and Policies’ in Dong-a Ilbo on 3rd August 1952 (Lee, 1993). At that time, 
however, most of the political advertisements were merely public statements.  
 
In the 3
rd
 presidential election, held on 15
th
 May 1956, highly symbolic election 
slogans were adopted and advertised in the form of an intensive appeal, showing 
a step towards advanced political newspaper advertising. In the 4
th
 presidential 
election, political newspaper advertising began to shape its formative frames 
through exchanging slanders and fierce offences and defences in daily 
newspapers, and in the 5
th
 presidential election, much more developed patterns 
were observed. In the 5
th
 presidential election, advertising techniques were also 
improved considerably. For example, while most political newspaper 
advertisements in the past used texts, symbolic things such as ‘bull’ were now 
used. Based on today’s political advertising analysis level, previous political 
advertisements could not be called political advertising, but, from the 5
th
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presidential election, they began to show techniques that may correspond to 
‘Seven Propagation Strategies Used in Political Propaganda’ classified by the 
Institute of Propaganda Analysis in the US (Lee, 1993).  
 
In the presidential elections in the 1980s, political newspaper advertising was 
spotlighted as an important factor in electoral races more than ever, and opened 
the age of active political communication (Lee, 1993). Particularly from the 
election in 1987, more refined and westernised forms of political newspaper 
advertising began to appear in Korean politics. 
 
Entering the 1990s, getting away political advertising limited to printed media, 
political TV advertisements emerged for the first time. In the 14
th
 presidential 
election, political advertisements on the TV were mainly for explaining the 
candidates’ policies or issues. The form was monotonous, and the dark-coloured 
screen dealt with heavy and serious issues. Of course, such programmes used 
only simple graphic techniques. Later, in the 15
th
 presidential election, many 
advanced patterns of political TV advertisements appeared and they used visual 
and auditory elements including colours for maximising the effect of the TV. 
Furthermore, emotional advertisements were also made as well as political 
advertisements dealing with issues. In the 16
th
 presidential election in 2002, new 
political environments were created with the emergence of ‘media politics.’ This 
provided comfort and a convenient environment for voters to connect with 
political advertisements that, with the use of various colours and technical effects, 
looked somewhat emotional, and many of the advertisements appealed to voters’ 
emotions rather than presenting the candidate’s policies and issues.  
 
Along with these changes, specific legal provisions were applied to political 
newspaper advertising in 1963 and The Presidential Election Law enacted in the 
same year stipulated regulations on political advertising in newspapers - which 
had been performed without rules until that time - providing a fixed frame for 
political newspaper advertising. To be specific, permission regarding TV 
advertising has improved since the 15
th
 presidential election and the number of 
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advertisements in newspaper and broadcasting dramatically increased during the 
15
th
 presidential election in 1997. For instance, parties were allowed to run 
advertisements in the newspaper 70 times in the 1997 presidential election as 
compared with four times in the 1992 presidential election. That is, it is needless 
to say that media democracy was launched in Korea during the 1997 presidential 
election (see Appendices A and B for more details).  
76 
 
 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This research aims to analyse how South Korean parties have managed their 
party organisation and campaign practices with campaign professionals in a 
response to continual changes in the electoral environment since the 1997 
presidential election in South Korea. Therefore, it will address the growing 
influence of campaign professionals on party organisation while discussing 
evolution of party organisation of professionalisation in political communication. 
Firstly, it will demonstrate how and how much parties’ presidential election 
campaigns have become more technically sophisticated as a consequence of mass 
media mobilisation and adaptation of new technologies. Secondly, it will analyse 
how and by how much political parties have made their organisation more 
‘systemic’ and ‘tactical’ using communications technologies in the context of a 
more professionalised model of party communication. Thirdly, it will analyse the 
relationship between political parties and professional consultants to investigate 
the changes to party structure that professionalisation theory suggests. 
Consequently, this thesis will discuss how these alterations in party organisation 
have contributed to the phenomenon of professionalisation in political 
communication in South Korea. 
 
In so doing, two major South Korean parties, the GNP and DP, are selected for 
this study. The most important part of this study is to see if there are any 
differences in the campaign practices between the two different parties. 
Differences could occur because the parties would conduct different campaign 
strategies based on their historical achievements and different party culture such 
as political elites’ minds, party ideology, and a decision-making system, as 
explained by Gibson and Römmele (2009). In reality, it is assumed that these two 
parties are in the same election environment but seem to seek out different 
campaign strategies. Overall, through comparison of the two parties’ cases, this 
study provides an opportunity for discussion of the extent to which the 
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professionalisation theory in the field of election campaigns can be applied to the 
case of South Korea.  
 
As argued earlier in the literature review, the professionalised election campaign 
theory, which can offer a multi-dimensional approach to the changing process of 
election campaigns through in-depth discussion, is more focused on a gradual 
shift in the utilisation of campaign practices by each political party. In particular, 
many studies that have dealt with the concept of professionalisation to 
understand the historical alteration of election campaigning have indicated that 
the degree of professionalisation differs according to social and political systems 
in a given country (Farrell, 1996; Rawnsley, 2006). As a result, many scholars 
explained that a hybridisation approach is reasonable to analyse the alteration of 
the election campaign of each different case due to the different political and 
electoral systems in every country (Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Karlsen, 2010). 
Therefore, this study will examine in depth the pattern of change in Korean 
parties’ campaign activities in the context of professionalisation of election 
campaigns.  
 
As stated earlier in the literature review chapter, the concept of 
professionalisation is defined here as ‘the whole adaptation process of political 
parties to a new electoral environment’. Accordingly, the whole process of 
professionalisation of election campaigns can occur when two aspects of the 
alteration fuse together: 1) the technical improvement of campaign activities 
corresponds to the development of mass media and campaign technology as an 
external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigns, and 2) the 
organisational change of political parties such as the increase of departments’ 
power in relation to PR, the growth of campaign professionals, and the change of 
relationship between internal party campaign staffers and external campaign 
professionals as an internal dimension of professionalisation of election 
campaign. Although the increase of the influx of campaign professionals caused 
by the utilisation of modern campaign technology would be a possible influence 
on potential organisational changes of a political party, it may not be one of the 
factors in undergoing substantial changes of party organisation. Therefore, this 
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study will not deeply discuss the matter regarding the alteration of party 
organisational form such as mass party, electoral-professional party and so on.   
 
Accordingly, to understand these different aspects, this study has chosen semi-
structured interview as a main research method to achieve the purpose of this 
research as explained above. In particular, an in-depth investigation through 
semi-structured interviews with external campaign professionals and internal 
party campaign staffers will be helpful to lead a more detailed discussion about 
those results of external and internal alteration of professionalisation of election 
campaigning. In addition to this, measurement of the degree of 
professionalisation between two parties, the GNP and DP, will clearly show up 
the differences in dealing with mass media and new technology using the 
CAMPROF index as presented in Gibson and Römmele’s research (2009).  
 
For this reason, this chapter addresses detailed information in relation to the 
research methodology of this study. In that sense, the following sub-chapters will 
provide some contents such as discussions about case study and in-depth 
interview as the main methodology of this study, the research periods, the 
procedure and process of in-depth interview and so on.  
 
4.2. Overview of the case study 
 
Single-case studies can help raise exploratory questions which can strengthen the 
evidence of an existing theory through a specific explanation despite the 
difficulty of generalisation (Yin, 1990). Since most theories in political contexts 
have been developed and discussed in Western countries such as the USA and in 
European countries, due to the advanced growth of those countries, it is essential 
to apply those theories in other countries. In particular, in terms of election 
campaign research, US literature has shown that the area has strengths because of 
a great number of skilful campaign professionals in the extensive industry of 
political consulting, accumulated know-how in dealing with mass media 
communication, and the demands for USA campaign practices by other countries. 
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Recently, there has been agreement over the similarities between nations, but 
researchers have started to discuss the differences because the alteration of 
election campaigns occur based on different systems in a given country.  
 
Drawing on the current interests, there are three main reasons for having chosen 
the case study as the research method. Firstly, it is necessary to test the 
applicability and acceptability of theories being discussed by academic scholars 
in a real case. The verification of the applicability of these new theories has an 
important meaning in that it may allow the possibility of widening the scope of 
theories by supporting different perspectives. In particular, considering that many 
discussions and studies have vigorously been made in the West, we should 
determine how applicable such new theories are to other countries, such as in 
Asia.  
 
Secondly, it is necessary to examine the phenomena that accompany existing 
theories. When normative theories proven in the past need to be re-established in 
accordance with the current environment, the case study is helpful in 
strengthening the theories as important evidence in the verification of phenomena 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The concept of professionalisation of election campaigns 
discussed in this study is an on-going subject that reflects current changes in the 
election environment and key issues among academic scholars in the existing 
theories of Americanisation and Modernisation. By testing the newly discussed 
theories in a substantial case today, we have an opportunity to lay some 
theoretical groundwork (Anderson, 1983).  
 
Thirdly, it is possible to validate a theory using practical data (Gillham, 2000). 
Quantitative and qualitative data such as interviews, questionnaire surveys, 
articles, and statistics when used in a case study can be important evidence for 
the validation of a theory. Furthermore, this data may provide opportunities to 
identify exogenous factors that have not been recognised theoretically. 
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4.3. The rationale for the South Korean case 
 
Although the reasons for why a Korean case is selected for this study are 
explained in the introductory chapter, the aim of this section is briefly to review 
the reasons for selection of a Korean case as part of the methodology.   
 
Firstly, South Korean elections have been significantly influenced by regional 
politics. Regionalism of politics in South Korea has faced differences in political 
behaviour as well as political participation between local people. It has shown 
quite different features in comparison with other countries that have the same 
problem such as the UK, Spain (Park, 2003). Admittedly, it can be said that 
politics of regionalism in South Korea come from blind partisanship and party 
loyalty. In spite of that, blind faith in a party is still an important factor that 
affects a voter’s decision. For this reason, it is obvious that almost all candidates 
who want to run for election hope to join the main parties, the GNP or DP, and 
this has eventually permitted the parties to have stronger power than those in 
other countries. In particular, it is reported that each party tends to focus more on 
the vulnerable areas that do not receive a lot of voters’ support (Seoul Shinmun, 
05/Dec/1997; Segye Times, 02/Oct/2002; SBS news, 17/Dec/2007). As explained 
in Chapter 3, the GNP is strongly supported from Gyeong-sang province whilst 
the DP receives many votes from Jeolla province. However, the current research 
argues that this phenomenon is declining and the generation gap has been 
strongly increased by the emergence of the Internet as a new medium. Therefore, 
each of the parties has had to design a campaign strategy through a sophisticated 
electoral market survey to deal with the new electoral environment and, actually, 
this has raised the argument that election campaigning has to be improved with a 
certain level of professionalisation.  
 
Secondly, election campaign practices today are reliant on advanced technology, 
particularly in South Korea, where the Internet has been regarded as the most 
powerful and efficient medium for campaign purposes since 2000. Although this 
phenomenon is not limited to Korea among Asian countries, the country ranks 
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first in Asia in the spread and use of the Internet. In the presidential election of 
2002, for example, official political advertisements were broadcast through the 
TV, with candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s political advertisements causing a great 
sensation. As a result, supporting voters collected and distributed information 
through the Internet unofficially and this had a greater impact than expected: it 
was a key element in Rho’s eventual victory. Furthermore, South Korean voters, 
in particular the younger age group, use the Internet as a major source of political 
information. This behaviour is evidenced by the large number of voters visiting 
the candidates' websites and the many supporter communities appearing on the 
Internet (Hwang, 2006). For this reason, South Korean Internet election 
campaign strategies are drawing the attention of scholars, and how to handle and 
utilise the Internet is emerging as a critical factor in campaign strategies. 
 
Thirdly, South Korean election campaigns utilise many scientific tools (Kwon, 
2006). A representative scientific method of election campaigns is an opinion 
poll. In South Korean election campaigns, opinion polls are used by parties as 
well as journalists as frequently as media articles containing political information. 
To voters, moreover, the reliability of opinion polls is higher than any political 
article, and this perception of high reliability has a direct impact on voters’ 
decisions. Thus, parties opt to use more efficient surveys or tools to communicate 
with voters.  
 
Fourthly, the number of media consultants and agencies is increasing. The 
advance of technology and the maximisation of media influence are expanding 
the role of consultants and so increasing the number of consultancy agencies. 
These days, political parties are contracting-out such political services as the 
production of political advertisements, advice on strategic techniques, and 
opinion polling, and even foreign consultants are joining the South Korean 
market (Schafferer, 2006). 
 
Lastly, Western trends, especially in the US, are adopted quickly in South Korea. 
The US trend has a strong influence on not only political and economic factors 
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but also on every corner and level of society in South Korea, including political 
campaigning. Furthermore, the rapid development of technology and its effects is 
creating many changes in modern society similar to those in Western society. In 
the same context, the pattern of change in election campaigns, especially the 
alteration of campaign activities, shows the trend of Westernisation or 
Americanisation as supported by many scholars (Tak, 2000). For example, 
Internet election campaigns began to appear in 2000 and political advertisements 
are spreading with the development of campaigns focusing on candidates’ 
images. Furthermore, mobile phone campaigns were utilised by parties in the 
2007 election. Taking all these things into consideration, research has shown that 
the South Korea model is valuable in examining the phenomenon of 
professionalisation in election campaigns.  
 
Therefore, two parties, the GNP and DP, have been chosen for this study for the 
following reasons: 1) the degree of practical use of new communication 
technologies, 2) the degree of institutionalisation, the stability, and sustainability 
of the political party, and 3) different election histories. Firstly, since the 
adoption of new communication technologies, party organisers have had a 
tendency to replace their original bureaucrats with professional consultants. 
Secondly, these two parties have been chosen for their stability and sustainability. 
In particular, the GNP and DP are more stable and have more political power 
than the other political parties, although South Korean politics is characterised by 
frequent coalitions between parties (see Table 4.1). Since the single member 
district system was restored in the 1998 general election in South Korea, it has 
been held at four-year intervals. In addition to this, South Korea has a unicameral 
system of legislature, composed of 299 lawmakers. Therefore, it is crucially 
important that the members of the National Assembly are from as many parties 
as possible because this gives strong political power to each party. As seen in 
Table 4.1, over a 10-year period, the GNP has had an average of 50% of the total 
seats on the National Assembly whilst the DP has had an average of 36% of the 
total seats. Given that South Korea politics normally comprises more than nine 
parties every year, it can be interpreted that the GNP and DP have stronger 
political powers than the others.  
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Table 4.1. Party creation and the number of members of the National Assembly 
1 
Political 
parties 
Party creation 
The number of members of the National Assembly 
1996 2000 2004 2008 
GNP December 1951 
 
139 
(46.4%) 
133 
(44.4%) 
121 
(40.4%) 
153 
(51.1%) 
DP
3 
June 1955 
 
79 
(26.4%) 
115 
(38.4%) 
161
2 
(53.8%)
 
81 
(27%) 
DLP January 2000 
 
 - 10 
(3.3%) 
3 
(1%) 
1 Source: KNEC 2000, 2004, and 2008 
2 As explained in Chapter 3, the original root of GNP was the Jayu Party. Thus, the date of the GNP’s party 
creation was marked as the date of the JaYu Party’s party creation.  
3 The DP was split into two different parties, the Uri party and MDP, caused by internal dispute after the 
2002 presidential election. Therefore, the Uri party secured 152 seats and the MDP secured only nine seats 
in the 2004 general election.  
 
Furthermore, it is important that the political parties maintain their 
‘independence’ during the research periods, to allow comparative analysis. 
Finally, they occupy the same electoral environment but have different histories 
in terms of presidential election results. As mentioned in the case study chapter 
and seen in Table 4.2, the GNP sustained their power over 40 years until the 
1997 presidential election. The reason that the GNP could hold political power 
for such a long time is due to the political background of their creation. In effect, 
the GNP was firstly established in November 1997; however, the party’s original 
political root goes back to the time when the Minjoo Jayue Party was first 
established in 1990. The Minjoo Jayue Party was created through the merger of 
three parties, the Minjoo Justice Party led by President Rho Tae Woo, the 
Unified Democratic Party, and the Sinminjoo Republication Party, and, therefore, 
they became the largest ruling party at that time.   
 
Table 4.2. The alteration of ruling party in South Korea 
The presidential election The ruling party  
Until the 1997 presidential election GNP (Grand National Party
11
) 
1997 DP (Democratic Party) 
2002 DP (Democratic Party) 
2007 GNP 
 
                                            
11
 A reminder that the official name of the DP was New Millennium Party (DP) in the 1997 
presidential election, New Millennium Democratic Party (DP) in the 2002 presidential election, 
and Unified New Democratic Party (DP) in the 2007 presidential election. 
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According to Gibson and Römmele (2009), the use of professionalised 
techniques for election campaigns may be accelerated when political parties are 
facing a difficult time, such as the loss of electoral support or a change of party 
leader. Bearing these points in mind, analysis of these two parties, the GNP and 
DP, is a good way to test the argument that professionalisation is overtaking 
South Korean politics, and to attempt to measure this change. In addition to this, 
Table 4.3 shows detailed information of each presidential election in South 
Korea such as the rate of overall voter turnout and voter share. It is also evidence 
of why the GNP and DP are considered as the major parties in South Korea. 
 
Table 4.3. Information for each presidential election from 1997 (15
th
) to 2007 (17
th
) 
The date of 
election 
18
th
/Dec/1997 (15
th
) 19
th
/Dec/2002 (16
th
) 19
th
/Dec/2007
1
 (17
th
) 
The method of 
election 
A direct election A direct election A direct election 
The president-
elect 
Dae-Jung, Kim 
(DP) 
Moo-Hyun, Rho 
(DP) 
Myung-Bak, Lee 
(GNP) 
Overall turnout 80.7% 70.8% 63% 
Main candidates’ 
vote share 
1. Hoi-chang, Lee 
(Grand National Party, 
38.7%) 
 
2. Dae-joong, Kim  
(New Millennium 
Party, 40.3%)  
 
3. In-jae, Lee 
(Kukminsindang, 
19.2%) 
4. Younggil, Kwon 
(Kukminsungri 21, 
1.2%) 
1. Mu-hyun, Rho  
(New Millennium 
Party, 48.9%)  
 
2. Hoi-chang, Lee 
(Grand National 
Party, 46.6%) 
 
3. Young-gil, Kwon 
(Democratic Labour 
Party, 3.9%) 
1.Dong-young, Jeong  
(United New 
Democratic Party, 
26.1%) 
 
2. Myung-bak, Lee  
(Grand National 
Party, 48.7%) 
 
3. Hoi-chang, Lee 
(Independent, 15.1%) 
The total number 
of candidates 
7 6 10 
1 As noted in the table, there were seven candidates, six candidates, and 10 candidates in the 1997, 2002, and 
2007 presidential election respectively. However, this table summarises the candidates who obtained the 
highest share of the vote in each presidential election.  
 
4.4. The period of the research 
 
As stated earlier, all campaign activities in Korea are restricted by an electoral 
law, called ‘the Public Official Election Act’. For this reason, some research has 
suggested that reviewing the historical alteration of campaign regulations is the 
easiest way to understand the big trend of campaign changes in South Korea (Lee, 
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2008). It is obvious that campaign regulation is generally established based on 
the electoral environment of the times and it could lead us to discover what 
differences have actually taken place over time. Furthermore some countries that 
have stringent campaign regulations, such as Korea and Japan, cannot be 
discussed without a deep understanding of campaign regulations.  
 
South Korea has dramatically modernised itself in the last 50 years and campaign 
regulations have been revised several times to keep up with the changing 
electoral environments. In particular the amendment of election campaigns has 
been accomplished in order to reflect the ever-changing media environment 
because the influence of mass media on politics has seriously increased and the 
swift attempts of parties or candidates to utilise new media has been gradually 
observed (Jeong, 2002). Although there have been many debates about whether 
the increased use of mass media has consequently brought positive aspects to 
parties or candidates, it cannot be denied that campaign activities using mass 
media have widely diversified in many different ways and their effect has 
increased. Accordingly, it is important to investigate how Korean parties have 
dealt with these alterations and how they utilise them to ensure their survival in a 
serious competition between parties under severe campaign regulations. When 
looking through campaign regulations especially related to mass media, it is clear 
that there has been a huge increase in regulations relating to campaign mediums 
such as newspaper, TV and the Internet over the last 20 years. 
 
Roughly speaking, campaign activity using newspapers was first allowed in the 
13
th
 presidential election in 1987. Accordingly, parties then started to run a small 
amount of newspaper advertising. After that, in the 14
th
 presidential election in 
1992, the first TV advertisements arrived and the era of TV had arrived in Korea. 
Afterwards, the first TV debate took place in the 15
th
 presidential election in 
1997 and the Internet has been used since the 16
th
 presidential election in 2002. 
Finally, campaign activities using mobile phones were introduced in the 17
th
 
presidential election in 2007. To be more exact, there was an alteration of 
election campaign activities caused by the advent of new media in the period of 
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the 13
th
, 14
th
 and 16
th
 elections. On the other hand, there were some attempts to 
enhance the effect of existing mass media in a professional way in the 15
th
 and 
17
th
 presidential elections as seen in Table 4.4. Given that the research period of 
this thesis is from the 15
th
 to 17
th
 elections in South Korea, it means that the 
Korean election campaign entered into the golden era of TV. Table 4.4 
summarises the historical changes of the utilisation of mass media in South 
Korea. 
 
Table 4.4. Historical changes of the utilisation of mass media in South Korea 
Presidential 
election 
Existing mass media New media The difference 
1987(13
th
) Party organ Newspaper 
The arrival of new 
media 
1992 (14
th
) Newspaper TV 
The arrival of new 
media 
1997 (15
th
) 
Newspaper 
TV 
- 
The intensification of 
media strategy 
2002 (16
th
) 
Newspaper 
TV 
The Internet 
The arrival of new 
media 
2007 (17
th
) 
Newspaper 
TV 
The Internet 
- 
The intensification of 
media strategy 
 
Accordingly, this research covers the period from 1997 to the 2007 presidential 
election. The reason for this is as follows: the 1997 presidential election was the 
first to be held in which mass media, especially television, featured in the 
electoral process. For instance, political advertising and political debate appeared 
on TV for the first time in the 1997 presidential election. Besides, the 1997 and 
2007 presidential elections were remarkable historical years in Korean politics 
because of a change in party regime, as explained in Table 4.2. In particular, this 
period was highly significant for South Korea because a change was made in the 
electoral process from ‘party-oriented’ to ‘candidate image-oriented through 
mass media’ (Lee, 2008).  
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4.5. Description of semi-structured interview data materials  
 
4.5.1. The general scope of interviews 
 
In general, interviews as a research method is divided into three different 
approaches: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. Firstly, the structured 
interview is described as a useful research technique for researchers who want to 
discover common or different figures between a respondent’s answers when 
they are asked same questions (May, 2011). Thus, interviewers should maintain 
neutrality and try not to affect any influences on the interviewee’s answers. For 
this reason, the structured interview is often used for survey research, such as 
large-scale telephone interviewing.  
 
Secondly, the semi-structured interview is described as a research method that 
allows more freedom to interviewees than the structured interview when 
responding to the interviewer’s questions. Although the questions being asked to 
interviewees are specific according to the research, interviewees are given more 
freedom in formulating their responses (May, 2011). Thus, it is necessary for 
interviewers to understand the contexts of what they want to hear from 
interviewees and to maintain ‘a balance between structure and openness’ 
(Gillham, 2005, pp.79). For this reason, Gillham (2005) explains that this 
method is ‘the most important way of conducting a research interview because 
of its flexibility balanced by structure, and the quality of the data so obtained’ 
(pp.70).  
 
Finally, the unstructured interview is a research method that relies on the 
interviewee’s response. As such, interviewees have a high level of freedom and 
they allow talking about ‘the subject within their own framework of reference’ 
(May, 2011, pp.124). This type of interview is therefore suitable for research 
such as narrative analysis.  
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Given this, this study used a semi-structured interview research method to obtain 
insights into historical changes in presidential election campaigning in South 
Korea from 1997 to 2007. In particular, this study aims to explore how the 
relationship between external campaign professionals and campaign staffers 
within party organisations has changed over the 10-year period. Naturally, it is 
important to hear real experiences from those who were involved in this process 
to investigate the changes in campaign strategies and their impact on political 
party organisation. Moreover, it is important to find out any valuable information 
such as campaign strategies and historical changes of election campaign, which 
might not be known accurately to outsiders. Therefore, semi-structured interview 
are considered a suitable method to investigate the professionalisation of election 
campaigning.  
 
4.5.2. The scope of interviewees for semi-structured interviews 
 
The definition of external campaign professionals and internal party 
campaign staffers  
 
As stated above, in order to achieve an effective sample of interviewees it is 
important to have clear understanding of the target group of the study. That is, 
we have to define who external campaign professionals are. Sabato (1981, pp.8) 
explains, ‘political consultants are campaign professionals engaged primarily in 
the provision of advice and services (such as polling, media creation and 
production, and direct-mail fund raising) to candidates, their campaigns, and 
other political committees’. Moreover, Manicini (1999, pp.237) points out that 
‘political consultants define the lines of campaign strategy as well as their 
organisation and management’. According to these definitions, campaign 
professionals tend to be largely composed of political consultants. However, in 
South Korea, it is hard to find people who can be called political consultants as 
the industry of political consultants is not well developed.  
 
Although there are a few political consultants who work for political parties, it is 
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true that they are limited in number; the information on their role and activities is 
not well-known to the public. Moreover, the scope and role of independent 
political consultants in South Korea is not as wide as in the USA. For instance, 
advertisers normally engage in the production of political advertising during the 
election campaigning period. However, they do not want to be called political 
consultants and treat the relationship with political parties similar to a business 
relationship. That is, they see political parties as one of their customers and they 
just offer their specialised skills to political parties. Thus, they want to be known 
as advertisers rather than political consultants. This also applies to other 
campaign professionals such as pollsters and image consultants. Only a few 
independent political consultants would chose to be called political consultants. 
 
Therefore, this research will use the term ‘external campaign professionals’ 
rather than the term ‘political consultants’. Accordingly, campaign professionals 
in this research can be defined as ‘those individuals employed by political parties 
for their expertise and skills in dealing with the media’ (Lilleker and Negrine, 
2002, pp.99). That is, those who are able to, or claim to be able to, manage the 
process of change are the campaign professionals. In the context of political 
communication these are opinion pollsters, media advisers, advertising 
companies, image-trainers for candidates, and sometimes also academics who 
offer advice to political organisations based on their working experience.  
 
Although Lilleker and Negrine (2002) include all people who have a basic 
knowledge of dealing with mass media into the category of campaign 
professionals, whether or not they are paid party staffers, this research excludes 
party staffers from the group of external campaign professionals because this 
research is interested in the relationship between internal party campaign staffers 
and external campaign professionals. Therefore, the list of interviewees is 
divided into two groups: internal party campaign staffers for each party and 
external campaign professionals.  
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The recruitment process of internal party campaign staffers  
 
According to the definition given above, the internal party campaign staffers will 
consist of people in specific departments who might be involved in election 
campaigns or campaign management and of people who work as and are working 
for politicians’ aides. In other words, the group of internal party campaign 
staffers in this research is limited to people who have been involved in campaign 
activities, especially in the department of mass media, new technologies, and PR 
inside party organisation. In addition, politicians’ aids who have an important 
role in the decision-making process for election campaigning are considered for 
interviews for internal campaign staffers.  
 
In the present political situation in South Korea, this is a small number of 
political elites who play an important role in the decision-making process and 
have control over all kinds of campaign activities. Thus, in order to compile the 
list of interviewees for this research, I searched for politicians who were engaged 
in the management of election campaigning and who played important roles in 
the final decision-making process for each party’s campaigning via online and 
offline newspapers. As a result, a total of 11 politicians, six for GNP and five for 
DP, were selected as potential interviewees and I contacted them via email. 
However, all those who were contacted declined to be interviewed or did not 
reply to my mail. After that, I tried to contact them via telephone, but it was 
obvious that they did not want, or did not have time, to be interviewed.  
 
Perhaps it is understandable that politicians are afraid of speaking about some 
issues, especially those related to party strategies. Furthermore, unlike in the US 
where political consultants can share campaign strategies with each other, all 
campaign matters in South Korea are considered to be politically sensitive issues, 
which the parties do not want to be exposed to a wider public. Although some 
journalists or previous internal party campaign staffers who have left party 
organisations have released some issues related to internal communication and 
the decision-making process, I have to say that the options were very limited.  
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Therefore, I decided to interview politicians’ aides who worked with them very 
closely as an alternative way to understanding the dynamics of election 
campaigning. The process of recruiting these people was also difficult. 
Furthermore, it was hard to find aides who were engaged in the 1997 presidential 
election because some of them had retired already or were no longer politically 
active. Thus, it was hard to find any contact details, such as e-mail addresses or 
mobile numbers. It was also difficult to find information about them in news 
sources such as newspapers and magazines because the names of politicians’ 
aides are rarely mentioned. As a result, I asked for help from a politician who I 
know personally and who was able to provide me with a list of politicians’ aides. 
When I contacted them by telephone and explained what information I wanted to 
hear and why I wanted to interview them, some accepted the invitation to be 
interviewed; however, the others wanted me to send the interview questions 
before they accepted the interviews. After sending a brief guide and ethical 
issues (in Korean) to them, a total of five political aides, two for GNP and three 
for DP, agreed to be interviewed. Although I was unable to access politicians 
who had played an important role in the campaign management process 
directly
12
, the information politician aides provided was very helpful to 
understand the hidden story about the decision-making process for election 
campaigning, which could not be heard from internal party campaign staffers 
who worked in the departments of mass media, new technologies and PR inside 
the party organisation. 
 
In addition to the interviews with these politicians’ aides, internal party campaign 
staffers were also interviewed. Therefore, these departments have been extracted 
from each party's organisational map, and interviewees chosen are the people 
who had experience as a member of a campaign team during the research period 
– the 1997, 2002, and 2007 presidential elections. Based on the development of 
mass media and a growing recognition of the importance of PR, the PR 
department had been subdivided into two or three departments depending on 
their role. For instance, the PR department was subdivided into the digital media 
                                            
12
 This could be one of the limitations of this research, as will be explained in the conclusion 
chapter.  
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team and the offline media team. In more detail, the digital media team mainly 
works on the management of party websites and computerised databases, and 
developing Internet communication systems, whilst the offline media team 
normally deals with any political news which is aired on the broadcasting system. 
This trend was apparent for both parties, GNP and DP, although specific 
department names are slightly different between them. As a result, the people 
currently working in the PR department were contacted at first to obtain contact 
information about the people in charge of the presidential election campaigning 
during the period from 1997 to 2007.  
 
Moreover, it is important to also include previous internal party campaign 
staffers who have left the party organisation because they may give more 
objective opinions than the current members, who are highly likely to be biased, 
for whatever reason. To contact them, I found contact information in the official 
party website and telephoned them directly. Although I explained the purpose of 
the research and the reason why I wanted to interview them, they wanted to meet 
me in person so I went to the office to answer their questions. They also wanted 
to look through the interview questions before finally agreeing to be interviewed. 
Given this research is focused on the historical alteration of election campaigning, 
I needed to interview people who worked on the 1997, 2002, and 2007 
presidential elections, and the people who were interviewed introduced me to the 
other people who could give a help or were senior people in charge. As a result, a 
total of seven people, four for GNP and three for DP, were interviewed.  
 
In addition to this, two of the internal party campaign staffers in the Democratic 
Labour Party (hereafter DLP), as a typical minor party, are interviewed. This is 
because all parties conduct research about the campaign strategy of the 
opposition parties, especially the GNP and DP. Thus, the views of DLP 
campaigners can provide additional information from an outsider’s perspective 
on the campaign strategies of the two major parties.  
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The recruitment process of external campaign professionals  
  
As explained earlier, the group of external campaign professionals was much 
harder to organise because they are, in general, not well-known people, expect 
for a few independent political consultants. In fact, the GNP and DP make 
extensive use of external campaign professionals to support their election 
campaign; even the scope of external campaign professionals is much broader. 
For example, it is reported that the GNP has more than 800 external campaign 
professionals including political consultants, pollsters, private advertising 
companies, professors as advisors, and even the technicians who manage their 
party’s websites. In addition, according to interview results stated in Schafferer’s 
research (2006), Korean parties sometimes hired foreign political consultants 
even if parties did not have great benefits from them at that time. However, who 
they were and which party they worked for was not noted. Therefore, the first 
thing I had to do for this research was to determine the criteria for classification.  
 
Unlike the US, in South Korea there are many non-paid workers amongst 
external campaign professionals, in addition to well-known independent political 
consultants and commercial companies such as polling, advertising, and 
technical advisors. The emergence of paid workers has only recently happened. 
For example, in the 1997 presidential election, almost all external campaign 
professionals except commercial companies were volunteer-based, although they 
received some rewards after the end of the election. Since the 2002 presidential 
election, paid workers have increased; however, pay was not standardised until 
the 2007 presidential election. Accordingly, given the research period of this 
study, the group of external campaign professionals was organised according to 
the length of their experience. That is, they are all people who have worked in at 
least two presidential elections, whether or not they were paid, and who have 
engaged in a particular area that needed specialised skills because the parties 
could not deliver in these areas, such as polling, advertising, media consultants, 
and electoral market surveying, etc. In particular, professors and advisers who 
just simply give some ideas to political parties are excluded from the group of 
external campaign professionals as they do not play an important role in the 
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management of campaigning and they do not need to make a deep relationship 
with internal party campaign staffers. That is, the people who can be called 
external campaign professionals for this research should have a deep or business 
relationship with the parties. Taking all things into consideration, a group of 
external campaign professionals is composed of pollsters, political consultants, 
and political advertising producers. However, it cannot be said that they represent 
all external campaign professionals in South Korea over the 10-year period.  
 
I made a list of external campaign professionals to interview and reviewed 
newspapers to find out who would be the best for this research. After drawing up 
the list, I was introduced to two independent political consultants by professors 
who were my supervisors when I was in postgraduate school in South Korea, and 
they subsequently introduced me to the other campaign professionals who might 
be helpful for this research after interviewing. In particular, one of them who I 
was introduced to met with me before commencing the interviewing in South 
Korea to give some information regarding Korean parties and the market of 
campaign professionals; it was helpful to confirm the interview questions one 
more time.  
 
The overall number of interviewees for semi-structured interviews 
 
Taking all things into consideration, 14 interviewees were interviewed for 
internal party campaign staffers whilst the external campaign professionals group 
including political consultants, pollsters, and advertisers is composed of 11 
people. In total, there were 25 people as interviewees for this research. Table 4.5 
summarises the list of interviewees for the semi-structured interviews as 
explained above.  
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Table 4.5. The list of interviewees for the semi-structured interviews 
Name of party 
Internal party campaign 
staffers 
External campaign 
professionals 
GNP 6 
11 DP 6 
DLP 2 
Total 14 11 
 
 
4.5.3. The guide to the semi-structured interview questions 
 
This section focuses on the explanation of how to develop semi-structured 
interview questions. As explained above, a total of two question guides for semi-
structured interviews, one for internal party campaign staffers and the other for 
external campaign professionals, were developed according to different groups of 
interviewees. Naturally, internal party campaign staffers will be often asked 
about the questions regarding party matters such as how and when campaign 
management teams are organised, what their role is and how it has been changed. 
Whereas, external campaign professionals will be asked about the questions such 
as how far they have participated, whether their role has expanded over 10 years, 
and how they think the relationship with party campaign staffers. In particular, 
this research adopted the questions that were mentioned in Negrine’s research 
(2007) to formulate questions about the role of campaign professionals. He 
explains that campaign professionals can be identified according to several 
perspectives. Accordingly, he recommends that the following questions should 
be asked:  
 
‘1) Are they different kinds of professionals, some of whom 
play a more strategic role than others? 2) Have professionals 
taken key decision-making powers away from party 
bureaucrats? 3) Do they share responsibilities with them or do 
they defer them? 4) Do professionals give shape to political 
ideas or do they alter the political ideas when they give shape 
to them? 5) Do they alter the political character of political 
parties?’ (pp.42).  
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Along with this, the researcher created a literature review and collected news 
articles prior to the fieldwork, which will be helpful to draw up a more detailed 
guide for the semi-structured interviews. Of course, all questions will mainly be 
structured for the analysis of the hypotheses that were stated earlier and the 
general interview questions for both groups will be involved in each question 
guides. For instance, the general questions for all interviewees will be as follows: 
what kind of political activities are they involved in, and what they perceive the 
main changes to be during the research period of the 1997 to 2007 presidential 
elections (see Appendix C).  
 
4.5.4. The process of the semi-structured interviews 
 
This section aims to explain the procedure of semi-structured interviews to give a 
deeper understanding about how to collect data sets. Before starting the 
explanation about the procedure, the ethical issues involved in this research will 
be discussed.  
 
In general, it is necessary to consider ethical issues when research deals with 
sensitive subjects such as sexual violence and matters related to privacy in 
conducting qualitative research. The key point of ethical issues is the matter of 
confidentiality and the privacy of the people involved (Darlington and Scott, 
2003). Accordingly, this research followed the formal procedure of ethical 
consideration in the AREA Faulty Research Ethics Committee of the University 
of Leeds in 16
th
 of Jun 2011 before carrying out the fieldwork. All matters 
related to research such as the aim of the research, the main questions, the details 
of interviewees, the research schedule, and consent form were issued. 
Accordingly, I explained the aim of this research, the process of ethical issues, 
and all matters relating to the process of interview briefly before starting 
interviews, and all interviewees signed a consent form.  
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After the formal approval about ethical issues, I started to carry out interviews in 
South Korea for approximately 4 months. As explained above, I met one 
campaign professional to check the choice and wording of questions for the 
semi-structured interviews. This input by an insider was important for me 
because I had very limited sources of campaign professionals. Furthermore, in 
the case of internal party campaign staffers, I met two people for a pre-test. 
Parallel to this, I tried to read as many as resources as possible via offline and 
online newspapers, as well as any other journal articles related to party matters. 
Based on this information, the question of the interview guide were more focused 
and better organised, which gave me more confidence during the interviews.  
 
As stated above, it was difficult to make an appointment with the interviewees 
because they hesitated to give an interview and almost all e-mails that were sent 
to request interviews received no response while I was still in the UK. Thus, 
most contacts were established by using personal connections, and I finally met 
the first interviewee from each party on 18
th
 July 2011. After these meetings, the 
first interviewees introduced me to other people who may be connected to my 
research. This snow-ball recruitment process for internal party campaign officials 
was very similar to the process for external campaign professionals. Even though 
I finally achieved a sufficient number of interviews, this was a slow process and 
the actual period of interviewing had to be prolonged by around a month in 
additional to the initially planned time.  
 
On average, each interview took at least 60 minutes, with the longest taking 120 
minutes. This depended on how much information the interviewees had to share 
and how keen they were to give that information to me. In general, interviewees 
asked what my research was, and sometimes asked what my opinion was in 
relation to specific questions, especially in the case of the interviews with 
internal party campaign staffers. Whenever I was asked, I tried to give very brief 
and general answers to avoid distracting interviewees from expressing their own 
opinions. Moreover, my responses and gestures to interviewees were important 
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in drawing answers from interviewees and I tried to give a nod of assent 
whenever they answered.  
 
Almost all of the interviews were conducted in their offices or a coffee shop in 
the National Assembly Building, depending on their preferences. For data 
analysis, I asked for the interviewees’ approval to record their interviews and 
they agreed with this. Moreover, in order to reduce any kind of confusion which 
might happen and ask questions efficiently to the interviewees, I interviewed 
internal party campaign staffers of GNP at first, and then those of DP. After 
finishing the interviews with the internal party campaign staffers, I started to 
interview external campaign professionals. In addition to this, I contacted them 
via email whenever I needed to ask further questions and they kindly replied if 
they could answer.  
 
4.5.5. Data analysis  
 
To analyse the semi-structured interviews I first transcribed all text materials in 
Korean. This process took an average of 2-3 days per interview, because 
interviewees’ responses were sometimes unclear, rendering the process a slow 
one. After finishing the transcription of all interviews, I highlighted important 
arguments of interviewees and characterised these arguments according to 
external and internal dimension of professionalisation. I then built up a specific 
analytical framework according to the hypotheses and main features of the 
professionalisation of election campaigning (see appendix D).  
 
Once the analysis had been completed, I chose supportive arguments to be used 
as quotes and translated them it into English. Since the Korean and English 
language are very different, it was sometimes very difficult to translate the 
quotes. To ensure a high level of accuracy I hired a professional translator and 
reviewed the translations carefully for correct meaning.  
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In addition to the analysis of semi-structured interviews, as stated above, this 
research chooses to conduct the investigation through the historical changes in 
the parties’ bank balance, which will give a definite yardstick in confirming the 
current issue being discussed - that the campaigns have become capital-intensive 
since parties have utilised these technical developments into their campaigning. 
Besides, it will be evidence of whether Korean parties truly have increased their 
expenditure to invest in those activities.  
 
Secondly, in order to investigate the relationship between political parties and 
campaign professionals as one aspect of the internal dimension, this study will 
use the framework of Kolodny and Logan’s analysis (1998) to construct 
interview questions and investigate these relationships. They examined how 
political parties have a role in training political consultants and divided it into 
two perspectives, adversarial view and allied view, to look at the relationship 
between parties and professional consultants. Briefly, they insist that professional 
consultants tend to act like advertising agencies in the case of the adversarial 
view. Moreover, they give some advice and suggestions about campaigns for 
political parties and generally work for their own company. On the other hand, in 
the case of the allied view, they help to support more specific technical services 
that parties cannot provide for themselves.  
 
In addition to this, this research uses the fourfold typology, as explained in the 
research of Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic (2001), in order to investigate the 
background of campaign professionals, and its trend to demonstrate any changes 
in the influx of campaign professionals in a historical context. In effect, the 
typology they mentioned seems to be limited when applying it to the South 
Korean case because it is mainly built based on the US case, where the industry 
of campaign professionals, especially political consultants, has been vitalised. 
However, it can be helpful to examine any variation or alteration in the 
relationship between political parties and campaign professionals, and, further, 
how the relationship has been altered. In particular, in the case of South Korea, 
parties have continued to hire external campaign professionals and most believe 
that this industry has rapidly increased, although the size and scope of the 
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industry of political consultancy is much smaller compared to the USA. 
Therefore, investigating the background of campaign professionals is especially 
useful in the case of South Korea, where parties seem to be in the transition 
period in the use of campaign professionals, and therefore can be considered as 
entering into the initial stage of professionalisation. Given this, it is worth 
investigating the process of involvement of campaign professionals in the 
campaign process, and, further, how their relationship has altered over 10 years 
using the fourfold typology in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s research (2001).  
 
4.5.6. The explanation of additional documents  
 
In addition to semi-structured interviews with external campaign professionals 
and internal party campaign staffers, this study needed additional documents and 
resources that could help investigate the process of professionalisation of election 
campaigning in South Korea. This was because interviewees could not remember 
all issues I was interested, especially those concerning campaign expenditure. 
Therefore, any types of sources that could confirm the accurate amount of 
campaign expenditures such as official reports or a white paper published by 
KNEC (Korean National Election Commission) were used to complement the 
information obtained in the interviews. These numbers were used as indicators 
for the degree of modern election campaigning becoming more capital-intensive 
due to increased use of external campaign professionals and modern campaign 
technology. It is also one of the features of the external dimension of 
professionalisation, which will be examined for this research. Moreover, it will 
be helpful to answer hypothesis 1-2, political parties will try to approach their 
work differently, including using contemporary communication technologies and 
campaigning practices, and a new campaign style will therefore become more 
capital-intensive. As explained in Farrell and Webb’s (2000) study, tracing 
expenditure of party campaigning will be a good way to confirm the question of 
whether Korean election campaigning has been towards the capital-intensive 
style.  
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This research used two sets of materials to trace accurate information about party 
finance: official reports submitted by political parties to KNEC and newspaper 
articles. In the case of the official reports submitted to KNEC, all political parties 
had to report details of their finances to KNEC every month. In particular, all 
parties had to report details of campaign expenditures after the end of the 
presidential election, because parties that qualified for an election subsidy were 
able to receive a government subsidy after submitting their campaign expenditure 
report. Furthermore, the public have a right to look through the information on 
campaign expenditure of political parties except for the official election period if 
they make a request to KNEC via the official process, and then obtain their 
approval. Even though there is likely to be a lack of evidence showing how much 
political parties have exactly spent on their election campaigning, this data can 
be helpful to estimate their approximate campaign expenditure. Moreover, 
newspaper articles in regard to party finance and interview materials are 
evidenced here to supplement insufficient information. Furthermore, additional 
research on political parties’ expenditure and interview materials are evidenced 
here for this research.  
 
4.5.7. The explanation of CAMPROF (campaign professionalisation) index 
 
To illustrate the differences between the GNP and DP in the utilisation of 
campaign technology and mass media, this research measures the degree of 
professionalisation in political communication based on the CAMPROF index, 
as demonstrated by the research of Gibson and Römmele (2009). Given that 
political parties have changed their organisation and their political activities 
according to different considerations, similar levels and types of change cannot 
be assumed between them, even if they do occupy the same political 
environment within one country (Smith, 2009). Briefly, the CAMPROF index ‘is 
designed to measure and compare the parties’ use of professionalised campaign 
techniques during an election campaign’ (Gibson and Römmele, 2009, pp.265), 
and it can help discern the technological shift of election campaigns through 
providing numerical data about the question of how much parties have utilised 
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new campaign technology such as telemarketing, e-letters, opinion polls, and so 
on. Therefore, this index can be considered useful in measuring and comparing 
the two parties’ performances and levels of professionalisation. To be more 
specific, 10 different variables in the index of CAMPROF are as follows (Gibson 
and Römmele, 2009, pp.285): 
 
(1) Use of telemarketing for contacting own members and outside target groups.  
(2) Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups.  
(3) Presence of an internal Internet communication system.  
(4) E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates.  
(5) Outside headquarters.  
(6) Continuous campaigning.  
(7) Use of outside public relations/media consultants.  
(8) Use of computerised databases.  
(9) Use of opinion polling.  
(10) Conducting opposition research.  
 
However, this research may have limitations in using CAMPROF index in the 
South Korean case because this tool is designed to analyse professionalisation in 
Western countries and, in effect, it was examined using a German party’s case as 
an example. Accordingly, modification is needed in order to be able to apply it to 
the South Korean case due to different electoral systems, which will be explained 
later. For example, Gibson and Römmele measure the level of use of 
telemarketing and direct mails through three different scores from 1 to 3 on the 
basis of the proportion of the population that was contacted by the parties. That is, 
the ‘party that contacts over 50 percent of constituencies or 1 percent or more of 
the voting age population is scored as 3. Score 2 means whether party contacts 
one-quarter and one-half of constituencies or 0.5-1 percent of the voting age 
population’ (Gibson and Römmele, 2009, pp.286). However, Korean parties can 
only contact party members and are not allowed to contact ordinary people if 
they are not party members. Due to this strict rule in South Korea, measuring the 
extent to which parties have used telemarketing and direct mail to court voters is 
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not an important matter, especially in the comparison of major parties’ different 
strategies.  
 
Nonetheless, it is still useful in showing the result of the change of technical 
development in a historical context and strengthening an interviewee’s opinions 
to look at the phenomenon objectively. Therefore, this research will also conduct 
a pre-survey to identify other factors that should be considered for the South 
Korea case, with systematic document analysis such as newspaper articles, 
official documents (submitted by parties whenever each presidential election has 
finished), National Election Commission documents and party periodicals. All 
materials featured here are considered the most accessible and revealing data 
necessary to delineate the characteristics of election campaigns and the evolution 
of party organisation in South Korea, and will help in the design of 
questionnaires for in-depth interviews. 
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Chapter 5 Results and discussion 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the results of two dimensions of professionalisation of 
election campaign: the external and internal dimensions. Therefore, the results of 
this study’s research questions and hypotheses will be displayed through the 
analysis of the results of 25 semi-structured interviews with campaign 
professionals and campaign managers inside the party organisation.  
 
Before the demonstration of specific results according to the different dimensions, 
this chapter will firstly explain the political situations in South Korea because the 
election campaign strategy is designed in tandem with the political situations of 
the time. Moreover, it may help understand the question of why each party 
conducted different styles of election campaigning although they were in the 
same electoral environment. 
 
Afterwards, this chapter will display the results of the external and internal 
dimensions of professionalisation of election campaigning. Given that the 
interest of this study is focused on the comparison of two different Korean 
parties’ election campaigning in examining professionalisation of election 
campaigning, both parties’ results will be appropriately presented based on the 
comparison between two parties.    
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5.2. Political situations in South Korea from 1997 to 2007  
 
The 1997 presidential election 
 
In 1997 the electoral environment surrounding the GNP was not as good as it had 
previously been, due to several reasons. First of all, there was a poor relationship 
between the governing party (GNP) and the opposition party due to the rushing 
through of a revised labour law in December 1996. Furthermore, people had 
become disillusioned with a back-scratching alliance of government and 
businesses after the news that the bankrupt conglomerate Hanbo Steel 
Cooperation, called cheabal in South Korea, was deeply connected with a few 
GNP politicians and especially Kim Hyun-chul, a son of the president at that 
time (Solinger, 2001)
13
. However, the worst scandal to engulf the GNP was the 
allegation that the candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s son had become involved in 
military conscription corruption. Naturally, the approval rating of this candidate 
decreased dramatically and the application to the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) for relief, which was necessitated by a bad performance by the 
government, heightened the level of distrust of the GNP. Consequently these all-
political scandals were driving the GNP into a corner.  
 
Nevertheless, the GNP started to prepare for the presidential election and held a 
party convention to select the candidate for the time. Unlike the other parties, the 
GNP had difficulty in agreeing on a suitable candidate and they exposed an 
internal discord. Although Lee Hoi-chang was narrowly elected, Lee In-jae - who 
was a strong contender against Lee Hoi-chang - expressed dissatisfaction with 
the process of candidate selection, and his followers left the party and he 
announced his plans to participate in the presidential election after creating a new 
party, known as ‘Kukminsindang’ in South Korea. In particular, such behaviour 
of political elites in the GNP, such as raising an issue about a replacement for Lee 
Hoi-chang due to a decline in his approval rating and showing a tendency 
                                            
13
 For more information, the GNP was the ruling party in 1997 and the scandal of Kim Young-
Sam, a president in 1997, worsened the GNP’s image at that time.  
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towards sympathy with Lee In-Jae’s defection, was interpreted as Lee Hoi-
chang’s leadership inside the GNP was weak. In effect, Lee Hoi-chang failed to 
show his strong leadership and this consequently increased the doubt about his 
qualifications and ability to be a prospective president (The Hankyoreh, 
01/Oct/1997). Naturally, the support rate for Lee Hoi-chang dropped and he 
ranked third on the poll result of approval ratings between candidates. Taking a 
number three ranking as a candidate of the ruling party was an exceptional 
circumstance in South Korea, and, therefore, it obviously meant that the GNP 
was facing a crisis.  
 
However, these all-bad performances by the GNP and the emergence of a serious 
economic crisis such as the IMF crisis when the GNP was the ruling party in 
1997 offered a great chance to the DP (formally known as MDP in 1997)
14
. Kim 
Dae-joong, the DP candidate, is a well-known politician, who has a considerable 
insight into economics, and is the most influential of the three Kims. In effect, 
GNP’s candidate Lee Hoi-chang was considered as a newcomer in politics 
compared to Kim Dae-joong. Furthermore, Kim’s approval rating sharply 
increased after he successfully formed a coalition with another candidate, Kim 
Jong-phil from the United of Jayue Party who had a great deal of support in 
Chungcheong do, which is province in the west of South Korea.  
 
The 2002 presidential election 
 
There was a remarkable institutional change, the first adoption of primary 
election, in the 2002 presidential election. Practically speaking, this is regarded 
as an important event because it led directly to the alteration of the election 
campaign process and a high level of voter participation. First of all, parties 
                                            
14
 As mentioned earlier, Korean parties often tend to change their official name especially when 
they have a new party leader or any new political elites join a party. In historical perspective, the 
DP launched as a united party of the two majority-opposition parties, named as Sinmin Party and 
Minjoo Party, in 1991. At that time, Kim Dae-Jung was the party leader of the Minjoo Party and 
naturally many of the political elites who follow him joined the Minjoo Party. Despite his efforts 
to win several presidential elections, he announced his retirement from politics when he failed in 
the 1992 presidential election. Afterwards, he returned to politics and the Millennium Democratic 
Party (MDP) to participate in the 1997 presidential election.  
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changed the method of candidate selection from a vote of the party members to 
primary election (also called a people participatory contest). Since the DP’s 
victory
10
 in the 1997 presidential election, their approval rating had dramatically 
decreased due to public dissatisfaction about government performance at that 
time; and, what is worse, the approval rating for Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP’s 
candidate, had increased. For this reason, the DP (formally known as New 
Millennium Democratic Party, NMDP) needed a new way to overcome these 
unfavourable conditions and announced a new method of candidate selection 
(Munhwa Ilbo, 27/April/2002). Although there were many arguments between 
political parties, primary election was positively supported by the public who 
were tired of the old style of candidate selection. According to Lee (2012), the 
first adoption of primary election caused by the DP is regarded as a significant 
political event in the way that parties have started to open a new route for 
political participation of voters by allowing ordinary people to participate in the 
method of candidate selection. To be specific, prior to the 1997 presidential 
election, only party members could choose their candidate, but from the 2002 
presidential election ordinary people could also engage in the process of 
candidate selection. Therefore, this means that, compared to in previous 
presidential elections, parties now increasingly tried to communicate with voters 
to encourage their participation. 
 
According to a report by KNEC (2003), in the case of the DP, their structure for 
primary election totalled 70,000 Electoral Colleges, which consisted of 15,000 
representatives, 20,000 party members, and 35,000 ordinary representatives. The 
method of selection of those Electoral Colleges is clearly specified in the DP’s 
party regulation. For instance, the 15,000 representatives consist of four different 
groups: members of the central committee who are elected in a meeting of 
representatives of district party chapters, 25 local assembly members who belong 
to the DP, party executives in the central party, and three people who received 
recommendations from members of the National Assembly who belongs to the 
DP.  
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After structuring Electoral Colleges for primary election, DP’s candidates visited 
cities and provinces to conduct primary elections. In a similar format, the GNP 
organised a total of 50,000 Electoral Colleges, comprised of 25,000 party 
members and 25,000 representatives of ordinary people. In effect, the adoption of 
primary election was widely considered an epoch-making event in three main 
aspects: the separation of party hegemony and presidency, the democratisation of 
the decision-making process of party organisation, and the invigoration of voters’ 
participation.  
 
However, there was a more negative perspective due to the immature behaviour 
of some DP’s politicians (Kim, 2002). In particular, it arose due to the behaviour 
of some politicians inside the DP who were not happy with the fact that Rho Mu-
hyun was elected in a primary election, and who insisted on a re-primary election 
and the invalidity of the original election. They pointed out the continued decline 
of candidate Rho’s approval rating and complete defeat in local elections. In fact, 
it was reported that about 85.7% of politicians inside the DP agreed over the 
issue of a re-primary election and the establishment of a new party (Seoul 
newspaper, 03/Aug/2002). Besides this internal conflict, Rho had to deal with the 
matter of a single candidacy agreement with Jeong Mong-jun from Gukmin 
Tonghap 21 Party before the actual date of registration of the candidate for the 
2007 presidential election. During this process, Rho and Jeong agreed on a single 
candidate decided by the result of opinion polls after a political TV discussion. It 
was a very different way compared to the process of single candidate agreement 
in previous elections. That is, it confirms the fact that South Korean election 
campaigning has definitely entered the era of media-democracy.  
 
Overall, the foregoing discussion of the DP’s internal discord magnified the 
problem of the relationship between party organisation and candidate while 
conducting the election. Although parties tried to put all resources into election 
campaigning when the official election period started, there is no doubt that there 
was an uncomfortable mood between them. Naturally, Rho relied more on his 
private camp and Rhosamo, was his fan-club community, rather than an official 
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campaign organisation inside DP when he entered into the primary election. 
Practically speaking, it is true that the absence of strong leadership caused by the 
political retirement of the three Kims has slowly loosened the relationship 
between party organisation and candidate. However, in the 2002 election, this 
phenomenon became prominent, and, therefore, it led to the intensification of 
candidate-centralised election campaigning in South Korea.   
 
Unlike the DP, the GNP seemed to be stable during the 2002 presidential election. 
Although there was internal conflict due to the different opinions about whether 
they should conduct primary elections between party elites like the DP, the party 
organisation seems to have been consoled by Lee Hoi-chang’s huge win in the 
primary election against the DP. 
 
The 2007 presidential election 
 
There was no equal competition between the GNP and DP (formally known as 
UNDP  in 2007) in 2007 as a huge number of people supported the GNP due to a 
bad performance by the DP over the previous 10 years. Accordingly, there was a 
monotonous mood during the election periods, and many issues, which were 
argued in the GNP’s primary election, became the main sources of discussion 
whilst conducting election campaigning (You, Na, and Lee, 2007). In particular, 
there were many issues in relation to Lee Myung-bak, the GNP’s final candidate. 
For instance, several times the DP mentioned Lee’s corruption scandals and bank 
frauds such as BBK’s gate event which was a big issue, by suggesting the fact 
that Lee was implicated in the scandal of a bankrupt investment company BBK. 
Nonetheless, Lee’s approval rating hit 50% whilst he was preparing for the 
presidential election and his landslide victory was already expected at the 
beginning of this period (Kwon, 2007). Because of this, the DP continued to 
attack the GNP using Lee’s qualifications as their reason, and this finally led to 
the intensification of a negative campaign. 
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The DP revealed many internal discords whilst conducting primary elections. 
The candidates who were engaging in primary elections announced their refusal 
to participation in primary elections because of illegal electioneering, which was 
caused by the compulsory mobilisation of Electoral Colleges. These internal 
problems inside party organisation caused a decline in the participation of voters 
for the DP’s primary election - although they adopted a mobile vote to encourage 
voting (Cho, 2007). For this reason, the reputation of the DP, as the first largest 
party in the Assembly at that time, seriously decreased. 
 
In contrast to these political situations, there was no dramatic change in the 
media environment - unlike in the 1997 and the 2002 elections - although the 
Internet became very popular and its usage increased. To be specific, there was 
frequent use of TV in election campaigns because of the first adoption of TV 
debate in the 1997 presidential election. In addition, the Internet campaigning 
had intensified since the 2002 presidential election. In this sense, it is a bit hard 
to say that there was no new media which was applied in the 2007 presidential 
election compared to the two earlier presidential elections. Therefore, almost all 
campaign activities remained as similar to the 2002 presidential election although 
each party’s performance in dealing with new media such as the Internet in 
election campaigning became more sophisticated than in the 2002 presidential 
election. If anything, election campaigns seem to be long-term because of the 
prolonged period of the process of primary election (KNEC, 2008a).  
 
Summary of this section 
 
Based on the political situations in South Korea as presented above, this section 
will be briefly summarised as follows. First of all, the ruling party firstly changed 
from GNP to DP in the 1997 presidential election because the approval rating of 
the GNP dramatically decreased due to several political reasons such as the 
party’s internal disorder. Unlike the previous presidential elections, voters have 
started doubting value of political system that maintained from military 
dictatorships and their political beliefs. Furthermore, in the 2002 presidential 
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election, the growth of political participation of educated young voters created a 
new sphere of electoral environment and made a big achievement of political 
development. Whereas, candidate Kim Dae-Jung of the DP was the one of the 
people amongst the three Kims - Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-joong, and Kim 
Jong-phil - who influenced the formation of Korean politics - and his approval 
rating gradually increased since he successfully formed a coalition with Kim 
Jong-Phil.  
 
Second, primary election as a new method for the selection of candidates was 
firstly adopted during the 2002 presidential election. Although it was adopted 
because of the DP’s idea that it would get more attention from voters (because 
the DP found it hard to elect a candidate who had the entire country’s support 
compared to the GNP), it had a sensational effect at that time. In effect, it was 
difficult to see if the people supported the previous method of selection of 
candidates for presidential election, which was through a party convention. This 
is because party members considered the party interest angle rather than wishing 
to represent the majority of citizens. However, the adoption of primary election 
in the 2002 presidential election was considered as a good system to contribute to 
intraparty democracy and to maximise political participation of voters. In this 
regard, Table 5.1 shows the historical alteration of the system of primary election.  
 
Table 5.1. The historical alteration of the system of primary election
1 
Party Structure 
The 1997 presidential 
election 
The 2002 presidential 
election 
The 2007 presidential 
election 
GNP 
Format 
National Convention 
of a party 
Primary election Primary election 
The 
Electoral 
Colleges 
12,068 representatives 
of party 
50,000 electoral colleges 
(15,000 representatives 
of party +10,000 party 
members +25,000 
ordinary voters) 
 
231, 384 electoral 
colleges  
(46,196 (20%) 
representatives of party 
+ 69,496 (30%) party 
members +69,496 
(30%) ordinary voters + 
46,196 (20%) opinion 
polls) 
DP Format 
National Convention 
of a party 
Primary election 
 
Cut-off pre-primary 
election + open primary 
election 
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Party Structure 
The 1997 presidential 
election 
The 2002 presidential 
election 
The 2007 presidential 
election 
DP 
The 
Electoral 
Colleges 
4,360 representatives 
of party  
 
70,000 Electoral Colleges 
(15,000 representatives 
of party + 20,000 party 
members + 35,000 
ordinary voters) 
1,680,000 Electoral 
Colleges 
(1,680,000 ordinary 
voters) 
1Sources: KNEC, 2003; Yoon, 2008  
 
As seen in Table 5.1, both parties selected their candidate for presidential 
election through a national party convention in the 1997 presidential election. 
Afterwards, both parties adopted a primary election to select their candidate in 
the following presidential election in 2002. To be specific, the GNP structures 
totalled 50,000 Electoral Colleges, composed of 15,000 party representatives, 
10,000 party members, and 25,000 ordinary voters for the primary election. That 
is, the basic structure in the formation of the Electoral Colleges for the primary 
election is party members and ordinary voters in the proportion 50:50. Although 
the DP’s structure was 70,000 Electoral Colleges for the primary election, 
proportions were the same as the GNP’s. In the 2007 presidential election, the 
GNP increased the number of Electoral Colleges compared to the 2002 
presidential election. The most interesting feature of the 2007 primary election is 
that the GNP included opinion polls’ results as one way of obtaining voters’ 
intentions. Whereas, the DP invited 1,680,000 ordinary voters for the primary 
election and they did not allow any party members to the primary election. The 
form was like a combined style, a cut-off pre-primary election and open primary 
election.  
 
To be more specific, the DP executed a public opinion poll for three days on 
10,000 people from the Electoral College and 2,400 from the general public to 
select five out of nine candidates in total in the primary election for the 2007 
presidential election. Then it determined the final candidates who would compete 
in the main competition by reflecting the results of the poll as 50%-50%. The 
rules of the main competition were selected as three methods in total, which are 
general Electoral College, mobile Electoral College and opinion poll. Total 
competition period was a month. Total number of valid votes from polling places 
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and mobile voting accounted for 90%, and the results of the poll for 10%. 
Anybody could actually become an Electoral College by application unlike 2002, 
when there was a limitation on mobilization.  
 
On the other hand, the GNP also elected candidates through competition like the 
DP. In the presidential election of 2007, they showed a more systematic look 
through various discussions unlike the 2002 presidential election which was 
processed hastily. First of all, the number of Electoral Colleges was expanded 
from 0.1% to 0.5% of qualified voters. Accordingly, it was changed from 40,000 
to 230,000 people. Additionally, the composition of the general Electoral College 
was changed to include 20% and 40% of the people under age of 40 from 30%. 
Finally, the Electoral College was made up of 231,384 voters, such as 20% of 
representatives (46,196), 30% of party members (69,496), 30% of National 
Electoral College (69,496) and 20% of Poll (46,196).  
 
5.3. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning 
 
As stated in the literature review, professionalisation of election campaign is 
broadly divided into two dimensions, the internal and the external. Therefore, in 
this sub-chapter, this research will firstly present all the results of the external 
dimension. As explained earlier, the external dimension of professionalisation of 
election campaign focuses more on the alteration of practical campaign activities 
rather than the internal change of party organisation such as the alteration of the 
role of party organisation by the influx of campaign professionals, and of the 
relationship between political parties and campaign professionals. In other words, 
it is about how parties have utilised new media and new campaign technology, 
and, consequently, how campaign strategy has altered over 10 years, looking at 
different party cases.  
 
Most importantly, this study will compare the campaigns of two parties, the GNP 
and DP (NMP, NMDP, and UNDP), in order to confirm whether each party has 
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practically differed in dealing with new media cutting-edge technology, and, 
therefore, has conducted different campaign strategies in the same electoral 
environment. It will be helpful to prove the arguments that the phenomenon of 
professionalisation of election campaign could have happened differently 
according to each party’s environment such as party size, the history of election 
results, and party structure. Accordingly, the results will be displayed according 
to the list of sub-sections: 1) the utilisation of media, 2) The utilisation of 
campaign technology including the results of the CAMPROF index and the use 
of opinion polls, 3) the alteration of campaign activities, especially focusing on 
political TV advertising and TV discussions, and 4) the alteration of style of 
election campaign such as the change from labour-intensive to capital-intensive 
campaigning.  
 
5.3.1. The utilisation of media 
 
As explained before, the arrival and utilisation of TV in politics has made about 
dramatic changes in the management of election campaigns in South Korea. 
Although mass media formats such as newspaper and radio have been utilised by 
political parties similarly to in previous election campaigns, their influences upon 
voters started to decrease because of TV since the 1997 presidential election. In 
effect, this trend was reported several times by academics and campaign 
commentators. According to KNEC (1998), it was researched that TV was the 
most powerful campaign medium and almost all respondents answered that 
political information on TV strongly influenced their votes in the 1997 
presidential election.  
 
Besides the effects of TV in the election campaign area, the electoral 
environment in South Korea has faced one more dramatic change due to the 
arrival of the Internet. As stated before, since the first arrival of the Internet in 
1982, it was firstly utilised as a campaign medium in the 2000 general election, 
and then the power of the Internet in the 2002 presidential election was stronger 
with young voters especially the 20-30 age group. In effect, the on-going process 
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of adoption of new media in politics has caused the decrease of the effect of 
printed media, and, eventually, it has launched a new paradigm for election 
campaigns. Therefore, Korean parties need to develop their campaign strategy, 
especially media strategy corresponding to the new media environment. 
 
Accordingly, this sub-section will discuss how campaign media has been utilised 
by political parties and explain what kinds of campaign activities have been less 
used or newly adopted, starting from the 1997 presidential election. 
 
The 1997 presidential election: the beginning of the TV campaign era 
 
With the political difficulties described above, there was a big challenge for 
political parties upon the first arrival of TV debates. Although many scholars cite 
Korean election campaigning utilising TV from the 1992 (14
th
) presidential 
election (Jeong, 2002), they also agree that the intensification of TV campaign 
strategies actually began in the 1997 (15
th
) presidential election with the arrival 
of TV debates (Polly news, 11/Dec/2012). In addition to this, it is clearly seen in 
the amendment of the electoral law, which was made before the 1997 presidential 
election.  
  
To be specific, the amendment to the electoral law was aimed at breaking the 
pattern of ‘high expenditure and low efficiency’ and covered new content about 
TV campaign activities instead of diminishing the number and category of small 
printed documents such as pamphlets and leaflets, and changing from an outdoor 
speech to an indoor speech (KNEC, 2009). To be specific, the number of election 
advertising broadcasts including radio and TV increased from five in the 1992 
presidential election to 30 times in the 1997 one. In addition, election advertising 
in newspapers appeared as many as 70 times in the 1997 presidential election. 
This was an incredible number compared to the fact that it was limited to only 
four times in the 1992 presidential election.  
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In contrast, it is stated in KNEC’s (1998) report that the number of outdoor 
speeches dramatically decreased and even the production of small printed matter 
like business cards was completely abolished in the 1997 presidential election. 
For example, it was possible to hold outdoor speeches up to 1,500 times in the 
1992 presidential election; however, this was later reduced to only one occasion 
in some districts and boroughs. In particular, this change was encouraged by the 
new article of electoral law that outdoor speeches that mobilised masses of 
people were transformed into indoor speeches, regardless of specific time and 
location. As a result, parties could only hold 294 speech meetings although they 
were allowed up to 335 times in electoral law (see Table 5.2). In the face of these 
facts, there is no doubt that the 1997 presidential election was a transition period 
between labour-intensive methods to capital-intensive ones, as stated in Farrell’s 
research (1996). Naturally political parties challenged the new electoral 
environment, and devoted much times to designing media-centralised campaign 
activities such as political TV advertising and joint political TV discussion
15
.  
 
Table 5.2. The alteration of campaign activities from the 1992 to the 1997 presidential 
elections 
Campaign method Category 1992 (14
th
) 1997 (15
th
) 
Newspaper Political advertising
1
 4 70 
TV 
Political advertising 5 30 
Political debates 0 4 
TV speeches 5 11 
The public 
mobilisation 
Outdoor speeches 1,500 335 
1. According to Cho (1998), the amount of political advertising through newspapers actually decreased. This 
is because candidates in the 1992 presidential election could place adverts four times in each daily 
newspaper. Given that there were more than 60 newspapers at the time of the 1992 presidential election, it 
was estimated that there were more than 240 advertisements per candidate, although there was a difference 
in the number being used by candidates depending on their financial state. However, in the 1997 presidential 
election, a total of just 70 advertisements per candidate were allowed.  
  
 
 
 
 
                                            
15
 Because of the strict campaign regulation in South Korea, political TV advertisings and jointed 
political TV discussion is considered as principal campaign activities using TV. Thus, the more 
detailed discussions about these two activities will be displayed on the 5.5.2 section.  
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The 2002 presidential election: the emergence of the Internet 
  
As explained above, the utilisation of mass media, especially TV, was vigorously 
launched in the 1997 presidential election, and South Korean campaigning 
entered the era of media-democracy. Naturally, the style of labour-intensive 
election campaigns, which are focused on mass rallies and outdoor speeches, has 
gradually decreased since the 1997 presidential election. There are no difference 
between the 1997 and the 2002 presidential election in dealing with conventional 
media such as TV and newspapers because the campaign regulations remained 
the same. Thus, parties were allowed to advertise up to 70 times in newspapers 
and no more than 30 times on TV and radio, and they were allowed four political 
TV discussions in the 2002 presidential election. Moreover, TV and endorsement 
speeches were allowed up to 11 times during the 23 days’ official campaign 
period before the actual presidential election date. Like the 1997 presidential 
election, in 2002 there were a total of 62 political discussions conducted by the 
press (KNEC, 2003). In a broad sense, there seemed to be no differences in 
dealing with TV and the other campaign activities compared to the 1997 
presidential election; however, there was a remarkable achievement for Internet 
campaigning in the 2002 presidential election. In effect, the first Internet election 
campaign in South Korea was the ‘National Simultaneous Local Election’ in 
1995, at which candidates provided information through PCs and election 
campaigns were formed using bulletin boards through PC communication. The 
following presidential election in 1997 was a turning point from PC 
communication to the Internet (Lee, 2008). At that time, some candidates had 
already opened their individual websites although the websites were not utilised 
as a major campaign instrument. This is because the Internet was not as popular 
as TV, with the introduction of political TV discussions, due to voters’ limited 
accessibility to the Internet, although a total of four times the amount of political 
discussions were held via the Internet and it certainly raised the voters’ interests 
(Dong-a Ilbo, 11/Nov/1997). 
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Afterwards, in South Korea, the Internet began to be used in earnest from the 
April 2000 general election for the members of the National Assembly (Back, 
2002; Schafferer, 2006). Since then, the Internet has broadly and largely 
influenced electoral outcomes and election campaigns. Although it was reported 
that 477 (45.9%) out of 1,038 candidates in the 2000 general election for the 
members of the National Assembly operated websites, most of these websites 
were built hurriedly only three months before the election (Jeon, 2008). Thus, 
this early trend in Internet political campaigns is distinguished from the trend in 
the 2002 presidential election, in terms of the method of usage of the Internet in 
election campaigns. 
 
Since the 2002 presidential election, the Internet is believed to be the most 
important medium in the political campaigns of South Korea (Hwang, 2002). In 
particular, voters believe that their political channels are being diversified and, 
consequently, that their political participation is being promoted. Conversely, 
political parties can communicate with voters and spread their campaign issues 
more easily as well as efficiently. In addition, parties can conduct election 
campaigns at a lower price than previously. Amongst these advantages in the 
utilisation of the Internet, the most important thing is that the composition of 
elections has changed from a regional competition between Gyeong-sang and 
Jeolla provinces to a generation gap between the 20-30 age group and the over-
40s (Interview with DP5; Shin, 2002). However, the Internet does not always 
bring positive aspects for parties in South Korea. For instance, the rejection 
movements against corrupt candidates promoted on the Internet by civil 
organisations including The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 
(Chamyeo Yeondae in South Korea) in the 2002 general election won fierce 
support from voters as they raised the political issue of ‘driving out inadequate 
politicians’ from the voters’ viewpoint. Different from representative election-
related civil movements in the past that mainly used assemblies, these new civil 
movements opened the ground for voters to exert more powerful influence and 
participation in politics using the Internet as a new campaign medium (Hwang, 
2002). This means that parties cannot treat the voters in the traditional way 
anymore and, further, there will be more campaign issues that parties have to 
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manage. Consequently, it has become problematic for parties because they may 
not anticipate issues such as the sudden exposure of scandals and rumours, in real 
time. As a result, South Korea seems to have entered into the era of permanent 
election campaign since the intensification of media-centralised campaigning 
including the Internet as a new medium. CP4 and GNP4 noted: 
 
‘… In effect, the official period of election campaign permitted 
by electoral law means nothing to parties, but rather, just a 
formal rule. … It is true that election campaigning has been 
permanent. … I do not think the majority of voters are 
significantly stimulated by campaign activities such as 
political TV discussions, advertising. … They already have a 
typical image about each candidate. … How does it form? It is 
from TV, the information source from the Internet that people 
view daily.’ (Interview transcript, CP4) 
 
 
‘The normal party activities are allowed 24 hours and 365 days. 
Nowadays GNP and DP do publicity work in the Internet, TV 
news, and newspapers everyday, and then, we receive 
evaluations from the voters afterwards through election. … 
See campaign slogans such as ‘prepared person’ of Kim 
candidate in 1997, ‘a clean liquidation of political corruption’ 
of Rho candidate in 2002, and ‘economic president’ of Lee 
candidate in 2007. All of these are related to their background 
and images.’ (Interview transcript, GNP4) 
 
In sum, in the 2002 presidential election election-related sites were largely 
divided into three types (Jeon, 2008). First, political forum sites providing 
general political information offered news and information related to elections 
and politics and promoted healthy political discussion among the site users by 
opening political forums. Second, the sites of civil organisations related to the 
general election provided information such as corrupt candidates to be rejected, 
and engaged in activities for the reform of political culture, which was their basic 
goal. Third, the websites of political parties and candidates basically provided 
political information, declared public promises, and distributed news about the 
activities of the political party or candidate. Compared to the 1997 presidential 
election, in the 2002 presidential election, most activities through the PC 
communication network were Internet election campaigns using bulletin boards. 
For instance, the candidates opened many interactive communication channels 
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through their private websites, such as email, free bulletin boards, online opinion 
polls, and discussion rooms. Especially, some candidates held cyber speech 
meetings or cyber supporter meetings in the virtual space of their websites and, 
furthermore, provided various contents like videos, animations and characters in 
order to attract Netizen’s attention (Shin, 2000).  
 
In particular, the Internet in the 2002 presidential election encouraged voters, 
especially the younger generation such as people aged between 20 and 30, to 
engage in political activities in many aspects. In other words, the Internet offers 
political motivation to the group of young voters, who are generally uninterested 
in politics, and, further, gives a sense of political purpose to the group of people 
that wants to change political convention. In addition to this, it means that parties 
have been able to design campaign strategies according to voters’ preferences in 
using campaign media. As briefly indicated earlier, for example, there was an 
incredible Internet campaign, ‘Rhosamo’ conducted by the voters who supported 
candidate Rho, which received a lot of attention from Korean academics in the 
2002 presidential election (Park, 2012; Jeong, 2004). Briefly, Rhosamo, which is 
the first politician’s fan club, was organised voluntarily by several Netizens when 
candidate Rho of the DP (formally known as NMDP in 2002), who ran in Busan 
under the mottos of regional integration and peace between the east and the west, 
failed to get elected in the 1999 general election. The number of members was 
estimated at approximately 61,800 and it was the biggest online community in 
2002. Therefore, it was maintained for a long period and waged political 
activities continuously. In particular, during the 2002 presidential election 
campaign, their activities were largely expanded, e.g. fundraising, the production 
of T-shirts and mobile ring tones, and developed into a movement to increase 
young people’s participation. In relation to this, DP5 said that 
 
‘Rhosamo was comprised of mainly young voters. In addition 
to this, Rho candidate emphasised clean liquidation of political 
custom and the differentiation between young and old-aged 
politicians. … Therefore, the voters, especially young people, 
were motivated and looked at DP in a new way.’ (Interview 
transcript, DP5)  
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A notable point is that the members of such communities made efforts to create a 
healthy political culture while doing their best to get their candidate elected 
through online and offline activities. Similarly, there was the Internet community, 
‘Changsarang’, for candidate Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP. The membership of this 
online community was around 11,600 from its organisation in November 2000 
(Lee and Seo, 2002). Like ‘Rhosamo’, it worked online at the beginning, and 
then started to work offline to support Lee in the 2002 presidential election. Each 
member of this community shared some political information and social 
activities through the official website. However, one thing that should be noted is 
that people in these two communities are all volunteers and, therefore, it was not 
controlled by political parties. Nonetheless, most DP as well as GNP 
interviewees agreed that those communities’ activities were, in effect, better than 
online campaign activities performed by the parties, and the influence of 
campaign activities such as mobilising people and raising funds was much 
stronger in terms of effectiveness. GNP2 said that 
 
‘The biggest advantage of ‘Rhosamo’ to DP in the 2002 
presidential election was that DP did not need money to 
operate it because it was organised by the supporters of Rho 
candidate. … That’s why it was very effectively operated and 
motivated. They had a very clear aim and motivation. … They 
did not need to care what the other people said, and even, 
check what DP thought about them. … Therefore, they 
engaged in or organised all campaign activities whatever they 
wanted
16
. Furthermore, they find out and spread out our 
rumours [GNP’s rumours].’ (Interview transcript, GNP2) 
 
Besides these typical communities in support of the two candidates, according to 
a newspaper article of Lee and Seo (2002), there were seven online websites and 
64 communities for candidate Lee Hoi-change of the GNP, and 16 websites and 
84 communities for candidate Rho Mu-hyun of the DP, which were all operated 
by voters. It cannot be said that political parties operated all these websites. 
However, it cannot be denied that there was a strong influence of Internet 
campaigning in the 2002 presidential election, and, consequently, the DP were 
                                            
16
 There were many big issues about whether campaign activities of ‘Rhosamo’ were contrary to 
election campaign regulations. In effect, the National Election Commission announced the order 
of closure of communities which organised campaign activities for particular candidates such as 
‘Rhosamo’ and ‘Changsarang’ (Seoul Economy, 20/Nov/2002) 
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the main beneficiary in the utilisation of the Internet as new campaign medium, 
whether the DP intended this or not.  
 
The 2007 presidential election: the intensification of Internet campaigning 
and the arrival of mobile vote  
 
Almost all campaign activities used in the 2002 presidential election continued in 
the 2007 presidential election. Therefore, like in the 2002 election, parties were 
allowed to advertise no more than 70 times each in newspapers, and up to 30 
times each on television and radio. In addition to this, candidates could attend 
four joint political TV discussions, as well as giving up to 11 endorsement 
speeches on TV (KNEC, 2008a). The biggest difference between the 2002 and 
the 2007 presidential elections was the decline in the attendance at political 
discussions by candidates, who now tended to avoid these because of strategic 
campaign planning (Lee, 2008). Although political TV discussion will be 
discussed more in the following section, it turned out that candidates were 
worried about the fall in their popularity caused by their participation in 
ineffective political debates on TV.  
 
In the case of Internet campaigning, it was believed that it would be intensified in 
the 2007 election due to its great success in the 2002 presidential election. 
Naturally, parties and candidates devoted more time to the creation of campaign 
activities on the web (Kang and Dyson, 2008). No doubt, there were a huge 
number of politician’s websites, communities, web-blogs, and Minihompy17 in 
Cyworld in the 2007 presidential election. Korean campaign observers indicated 
that the 2007 presidential election became the significant year that UCC (User 
created content) would be emphasised, compared to the 2002 presidential 
election (Jung, 2007). It can be interpreted that there were several attempts to 
                                            
17
 It is similar in form to Facebook. In general, it provides all kinds of online activities such as 
uploading and pictures, promoting friendship, chatting, and joining online communities. 
According to an article in emarketer (30/May/2012), the popularity of Minihompy was higher 
than other global sites such as Facebook, Yahoo, and MSN before 2012. It is reported that 
Facebook has been as popular as Minihompy since 2012, but the other global companies are still 
struggling. 
123 
 
 
stimulate voter participation beyond the recognition that the Internet is valued as 
one of the better campaign tools to communicate with voters, in comparison to 
conventional media such as newspaper and TV, and to share political information 
as well as to exchange political opinion. That is, it is not an exaggeration to say 
that the 2007 presidential election was the election where Internet campaigning 
was intensified.  
 
However, it was reported that the Internet campaign was not as successful or 
popular as campaign observers had expected (Im, 2007). Although parties 
invested a lot of time and a huge amount of money on Internet campaigning, 
especially in the case of the GNP which failed to win the 2002 presidential 
election due to a poorer performance than the DP, it did not play a key role in 
mobilising the voters. There were many reasons why Internet campaigning 
slowed down a bit compared to the 2002 presidential election; the severe 
campaign regulations in relation to Internet campaigning was the main cause that 
was pointed out (Kim, Lee, and Kim, 2007). In addition to this, there were many 
CCC (Camp Created Content) and PCC (Proteur Created Content) rather than 
UCC (Yoon, 2007). According to Yoon (2007), campaign professionals produced 
the most uploaded video clips. Thus, it can be said that the original purpose of 
the diffusion of UCC, in terms of invigoration of voters’ participation, was 
debased by the intervention of the parties. From this sense, strictly speaking, it is 
hard to say that the use of Internet campaigning performed by parties was not 
much improved in the 2007 presidential election compared to the 2002 
presidential election.   
 
To be more specific, according to a white paper (2008) by the DP
18
, they 
managed a total of six websites for election campaigning in the 2007 presidential 
election. First of all, they ran an individual website for candidate Jeong and an 
official party website to contain all the information related to a candidate and the 
                                            
18
 As explained in the part on the history of political parties in South Korea, Chapter 3, the DP 
changed their title several times. Therefore, the official name of DP was New Millennium Party 
(NMP) in the 1997 presidential election, New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) in the 2002 
presidential election, and Unified New Democratic Party (UNDP) in the 2007 presidential 
election.  
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party. In general, they utilised these websites to spread their campaign issues and 
any news in relation to the campaign. In addition to this, the DP promoted voter 
participation and received policy suggestions from the voters through a website 
called Naesesang Datkeom
19
 (http://www.happy1219.com) in South Korea. 
Moreover, they operated another website, known as Ppulttong
20
 in South Korea 
(http://www.happyman.com), to manage all kinds of video-clips. Interestingly, 
they ran candidate Jeong’s wife’s website, to show Jeong’s emotional 
characteristics. All of which had banner-ads to connect voters directly to 
candidate Jeong’s Minihompy website and blog. The differences between the 
2002 and the 2007 presidential election is that in the latter parties operated more 
websites related to their candidates and each website had its own specific 
functions, as explained above.  
 
Despite these efforts, many Korean observers judged the DP’s 2007 presidential 
election Internet campaign to be less successful than the 2002 one (Yoon, 2008; 
MBC news, 20/Dec/2007). In effect, the DP had many problems in the 
preparation of the 2007 presidential election campaign due to internal conflict 
resulting in the late establishment of their official election committee. On a more 
serious note, since the result in the polls predicted an overwhelming victory for 
candidate Lee Myung-bak of the GNP, the DP employed a negative campaign 
against the GNP, especially referring to candidate Lee’s ‘BBK scandal’, which is 
a stock price manipulation incident regarding the BBK company
21
. Moreover, the 
DP’s situation was further inflamed by the frequent appearance of news reports 
in the conventional media such as TV and newspapers due to the party’s internal 
conflict (DongA Ilbo, 30/Oct/2007; The Hankyoreh, 24/Nov/2007). In particular, 
there was a differentiation in dealing with the Internet between the GNP and the 
DP because the GNP was devoted to the improvement of Internet campaigning 
after the loss of the 2002 presidential election. DP3 and DP5 commented: 
                                            
19
 It means ‘my world’ in Korean.  
20
 It means ‘sparks’ in Korean.  
21
 It was a stock price manipulation incident regarding a BBK Company which was raised during 
the 2007 presidential election. It was particularly highlighted due to a doubt about the 
relationship between a representative of the BBK Company and candidate Lee Myung-bak. 
Consequently, the GNP did not receive positive responses from voters but, rather, its support 
decreased (DongA Ilbo, 22/Dec/2007) 
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‘We [DP] did not have any specific strategy for Internet 
campaigning in the 2007 presidential election. … In effect, the 
two remarkable reasons of our success in Internet campaigning 
in the 2002 presidential election were invaluable support from 
‘Rhosamo’ and the lack of preparation of the GNP at that 
time. … I remember that they [GNP] prepared a lot due to the 
loss of the election in the 2002 presidential election.’ 
(Interview transcript, DP3)  
 
 
‘If I make a list about the alteration of the use of mass media, I 
can say that the 1997 presidential election was TV, the 2002 
presidential election was the Internet, and the 2007 presidential 
election was … nothing. In effect, we [DP] should have more 
built in sophisticated campaign strategy in the utilisation of 
mass media in the 2007 presidential election than previous 
elections if we are following these steps. However, we did 
not. … Rather, campaign strategy using media was worse than 
before’. (Interview transcript, DP5) 
 
From DP3’s comment, it is assumed that the firm trust in traditional media 
caused by the conventional political elite culture inside the GNP gave some 
benefits to the DP in the 2002 presidential election. Although South Korean 
campaigning is influenced more by political situations of the time such as 
political coalition and internal conflicts rather than the utilisation of efficient 
mass media, it cannot be denied that the campaign strategy of the DP was less 
improved than that of the GNP; strictly speaking, it was a slowdown in terms of 
the utilisation of mass media.       
 
On the other hand, as explained above, the GNP were fully ready for Internet 
campaigning after the loss of the 2002 presidential election by the narrowest of 
margins due to the lack of preparation in Internet campaigning. According to 
GNP5, the GNP mobilised all kinds of party resources into Internet campaigning 
and they had a higher expectation about its effect. GNP5 said that  
 
‘In the 2002 presidential election, our main concern was just 
how to manage the party and candidate’s websites, and how to 
advertise the candidate Lee through these websites. … In 
effect, we were not overly concerned about the method of how 
to mobilise people via online campaign activities at that time. 
We [GNP] did more old care media. … However, in the 2007 
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presidential election, we had invested a lot in Internet 
campaigning since 2002 and our expectation was high enough’. 
(Interview transcript, GNP5)  
 
Continually, GNP5 stated that the GNP took a lot of care in online political 
adverts. For this reason, GNP 5 argued that they had to reduce budget estimates 
on political advertisements in newspapers dramatically, especially in local papers. 
Like the DP, the GNP also operated each party and candidate’s websites, 
communities, and Facebook to communicate with the voters. In particular, they 
ran a specialised website to broadcast their speeches and any campaign activities 
live across the country. Furthermore, the GNP conducted election campaigning 
via mobiles, although this was not very effective at that time. Taking all things 
into consideration, the GNP has gradually improved their campaign strategy 
through analysing the failing factors of previous elections, although they were a 
bit slower in the context of the speed of adoption of new media.  
 
Summary of the section  
 
Almost all interviewees agreed with the alteration of election campaign paradigm 
caused by the development of media. It is true that political parties need all kinds 
of media to communicate with voters and try to utilise these in response to a 
changing society. As a result, parties have to give careful attention to these 
developments and continue to improve their campaign strategies with them. With 
regard to these changes to parties, all interviewees said that it is not surprising 
news but just a natural phenomenon. In addition to this, they indicated that 
efficient use of mass media in election campaigning has been a decisive factor in 
the outcome of elections in South Korea. In particular, its importance has been 
deeply emphasised since labour-intensive campaign activities such as canvassing 
and outdoor speeches were restricted by a new electoral law in 1994, known as 
The Public Official Election Act, to assuage the election pattern of low efficiency 
and high expenditure. In relation to this, CP5 indicated that  
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‘It is true that Korean parties have conducted various kinds of 
campaign activities using media although doubts still remain 
about the question of which one is a dependent variable in 
diffusion of media democracy between a revised campaign 
regulation encourage on the increase of party’s campaign 
activities using mass media and of party’s various use of mass 
media lead to campaign regulation’s change’. (Interview 
transcript, CP5)  
 
Under the changing electoral environment, Korean parties seemed to have no 
choice but to adapt to these changes without any consideration of how they affect 
their campaigns. DP1 stated that  
 
‘We do not actually have much time to consider whether we 
have to adopt new media in our campaign if voters use it well 
in their current life. No matter what it is and how we deal with 
it at the beginning of adoption, what we can do is to utilise it 
immediately not to keep up with the others’. (Interview 
transcript, DP1)  
 
Thus, it is hard to say whether South Korean parties have adopted new media and 
new campaign technology by their conscious and strategic attitude.  
 
It is shown that South Korean parties have accomplished various kinds of 
campaign activities by the adoption of new media and communication 
technologies in each presidential election from 1997 to 2007, especially since the 
arrival of TV in election campaigns in the early 1990s
22
 (Kwon, 1992; You, 
1997). Briefly, the first political discussion on TV was introduced in the 1997 
presidential election (Kim, 2002), and, following the presidential election in 
2002, the Internet was utilised (Kang, 2011). Moreover, in 2007, a mobile vote 
was conducted by the DP
23
 (Lee, 2007). Accordingly, it does not need to be said 
that South Korean parties have made every endeavour to adopt new media and 
                                            
22
  In fact, in South Korea, TV as a medium for political discussion was introduced into the 
election campaign in the 1987 (13
th
) presidential election, as mentioned in Chapter 2. However, 
its effect was not strong at that time because of a low rate of distribution. Therefore, Korean 
scholars mention the time, when media politics started as being from the 1992 (14
th
) presidential 
election (Jeong, 2002; Kim and Kim, 2005).  
23
 As explained earlier, DP is an abbreviation of The United New Democratic Party. It was 
formed in 2008. (See historical party changes in Chapter 1 for more details about it.) 
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communication technology during these periods, despite the turbulent 
development in media. Furthermore, almost all interviewees generally agree that 
the extensive use of mass media and new campaign technology by political 
parties can be understood as the result in the change of campaign paradigm 
caused by the advent of new media; that is, by the modernisation process. The 
two interview transcripts presented below clearly express this.  
 
‘Even though surrounding electoral environments such as a 
bad relationship with media companies, [and] less than 
friendly assessment of the previous government in 2002 had a 
bad influence on the DP, the reason the DP could win the 
presidential election was because campaign paradigm totally 
changed at that time because of the arrival of the Internet.’ 
(Interview transcript, DP5)  
 
 
‘Since political TV advertising was firstly introduced for the 
election campaign in the 1987 presidential election, the arrival 
of television has totally the altered election campaign 
paradigm in following presidential election. Afterwards, the 
Internet in 2002 performed the same role as TV in the 1987 
presidential election.’ (Interview transcript, GNP2) 
 
As noted in interview transcripts and campaign regulations, it is true that there is 
a high level of reliance on mass media in election campaigns in South Korea. In 
relation to this issue, DP5 commented that parties seem to have the hardest time 
in designing campaign strategy especially when no new media is introduced. 
How much parties have struggled to show something new in their campaign and 
how important the meaning of novelty is in designing campaign strategy can be 
clearly understood. According to DP5, the arrival of the Internet as a new 
medium in political campaigning in the 2002 presidential election was not that 
difficult to utilise because the Internet was in general use, was very popular with 
the public and had the potential to draw the voters’ attention at that time. In 
particular, he explained that most people do not care about whether the party has 
a high standard of skill in management of new media, especially in the initial 
step, and the judgment of a successful campaign is determined according to 
whether the party appeals to voters’ tastes. Whereas, DP5 states that formulating 
a media strategy in the 2007 presidential election was a big issue for DP because 
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the Internet was not a new medium anymore to Koreans as every party had 
utilised it since the 2002 presidential election. To make matters worse, the 
public’s aspirations to change a party in government were highly serious due to a 
bad assessment of the DP’s achievements whilst in office. Naturally, election 
agendas focused on candidate Lee of the GNP, and his approval rating increased. 
In particular, his career as a successful businessman was strongly emphasised 
during the then worst economic situation in Korea in the 2007 presidential 
election. Although there was a new campaign approach of mobile voting by the 
DP, and it was successfully popular at that time, its popularity did not last long. 
Compared to the 2002 presidential election, it is therefore assumed that parties 
had no greater benefit in utilising mass media in the 2007 presidential election 
because the appearance of new media was not obvious. For this reason, the 
election campaign accomplished by the utilisation of mass media in the 2007 
presidential election did not seem to work. Consequently, it is inferred that taking 
great advantage of the adoption of mass media in election campaigns is highly 
related to two issues in South Korea: 1) the proper timing and sophisticated 
targeting tactics; that is, when new media is introduced first and who uses those 
campaign media; 2) the time when candidates are equal in competition with no 
differences in election pledge.  
 
5.3.2. The utilisation of campaign technology 
 
This section will present the result of how Korean parties have adopted cutting-
edge campaign technologies and have utilised these in their campaigning over 
the 10 years in question. Therefore, this section will focus on answering one of 
the research questions, which is what and how differences in campaign activities 
were accomplished by the utilisation of campaign technologies, using the 
CAMPROF index and interview materials. In addition to this, this section will 
confirm whether or not hypothesis 1, political parties will try to approach their 
work differently especially after an election defeat, would be accepted.  
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5.3.2.1. The results of the CAMPROF index  
 
Tenscher, Mykkänen, and Moring (2012) argued that the CAMPROF index, 
which was introduced by Gibson and Römmele (2009), is designed to measure 
new media technology and campaign structures such as the formation of 
personnel and communication resources. Accordingly, presenting the results of 
the CAMPROF index is helpful in understanding historical changes, especially 
when focused on the utilisation of campaign technology and its following 
consequences such as the use of campaign professionals in South Korea. 
However, as explained in the methodology chapter, measuring and presenting 
figures of the results of the CAMPROF index using the Korean case in a 
historical context is somewhat difficult due to several reasons - such as lack of 
information about party resources and restrictions of campaign regulations
24
.  
 
Accordingly, the results are presented according to variables which are stated on 
the CAMPROF index - (1) use of telemarketing and direct mail, (2) presence of 
an internal Internet communication system, (3) e-mail sign up or subscription list 
for regular news updates,  (4) outside headquarters, (5) continuous campaigning, 
and (6) use of outside public relations/media consultants - based on interview 
materials.  
 
(1) Use of telemarketing and direct mail  
 
First of all, both parties use telemarketing and direct mails to contact voters; 
however, under campaign regulations, they are only allowed to contact their own 
members. In relation to this issue, DP3 commented that these activities do not 
actually give benefits to the party compared to their efforts and investments on 
these activities. It is because parties cannot contact ordinary people, and can even 
only contact party members who agreed to receive calls and mail when they 
                                            
24
 According to campaign regulations in South Korea, parties are allowed to send direct mails 
only to constituents who are registered on the list of party members and agree to receive this 
service.  
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registered with the party. In the same line, GNP5 noted that they cannot even 
know and check whether party members who receive direct mails read all the 
mail a party sends. Therefore, GNP5 argued that a party does not think direct 
mail would bring strong effects to the party itself. Nonetheless, both parties send 
regular e-mail subscriptions once a month in non-election periods, and once a 
week or more than once a week in election periods.  
 
(2) Presence of an internal Internet communication system 
 
Secondly, it turned out that both parties have had internal Internet 
communication systems since the 2000s. In the case of the DP, they made their 
Intranet system after the 1997 presidential election and the GNP have utilised 
one since 2004. Although the DP utilised the Intranet system earlier than the 
GNP, full utilisation has been accomplished since 2004. Furthermore, the two 
parties have utilised it with the purpose of it providing a communication tool 
between internal party campaign staffers. Despite their original aim, it turned out 
that the function of the Intranet system was not efficient for them. DP3 noted: 
 
‘It is hard to say that the establishment of the Intranet system 
has been achieved in a way of communication medium 
between internal party campaign staffers. … Whenever we 
need to communicate, phoning and fax service are much 
easiest way than using the Internet system. … In effect, we 
should use computers in [the] party office in order to use the 
Intranet system, but we often work outside’ (Interview 
transcripts, DP3).  
 
Due to these problems, the function of the Intranet system has changed from 
communication medium to storage of official documents. This situation also 
happened in GNP. GNP4 noted: 
 
‘In general, we use the Internet for the storage of official 
documents. However, we prefer using online messenger 
services such as MSN or NateOn online messengers to 
communicate and to notify daily news between party staffs. 
Since the smart phone arrived in South Korea in 2010, these 
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communication apps have also been frequent used than the 
Intranet system.’ (Interview transcript, GNP4) 
 
Although they agree that the Intranet system is not efficient, it turned out that 
both parties have continued to find different ways to revitalise it in response to 
technology developments. For example, the GNP have started to rebuild their 
system, although they are still not convinced of the efficiency of the Intranet 
system, whilst the DP have created a new mobile application which can help paid 
party executives to access the system frequently whenever internal party 
campaign staffers want to use it. In these ways, both parties have tried to develop 
the Intranet system; however, it does not seem to be used for election campaigns.  
 
(3) E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates 
 
In the case of e-mail subscription newsletter, it is revealed that both parties send 
a regular e-mail newsletter to voters who registered on party websites and 
consented to receive it, one per month. In the case of election periods, parties 
often send e-mail newsletters whenever they have any news updates for voters.  
 
(4) Outside headquarters 
 
Thirdly, both parties have outside headquarters, especially during campaign 
periods. As explained earlier, Korean parties have had candidates’ private camps 
since 1997. Although this team is set up for election campaigns, it turns out that 
almost all important decisions related to campaign activities are decide by private 
camp. In particular, this situation occurs more in major parties rather than in 
minor parties.  
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(5) Continuous campaigning 
 
Fourthly, party organisation could conduct election campaigning activities after 
the end of the ballot within a party in the 1997 presidential election, and the end 
of the primary election for presidential election from the 2002 presidential 
election. In effect, Korean parties conduct official campaign activities 21 days 
before the actual Election Day. Although parties cannot start campaign activities 
earlier due to campaign regulation, DP5 and DP3 noted that Korean campaigning 
has been permanent style. DP3 commented that  
 
‘There is a distinction between the headquarters of a political 
party and the private camp. The headquarters of political 
parties can engage in election campaigning after the primary 
election …3 months before the actual election Day, but camp 
may be established up to 1 year before election day’ (Interview 
transcript, DP3).  
 
In addition to this, DP5 said that ordinary images of parties or candidates tend to 
influence voting decisions because voters no longer have a high level of party 
attachment. 
 
(6) Use of outside public relations/media consultants 
 
Sixthly, both parties have occasionally employed media consultants and opinion 
poll companies, especially in the campaign period. The most remarkable feature 
in using external campaign professionals in presidential elections from 1997 to 
2007 is that the number of those employed has increased and their role has been 
expanded. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that they are used on a temporary 
rather than a permanent basis
25
.  
 
In addition, the two party organisations have improved and have operated their 
training sessions in relation to new media skills. In effect, developing training 
                                            
25
 The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning will be discussed in 
more details in the section 5.4.   
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sessions for internal party campaign staffers and legislatures including party 
leaders and candidates is necessary to make a successful campaign (Wlezien, 
2010). Although many interviewees in the group of internal party campaign 
staffers stated that training is not as efficient as they expect, it cannot be denied 
that the contents of training have developed in accordance with the changing 
electoral environment.  
 
From these results, it can be asserted that there are not many differences between 
parties in the utilisation of new technology if the state of their finances is similar 
to each other under South Korea’s strict campaign regulations. This is 
understandable because major parties try to utilise all the best party resources so 
far as circumstances permit.  
 
5.3.2.2. The use of opinion polls  
 
As mentioned before, the growth of technological advances such as, telephone 
canvassing, computers, direct mail, and fax machines, and the intensification of 
the scientific campaigning methods such as opinion polls have continued. 
Moreover, the power of voters is stronger in the electoral process because they 
can use various personnel communication channels - computers, the Internet, 
PDA, and mobile phone etc. - according to their tastes in post-modern society to 
obtain as much political information as they want. For this reason, parties devote 
resources to adopting the latest campaign technology into their campaign. 
Amongst the various kinds of new technology from the 1990s to 2000s, what is 
mostly used for election campaigns in Korea is opinion polls.   
 
In South Korea, the utilisation of opinion polls started in the 1987 presidential 
election. Up to now in South Korea, they have been utilised in various types of 
elections and their influence on election outcome has increased; although the 
history of opinion polls is shorter than in both the UK and USA, where polls 
have been used for over 100 years. In particular, Park (2002) explained that polls 
have contributed to achieving the improvement of electoral culture in terms of 
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quality by building on unique survey methods that have been specialised for 
South Korea through trial and error. In addition to this, he exemplified the result 
of the 1997 presidential election, which was reported by the KOREAN Gallup 
poll company, as a concrete example in his research. In the 1997 presidential 
election, the Korean Gallup foresaw the election outcome and the prediction was 
successfully fulfilled with few minor errors, e.g. less than average 0.3% errors 
against the actual rate of turnout. Accordingly, Park argued that it is now the time 
to increase the accuracy of voting about opinion polls.  
 
Moreover, in South Korea, under strict campaign regulations dealing with 
campaign technologies such as sending an e-mail subscription newsletter and 
direct mailing, the extensive use of polls has been considered the best method as 
well as providing objective data that parties or candidates can reference in 
designing election campaigns. Thus, it can be said that the utilisation of opinion 
polls made a technological breakthrough that led to a scientific campaign in the 
historical Korean context in spite of a short history of utilisation in the country.  
 
The historical alteration of the utilisation of opinion polls from 1997 to 2007 
 
As briefly explained above, one of the remarkable features of the 1997 
presidential election campaign was the extensive use of opinion polls by 
broadcasting and newspapers companies compared to previous elections. From 
the 1987 to the 1992 presidential elections, they were mainly used by parties, 
civic organisations, and academia rather than the press due to a low level of 
awareness of and trust in them. Furthermore, it was prohibited to inform the 
public of the result of polls from the start date of the official election campaign 
period until midnight on Election Day. However, it was officially permitted to 
broadcast the result of the presidential election forecasting survey at the end of 
the vote in 1997 and this has consequently led to the expansion of the use of 
opinion polls (Park, 2002). 
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In addition to this, the utilisation of opinion polls by parties or individual 
candidates was widely as well as vigorously performed. According to the 
interview with CP7, there were many surveys to investigate party dynamics and 
the relationship between their own factions, along with a great deal of polls of 
approval rating during the official period of election campaign. That is, it meant 
that polls were mainly carried out to investigate whether a particular politician 
who wanted to run for primary election would be a final candidate for 
presidential election. Thus, CP7 noted that individual candidates basically used 
opinion polls in order to prove their suitability and popularity to the others, and 
then establish their own campaign strategy to win in a primary election. 
Although parties asked private poll companies for their approval ratings after the 
final candidate was elected, CP7 and CP8 commented that there were actually 
more surveys which were asked for by individual politicians before primary 
elections rather than during the official period of election campaign. This was 
because the final candidates in the 1997 election were elected by a vote of the 
party members, unlike the mixed form of the vote of the party members and 
people’s participatory contest in the 2002 and the 2007 elections. Accordingly, 
building on a sound position inside the party through good support from party 
members might be a priority to ensure that a particular individual was the final 
candidate of each party. In particular, party members wanted to elect a candidate 
to win and, therefore, the result of opinion polls were the heart of the whole issue 
of party members. Given this, individual candidates who wanted to run for 
primary election might need to know the dynamics of political power inside the 
party in order to create a tactical strategy based on careful surveys. Thus, CP7 
indicated that the institutional environment referred to above in 1997 strongly 
emphasised the importance of the establishment of campaign strategy through 
polls.  
 
‘Until the 1997 election, I saw several cases that candidates 
who were not fully supported by the public were elected 
through a tactical campaign strategy. … It might be because of 
the different process of candidate selection compared to the 
current one. ... The matter of how to form relationships with 
party members and politicians who belonged to the party was a 
key success for every candidate to be elected.’ (Interview 
transcript, CP7) 
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Moreover, it is reported that polls strongly influence a political coalition. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, South Korean parties have been formed by particular 
politicians, who have rich political experience and knowledge as well as being 
from their hometown, rather than by similar political ideology. Accordingly, the 
political support for a particular party is clearly divided according to local 
constituencies. Thus, the opposition parties tried to unite for a single candidacy 
agreement, except the GNP, which has more support and party members. 
Especially, the GNP has held an unchallenged position in historical political 
dynamics in South Korea as they have maintained a regime for more than 40 
years. Under this unique political situation, it is referred to in several interviews 
(CP2, CP7 and CP8) that polls played a key role in the negotiation of a political 
collation. According to a newspaper article from The Hankyorech, many 
observers believed that candidate Kim Jong-phil of the United Liberal 
Democratic Party, the second biggest opposition party in the 1997 presidential 
election, would not unite with the DP and agree on a single candidate if the 
approval rating of candidate Kim of the DP maintained an average of 15% (Baek, 
1997).  
 
Furthermore, the result of polls caused a factional strife in the GNP. Lee In-jae, 
who was one of the preliminary candidates of the GNP’s primary election, 
pointed out the fact that his approval rating was higher than that of Lee Hoi-
chang of the GNP. Afterwards, he was defeated by the GNP after losing the 
primary election and organised a new political party, called Kukminshindang, in 
South Korea. Consequently, supporters of the GNP were split and it was a 
decisive factor of the GNP’s election defeat in the 1997 presidential election. 
Through the two cases describe above, it can be said that polls had a greater 
influence on more political issues such as coalitions and the formation of factions 
than on a direct electoral outcome.   
 
In the 2002 presidential election, there was extensive use of polls by political 
parties and their influence was greatly increased in comparison to the 1997 
presidential election. The press reported that poll results of candidate’s approval 
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rating were close-run things every day, and even the main issues on TV news 
relating to the election campaign were about them. In particular, the reflection of 
the results of polls in the DP’s primary election was enough to indicate their 
importance. Furthermore, voters answered that the results of polls mostly 
affected their voting choices (KNEC, 2003). Many observers argued that South 
Korea was experiencing a flood of opinion polls (Hankuk Ilbo, 20/Nov/2002). 
Accordingly, parties and candidates were sensitive to poll results, and were in 
constant fear of their approval rating decreasing. In effect, some politicians in the 
DP requested a re-primary election because of the decline Rho Mu-hyun’s 
approval rating that was presented in newspapers in the 2002 presidential 
election. Furthermore, polls were utilised for the main method of the selection 
about a single candidacy of opposition parties, between the DP and 
Kukmintognhap 21 Party. Despite many criticisms about the problem of the 
samplings, the methods, and the interpretation of poll results, and a blind faith of 
parties and candidates, such cases show how much the power of opinion polls 
has increased and affected the campaign process more so in the 2002 presidential 
election than in the 1997 presidential election.  
 
Entering into the 2007 election, a huge number of polls were utilised due to a 
reduction in the prohibition period of the announcement of the results of polls in 
newspapers and TV from 22 days before the actual Election Day in the 2002 
presidential election to six days in the 2007 presidential election (KNEC, 2009). 
In particular, the 2007 presidential election is considered as a victory for polls 
(The Hankyoreh, 14/Dec/2007). This is because Lee Myung-bak, the GNP 
candidate, continued to rank number one in almost all surveys for around a year, 
and newspaper articles issued those results constantly. Furthermore, the 
importance of polls has risen because they were firstly adopted by the DP’s 
primary election in the 2002 presidential election, and have been utilised in the 
GNP’s primary election. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the poll actually 
was a key role in Lee winning. Moreover, various kinds of poll methods such as 
FGI, focus group interview with professionals beyond telephone survey, have 
been applied and have been requested by parties and candidates.  
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From a historical perspective in the utilisation of polls in Korean election 
campaigns, CP7 and CP8 expected that there were many more polls conducted 
and research undertaken in the 1997 presidential election than in the 2007 
presidential election, unlike the general expectation. As a reasonable explanation, 
CP7 guessed that this might be due to a better state of party finance. Compared to 
the current situation, parties might have had many ways of receiving sponsorship 
from big companies or any other support funds in the 1997 presidential election. 
Thus, it might be easier to do it. In addition to this, the most important thing is 
that there was a difference in the context of tactical usage of polls between the 
1997 and the 2007 presidential elections. To be precise, parties or each candidate 
used polls and surveys at first to ensure that they were their party’s final 
candidate, and then they used simple polls such as the approval rating of a 
selected final candidate in the 1997 presidential election. On the other hand, in 
the 2007 presidential election, parties utilised polls to select a candidate who is 
valued as a competitive candidate against other parties or who is popular with the 
public, at first, and then they used them to understand the fact of their current 
situation. In addition, CP5 explained that parties have understood more and more 
about what the role of polls is and how to utilise it properly for their election 
campaign. 
 
‘They [parties] understand that polls [are] only way to check 
what voters want to parties or candidates. … Since the 
emergence of the Internet, it is true that the method of party 
communication that can help reach to voters has widely 
expanded. However, it is applied to the special groups 
especially young voters or voters who have often used the 
Internet. They are not representatives of whole voters.’ 
(Interview transcript, CP5) 
 
In other words, polls were regarded as a scientific campaign tool in the 1997 
presidential election whilst parties were utilised to discern their candidate’s 
accurate positions during the election campaign period. With regard to this, CP7 
gave a real case: 
 
‘… He was an incumbent National Assembly member who 
belonged to a private camp of presidential election. One day, 
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he asked us to change the results of polls because he was 
afraid if a presidential candidate would be down-cast at the 
poll results during his election campaigning. …. He even knew 
already that the result of the poll was exactly accurate and their 
approval rating had decreased.’ (Interview transcript, CP7) 
 
This case clearly shows the low awareness of politicians. At that time, they 
widely believed that they considered opinion polls as one of the campaign tools 
needed to achieve their final aim of winning an election and forming political 
coalitions rather than reading the mind of the public such as interests and 
requirements. Therefore, the utilisation of opinion polls in the 1997 presidential 
election can be interpreted as developing quantitatively compared to previous 
election campaigns due to their popularity and somehow sufficient financial state. 
However, in terms of cognition and knowledge about the utilisation of opinion 
polls, it was hard to say that polls were performed qualitatively. Whereas, in the 
2007 presidential election, each party had a better understanding about what 
opinion polls are about and how to utilise them. CP5 said that parties conduct 
polls on a permanent basis, not just for election campaigns nowadays. It means 
that the utilisation of polls by parties has expanded and their importance has been 
recognised by parties.  
 
According to CP4, parties have considered opinion polls as a kind of 
communication medium. Therefore, they try to understand the minds of voters 
through polls at first whenever any important issues are raised, and then they try 
to reflect voter opinion into their policies and campaign issues. Therefore, the 
role of opinion polls seems to be an intermediary link between parties and voters. 
Therefore, it can be said that the utilisation of opinion polls from the 1997 to the 
2007 presidential election has developed quantitatively as well as qualitatively 
due to their popularity, the new emergence of primary election as the new rule of 
the selection process, and the arrival of unexpected variables in an on-going 
electoral environment. CP2 noted: 
 
‘In comparison with the election campaign from the 1997 to 
the 2007 presidential election, the biggest difference is the 
adaptation of scientific campaign tools in election campaigns 
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such as opinion polling. The previous elections before the 
1997 presidential election seemed to have competition 
between political parties or between the local areas. Since the 
elections have grown fiercer and no one could expect the result 
of an election because of unexpected variables such as floating 
voters, parties have tended to rely more on opinion polling.’ 
(Interview transcript, CP2) 
 
In conclusion, under severe campaign regulations in South Korea, there is little 
difference between the parties if their financial conditions are similar (see 
campaign regulations in Chapter 3) because parties tried to utilise these 
campaign technologies as much as they could. Nonetheless, it is true that there 
are differences in the adoption of the latest campaign technologies in a historical 
context. Therefore, there are no big differences between the GNP and the DP; 
however, there is steady progress in the utilisation of campaign technologies, 
especially opinion polls, between presidential elections.  
 
5.3.3. The alteration of campaign activities  
 
Due to strict campaign regulation in South Korea, as stated earlier, all campaign 
activities especially using mass media are heavily limited. However, it is no 
exaggeration to say that TV has played a key role as the main medium in election 
campaigns in South Korea since the 1997 presidential election, when campaign 
activities using mass media were actively utilised (Jeong, 2002)
26
. Therefore, the 
major campaign activities via TV are divided into two: political TV advertising 
and TV discussion. In the case of political TV adverts, their effects and 
importance have been recognised since the 1992 presidential election. On the 
other hand, political TV discussion received a lot of attention when it was first 
established in the 1997 presidential election due to the high expectation that it 
could break the pattern of high expenditure in conducting campaign activities 
(Kim, 1997; Kim, 1997). Naturally, these two are regarded as typically important 
campaign activities in South Korea. Therefore, this section will focus on 
                                            
26
 Although other forms of media such as newspapers were also utilised at that time, it is true to 
say that their effect on voters gradually decreased after the arrival of TV into the political arena 
during the 1997 presidential election (KNEC, 2003 and 2008b). 
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answering one of the research questions: how differences in these campaign 
activities were accomplished by each party. In addition to this, this section will 
confirm whether political parties will try to approach their work differently, 
especially after an election defeat.  
 
5.3.3.1. Political TV advertising  
 
The 1997 presidential election  
 
The 1997 presidential election saw the biggest improvement in political TV 
advertising quantitatively as well as qualitatively. However, one of the most 
impressive aspects was the first adoption of business concepts into political TV 
adverts (Cho, 1993). In other words, previous advertising before the 1997 
presidential election mainly attempted to deliver a candidate’s policies to the 
voters; thus, its form was simple and easy. Although political TV advertisements 
were first established in the 1992 presidential election (Tak, Kaid, and Lee, 1997), 
they were not very different to the newspaper advertisements in the matter of 
stressing a candidate’s policies. However, there was a clear difference in 
advertising strategy between TV and newspapers in the 1997 presidential 
election. According to Cho’s research (1998) about the analysis of political 
advertising in the 1997 presidential election, TV advertisements were much more 
focused on a candidate’s image rather than on campaign issues, whilst newspaper 
advertising dealt with both subjects evenly.  
 
Perhaps it would be inferred that campaigners have gradually established a 
differentiation strategy in accordance with the attributes of mass media. For 
example, TV tends to strengthen intimacy between candidates and voters and 
create familiarity with campaign issues and the shape of campaign activities due 
to its effectiveness (Lang and Lang, 1984). Whereas newspapers can help deliver 
detailed information about a candidate’s policies and campaign issues to the 
voters. Accordingly, given the different characteristics of TV and newspaper, 
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political TV advertisements would be better at producing the emotional content 
needed to appeal to the voters whilst newspapers would deliver rational 
campaign issues. In this respect, the 1997 presidential election in South Korea 
has a significant meaning in that political advertising was at least based on the 
wider understanding of the characteristics of each campaign medium despite 
many arguments that newspaper advertisements could not deliver substantive 
campaign issues and detailed information to voters, and that TV advertisements 
were much too focused on candidate image (Kim, 2000). 
 
Within the general outline of political advertising in the 1997 presidential 
election, it was also observed that somewhat different campaign strategies 
existed in each of the parties, according to the political situations they 
encountered. In the case of the GNP, as mentioned above, they had many 
political difficulties, which they had to manage in the election campaign period, 
internally as well as externally. In order to overcome the internal organisational 
problems such as a deep division within the party organisation and the voters’ 
negative viewpoint of them as a governing party due to the corruption of the 
government at that time, candidate Lee Hoi-chang had to concentrate on showing 
the differentiation of his future government from the current one. Thus, his 
election campaign motto was ‘the candidate who keeps a promise’ (Lee, 1997) 
and his slogan was ‘a clean politics, sound economy – a clean candidate Lee Hoi-
chang’ (Kim, 1997). It was produced to differentiate him from the other 
candidates who just focused on the ‘economy’. Furthermore, there were negative 
catchphrases that were targeted solely at candidate Kim Dae-joong of the DP, 
who was the strongest opposition candidate, such as ‘Let’s root out the 
corruption of black money and make a clean breast of the past’ and ‘3 Kims’ 
liquidation’ (Kim, 1997).   
 
Along with this, political TV advertisements were also produced for the same 
purpose. In total, the GNP produced seven political advertisements and it was 
revealed that six were ‘emotional’ advertisements focused on the candidate’s 
image. In Devlin’s research (1986) about the analysis of presidential television 
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commercials between 1952 and 1984, he explains that advertisement ‘spots’ can 
be divided into seven categories: 1) talking head ads, 2) negative ads, 3) cinéma 
vérité ads, 4) documentary ads, 5) man-in-the-street ads, 6) testimonial ads, and 7) 
independent ads. Amongst these types, research shows that the GNP mainly used 
documentary style and phrases which emphasised a candidate’s honesty and 
responsibility, compared with the numerous use of testimonial ads by the DP 
(Cho, 1998).  
 
Despite the GNP’s efforts in the adoption of modern communication, their 
advertisements were subjected to severe criticism from many observers (Cho, 
1998; Kim, 1998; Kim, 2003). The first reason was the GNP failed to send a 
constant message to the voters whilst the DP, as the most powerful opposition, 
tried to transmit just one campaign message - ‘economy’ - on a whole series of 
political advertisements (Cho, 1998). Perhaps the GNP as ruling party in 1997 
thought that they should not need to choose ‘an economical revival’ as a main 
campaign message because the result of a bad economic situation in 1997 was a 
by-product of a bad performance by the government. Thus, the GNP tried to 
bypass this issue and to drive voter attention away from it. However, the GNP’s 
advertisement strategy eventually failed to express what they exactly wanted to 
say to the voters because of their incoherent messages.  
 
In the interview with GNP2, another problem of the GNP’s advertising strategy 
was pointed out. GNP2 insisted on an old-fashioned style without considering 
the TV characteristics. In addition, GNP2 commented wistfully 
 
‘DP tried to graft music video format onto political TV 
advertisements. … Although we did new attempts, we did not 
derive many advantages from TV. For example, we also 
mobilised around 200 people to make a political TV 
advertisement in the 1997 presidential election like we 
mobilised a mass of people when we held outdoor speeches in 
previous elections’. (Interview transcript, GNP2) 
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For example, ‘the song of victory’ is considered as a typical advertisement by the 
GNP in 2007. Although it attempted to adopt a new style with the use of a 
popular Korean song, ‘Seoul’, as the main background music of an advertisement, 
the GNP still mobilised many people to appear in TV advertisements, as seen in 
Figure 5.1, although it was not necessary in producing political TV advertising. 
In regard to this, GNP2 pointed out DP’s advertisement, ‘With DJ’, which 
seemed to be like a professionalised commercial music video compared to the 
GNP’s advertisement, ‘The Song of Victory’, given that both advertisements 
adopted the same style. Continually, GNP2 explained that the song chosen by the 
DP was very popular with the younger generation, and campaign managers 
inside the GNP expected that the target audience of the DP advertisement titled 
‘With DJ’ was young voters. This is also argued in Choi’s study of Korean 
political advertisements from the viewpoint of political marketing (Choi, 2008). 
In his research, he argues that Kim Dae-joong, the DP’s candidate, who has a 
progressive inclination, attempted an unprecedented style of advertisement, 
whilst Lee, the GNP’s candidate, has a conservative disposition and tried to 
produce general advertising (pp.260). Furthermore, GNP2 stated that the reason 
why the GNP produced normal spots was because of the conventional thoughts 
of the politicians who mainly had important roles in the management of election 
campaigns. That is, it can be said that the custom of political parties themselves 
and the value of political elites, as will be explained more later, are significant 
factors in the alteration of election campaigns in South Korea.  
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Figure 5.1. Candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s political TV advertisement (GNP) in the 
1997 presidential election: ‘The Song of Victory’1 
 
Video Audio 
The appearance of a subtitle ‘Clean politics, Sound 
economy’. 
The people, who hold a flag of candidate number 1, 
are parading through the city. 
The flag parade and smiling children. 
The appearance of labourers and candidate.  
The scene of candidate number 1. 
The appearance of farmers and the scene of the 
candidate’s political activities. 
The scene of Korea-Japan football matches and of 
cheering at World Cup games.  
The computer graphical scene that highlights the 
candidate number 1.  
Let’s select a clean person, this time. 
Let’s unfold powerful Korea together 
with him. 
Let’s select No. 1, the healthy candidate. 
Let’s open the future with Lee Hoi-
Chang. 
Clean politics, Sound economy 
No. 1 Lee Hoi-Chang, to presidency 
Let us all select Lee Hoi-Chang 
No. 1 Lee Hoi-Chang 
1. This frame of table is quoted from the Choi research (2008, pp.248), and the content is re-structured by the 
author. 
 
On the other hand, the DP established a sophisticated campaign strategy, 
especially in political TV advertising and political TV debate. Although the DP 
were more superior in political situations than the GNP, as mentioned above, 
Kim Dae-joong of the DP also had weaknesses such as his health
27
 and the doubt 
that he would be able to raise sufficient funds. Furthermore, the GNP held onto 
political power for 40 years and the major companies as the biggest and the most 
powerful fund suppliers were deeply associated with the party. Thus, the DP were 
                                            
27
 When he ran for the election, he was 74 years old whilst Lee, the GNP candidate, was 63 years 
old. The reason the GNP pointed out his health problem was not just an age matter. He was 
severely tortured several times when he was young because of his participation in democratic 
movements. For this reason, many people suspected that his health was not good enough to 
conduct state affairs.  
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under favourable conditions in fund-raising and making networks with large 
companies, called cheabol in Korean, which could privately support political 
funding for parties. In particular, external campaign professionals as well as 
private campaign agents wanted to work for the GNP. With regard to this issue, 
an DP party executive, DP8, talked about how difficult it was, explaining that  
 
‘It was hard to compile a list of suitable people for PR in the 
1997 presidential election. In effect, external campaign 
professionals normally consider first whether it will bring 
disadvantages to them. … Thus, the position of DP as the 
opposition party in their [campaign professionals] perceptions 
was lower than GNP. … Perhaps they even might not want to 
be asked for PR tasks until before the time when the approval 
rating of Kim candidate of the DP was higher than Lee 
candidate of the GNP (Interview transcript, DP8).’  
 
Despite the unfavourable factors surrounding the DP discussed above, the 
campaign of candidate Kim Dae-joong of the DP is considered as the best 
campaign strategy in the aspect of being scientific in campaign method and 
systemic in the creation of campaign organisation. CP2 explained that the 1997 
election was an issue-centralised election whilst the 2002 and 2007 presidential 
elections focused on candidates’ images. Furthermore, CP2 insisted that the main 
competitive structure in the 1997 presidential election was whether or not people 
voted for candidate Kim Dae-joong, rather than the fair competition between Lee 
of the GNP and Kim of the DP. For instance, if there are some voters who do not 
want to vote for candidate Kim Dae-joong, they tend to vote for the candidate of 
the GNP because Koreans tend to square candidate image and party image. Thus, 
it did not mean that they really preferred Lee Hoi-change to Kim Dae-joong. For 
this reason, it is believed that the DP needed to establish sophisticated campaign 
tactics in developing campaign messages and positioning their candidate’s image 
based on a careful survey of the electoral market (Choi, 2008).  
 
In the case of Kim of the DP in the 1997 presidential election, political TV 
advertising received high praise for its scientific campaign strategy. With deep 
consideration of Kim Dae-joong’s weakness and strengths, the DP selected ‘I am 
confident (I feel safe)’ and ‘economy president’ as catchphrases, based on his 
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political experiences and knowledge. Accordingly, the DP constantly tried to 
highlight these messages in their political advertisements. In particular, the most 
popular advertisement was the ‘With DJ’ (see Figure 5.2). It used a popular 
Korean pop song, ‘Dance with DJ. DOC’, after changing its original lyrics. This 
song appealed especially to the younger generation because it was easy to follow. 
When the advertisement ‘With DJ’ went on the air, many observers mentioned it 
was a new attempt to attract the voters (Kim, 1998; interview with GNP2). GNP2 
described the situation when they watched this advertisement: they felt that they 
failed in the strategy of political TV advertising in the 1997 presidential election.  
 
Figure 5.2. Kim Dae-joong’s political TV advertisement (DP) in the 1997 
presidential election: ‘With DJ’1 
 
Video Audio 
The candidate Kim Dae-joong is smiling with 
children.  
 
The appearance of people who have various 
kinds of job.  
 
The appearance of family, office workers, and 
members of the National Assembly.   
 
The scene of weddings, office workers, and 
cheering at World Cup games. 
 
The appearance of politicians Jeong Han-young 
and Choi Jong-phil.  
The appearance of children, labourers, and 
university students.  
The appearance of a subtitle ‘I am ready’. 
The close-up scene of a candidate.  
I know that good things will happen. I feel 
that a good world will be opened. 
 
We can do it. Bright future and hopeful 
tomorrow. 
Happy home, stable society, strong state. 
 
I am confident with Kim Dae-joong. We can 
solve all the problems. 
 
Let’s make our happy world with ‘DJ.’ 
 
I am confident with Kim Dae-joong. He can 
fulfil economic unification. 
 
Our prepared president, we can make with 
‘DJ.’ 
 
I have been really prepared passionately. I can 
do well. Please, give me just one chance.  
 
The prepared president, No.2, Kim Dae-Jung. 
1 Source: This format of picture is quoted from the Choi research (2008, pp.245) and is revised by the author 
of this thesis. 
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The advertisement ‘With DJ’ is composed of many scenes of Kim Dae-joong 
along with people in various kinds of jobs in order to highlight Kim’s intimacy 
with the people. In addition, the overall format of the advertisement seems to be 
rationalised by including constant messages like ‘I am confident (I feel safe)’ and 
‘He can fulfil economic unification’ in the lyrics (Choi, 2008). Most importantly, 
the reason this advertisement received a lot of attention from many observers is 
because it was the first attempt at target segmentation strategy for political 
advertising. That is, the DP aimed at young voters as the main viewers for Kim’s 
‘With DJ’ advert, whilst the target audience of candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s TV 
advertisement ‘The Song of Victory’ was all voters. In addition to this, as 
explained in Choi’s (2008) research, Kim’s image to voters strongly tended to be 
close to progressive disposition and changes whilst Lee’s image had a 
conservative inclination and stability in the positioning map of candidates’ image. 
Overall, it can be said that the DP’s strategy regarding political TV advertising 
was appropriate action when considering Kim’s image at that time. 
 
Besides these two typical advertisements, there were distant differences in 
strategies between the GNP and DP. According to Cho’s research (1998), the 
GNP tended to change their slogans, the format, and layout of advertisement 
constantly across media during the campaign period, whilst the DP continued to 
show the consistency of message as well as format. As a result, Cho mentioned 
that the GNP’s strategy looked more de-professionalised than that of the DP, and 
perhaps it might be evidence of internal discord between campaign managers and 
campaign agents. Therefore, the GNP’s advertisements were produced with 
rather inconsistent campaign messages. Like this, it can be understood that 
political advertising, especially the DP’s, in the 1997 presidential election 
showed the party’s new attempts to develop their previous skills, although each 
party perused somewhat different strategies. Despite differences between parties, 
those advertisements performed in the 1997 presidential election are still valued 
in the aspect of the first adoption of commercial advertising strategy into political 
advertising.  
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The 2002 presidential election  
 
Like the previous situation of the GNP in the 1997 election, Kwon, who worked 
for the PR department of the GNP in the 2002 election, pointed out that there 
were disagreements about the strategy of political TV advertising between the 
special team for PR, which is mainly comprised of campaign professionals, and 
an internal PR Bureau (Kwon, 2003). As a result, he argued that it led to the 
failure to create competitive adverts compared to those of the DP. As seen in 
Table 5.3, he explained that campaign professionals wanted to aim at producing 
advertising based on ‘rationality and logic’ whilst internal party campaign 
staffers within the PR Bureau desired to make ads focusing on ‘emotion and 
humour’ (pp.31).  
 
Table 5.3. The different strategy of political TV advertising between PR Bureau and 
special team for PR
1 
PR Bureau  
(Internal party campaign staffers) 
Special Team for PR  
(External campaign professionals) 
Title of TV 
advertising 
Main contents 
Title of TV 
advertising 
Main contents 
Street Light 
Warming scene of an old 
couple lighting street light 
with a light bulb taken 
from their house 
Birth 
Trustworthy doctor who 
treats a mother 
experiencing difficulties 
in delivery 
Government 
Management 
Showing various driving 
careers such as using a 
bicycle, a car and an 
airplane 
Hope 
Express hope of all 
classes such as children, 
women and family in 
narration  
Upgrade Korea 
Utilise game image, 
deliver message on 
enhanced policy 
Safe Operation 
Contrast of safe bus and 
one in accident 
Harmony 
Various classes of people 
dancing to the logo’s song 
Economics 
 Express economic reality 
which is becoming better 
only in the numbers on 
TV  
Main strategy Emotion and humour Main strategy Rationality and logic 
1 Source: Kwon (2003, pp.30) 
 
 
In effect, although the first advertisement, ‘Danger vs. Safety’, for Lee Hoi-
chang, the GNP candidate, which was made by mainly campaign professionals, 
went on the air, the response from voters was too negative because the 
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advertisement was mainly aimed against Rho Mu-hyun, the DP’s candidate. 
Briefly, the content of the advertisement is as follows. The first part of this 
advertisement gives tension by editing a child and a bus, which is speeding. The 
child chooses a safe bus finally and then sees that the previous bus, which was 
speeding, has had an accident. On the TV advertisement, the driver who of the 
safe bus is Lee Hoi-chang whilst the bad driver is described as Rho Mu-hyun. 
After the ad was aired, the GNP established a new department called ‘a central 
executive committee’, which consists of highly experienced incumbent 
politicians. From this perspective, it means that campaign professionals have 
good sense in producing modern style of advertising; however, they did not 
understand politics at that time. In addition to this, it is assumed that perhaps it 
would be hard to create groundbreaking ideas for advertising due to the absence 
of authority of the special team for PR and the PR Bureau caused by internal 
discord of communication between the two groups. As a result, the GNP’s 
continued internal discord led to the failure to transmit a constant campaign 
message (Kim, 2003). 
 
Figure 5.3. Candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2002 
presidential election: ‘Danger vs. Safety’1 
 
Video Audio 
 A passenger who could not catch the previous 
bus gets on board another bus.  
Accident of the previous bus. 
Crying Child. 
Smile of bus driver. Running bus. 
Korea is a vehicle that should be driven more 
carefully than any other time. 
Who can give us peace of mind? 
Popularity at one instance cannot be a 
qualification of president. 
You know better which is safer. 
Nation  
1 Source: The picture is quoted from the Choi research (2008, pp.258) and the contents are reformed by the 
author of this thesis. 
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On the other hand, the DP’s (formally known as NMDP in 2002) adverts were 
mainly positive as well as having an emotional style. As explained in the section 
of the political situation in the 2002 presidential election, the DP focused on 
candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s image like a successful human story. These emotional 
contents were enough to provoke voters’ emotions. In particular, Rho’s previous 
political achievements, such as his attempts against regionalism of politics, 
which is characterised as an old custom in South Korea, and work experiences as 
a human rights lawyer, appealed to the tastes of young voters. DP5 and GNP4 
stated:  
 
‘… Whenever I think it would be possible to make a syndrome 
like the candidate Rho [DP] in 2002 if the candidate Lee [DLP] 
had had the same political advertising like Rho. It might be 
not. … It is true that a TV advertising strategy is important 
more than ever, however, it should harmonise with the other 
materials such as the image and historical career of the 
candidate.’ (Interview transcript, DP5) 
 
‘To be honest, Rho Mu-hyun had a human story the public 
liked. … Those who were heartily sick of an old custom of 
politicians or parties, especially young generations, believed 
that he would be the only person who could be a representative 
of them to break political corruption.’ (Interview transcript, 
GNP 4)  
 
Accordingly, the DP selected the catchphrase ‘a lawful Korea, honest Rho Moo-
Hyun’ and concentrated on the differentiation of their candidate’s image 
compared to the others (Ko, 2002). In addition to this, the DP did not respond 
directly whenever the GNP blamed them for corruption of the government of the 
time, but used indirect methods like ‘we will deal with 21st century’. Although 
there was a late establishment of The Election Committee, which was caused by 
many problems whilst conducting the primary election such as disapproval of the 
result of the primary election, it was reported that the DP was excellent in the 
production of advertising in terms of strategy (Kim, 2003). That is, the DP had a 
clear target base on both political TV and newspaper adverts. For instance, there 
are two political TV advertisements which were popular with voters in the 2002 
presidential election: ‘Evergreen’ and ‘Tears’. 
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Firstly, as seen in Figure 5.4, the main background of the ‘Evergreen’ political 
advertisement is the candidate playing the guitar. The kind of scene where the 
candidate plays the guitar and sings the song to the tranquil melody of a piano 
with a dark tone background had not been seen in any previous advertisements. 
While the past candidates tried to shed light on and show their virtues including 
their leadership and strength, the majority of Rho Mu-hyun’s advertisements 
were those that made efforts to emphasise his contented and humane aspects. 
This work is also one of Rho’s representative advertisements, which puts focus 
on the emotion given to the so-called ‘386 Generation’28 by the background song 
Evergreen. 
 
Figure 5.4. Candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s political advertisement (DP) in the 2002 
presidential election: ‘Evergreen’ 
 
Video Audio 
The candidate plays the guitar and sings the 
song ‘Evergreen’ to the accompaniment of a 
piano. 
 
Moreover, the narration is accompanied with 
scrolling text that appeals to the people. 
 
 
The people are President. 
 
When I fell down hit by regionalism, it was you 
people who made me stand up. 
 
When I was not able to stand in an election as I 
did not receive black money, it was you people 
who sent me piggy-banks
1
. 
The president, who owed only the people, Rho 
Mu-hyun. 
 
                                            
28
 Park (2007) summarised that ‘The 386 Generation, named after the 386 computer, was coined 
in the 1990s to describe those in their late 30s and 40s who were born in the 1960s and attended 
university in the 1980s. It is the 386 Generation who spent most of their youth fighting for 
democracy under authoritarian rule and who had a shared generational experience and culture for 
the first time in Korean history. They are now in decision-making positions in all fields, including 
political, economic, social and cultural areas. The 386 Generation will go down in history as a 
very active and passionate group of people who toppled a military dictatorship of more than three 
decades and built democracy in South Korea’ (East-West Center Insights news June/2007).  
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I will work only for you people. 
 
The people are president. 
 
You can see Roh Mu-hyun when you think 
twice
2
.  
 
The new president of the Republic of Korea, 
Roh Mu-hyun. 
Background music Protest song ‘Evergreen.’ This song, preferred 
and sung frequently by students in the 1970s 
who desired democracy, had been banned by the 
government but the ban was lifted in 1988.  
 
Its words, describing the social situations of 
Korea at that time, imply in general that we can 
eventually win the struggle by pulling together 
though we currently have nothing. 
<The lyrics of ‘Evergreen’> 
 
See the green pine leaves in that field. 
There is no one caring for them 
Though they get caught in rainstorms and 
snowstorms 
They fully enjoy their own green to the end of 
the world 
The sad and bitter previous days, come never 
again 
We will sweat and realise 
We will be green leaves in the wild field. 
 
Though we have just a little  
as we shed tears hand in hand 
Even if the road where we go on is far and 
tough 
We will go on and finally win. 
1 ‘Wish Piggy-Bank’ was made by Rho’s fund-raising support. In terms of a different fund-raising method 
compared to the traditional way, where voters generally support a particular party rather than one candidate, 
it was valuable and meaningful.  
2 The pronunciation of ‘twice’ is the same as the number 2 in Korean. Candidate Rho’s number in the 2002 
presidential election was 2 and his campaign team put this sentence into all his advertising to remind people 
of his number.  
 
In the same line, the main target of the ‘Tears’ series is the working class who 
wanted to change their life and live a better life. As seen in Figure 5.5, this 
advertisement focuses on showing Rho’s remarkable historical political 
behaviours such as being at the forefront of breaking down regionalism of 
politics and enduring hard the process of primary election despite adversity. That 
is, it aims at stressing Rho’s honesty and challenging spirit.  
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Figure 5.5. Candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s political advertisement (DP) in the 2002 
presidential election: ‘Tears’1 
 
Video Audio 
The Republic of Korea, which these children 
are proud of. 
 
The Republic of Korea, in which we share our 
neighbour’s gladness and sadness. 
 
The Republic of Korea, where north, south, 
east, and west are one. 
 
The new president of the Republic of Korea, 
Rho Mu-hyun. 
Rho Mu-hyun’s one teardrop changes the 
Republic of Korea. 
 
You can see Rho Mu-hyun when you think 
twice. 
1 Source: This format of picture is quoted from the Choi research (2008, pp.255) and is revised by the author 
of this thesis. 
 
Like this, the DP’s advertising strategy that had a clear target base stimulated a 
positive response from voters. According to DP5, the DP conducted an electoral 
market survey before the production of those advertisements, and received 
responses from Netizens before broadcasting. Furthermore, DP3 stated that there 
were many adverts on online communities and websites produced by voters, not 
by parties. Even, the number of those advertisements online was beyond measure 
and spread very quickly to many voters. 
 
Taking all the above-mentioned points into consideration, there is no doubt that 
in 2002 both parties, GNP and DP, had better knowledge of the utilisation of TV 
for political adverts than during the 1997 presidential election. Accordingly, they 
used various kinds of techniques to draw voters’ attention and at least attempted 
to create the style of political advertising that voters wanted. However, the two 
parties had different campaign strategies. Although there are many reasons for 
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this, such as internal discords, political situations, the absence of internal 
communication, it cannot be denied that the DP improved their skills and had a 
better understanding of ‘media logic’ than the GNP did.   
 
The 2007 presidential election 
 
As indicated earlier, political TV advertising was not as influential or as efficient 
in the 2007 presidential election as that of the 2002 presidential election because 
the approval rating of Lee, the GNP’s candidate had been around an average of 
50% for a long time. However, there was a distinct change in the way to 
approach voters, that is, the intensification of emotional advertisement. 
 
The most remarkable point in the 2007 presidential election was the GNP’s 
political TV advertising. As explained above, in general, it is true that the GNP’s 
adverts were more focused on producing ‘rational and logical’ advertising than 
emotional. It cannot be said that their advertising strategy was not as good as the 
DP’s in the 2002 presidential election although they also launched emotional 
adverts. GNP4 pointed out that they were devoted to the production of political 
TV advertisements although there were some criticisms because candidate Lee’s 
advertisements were similar to candidate Rho’s emotional strategy (Kim, 2008). 
For example, Lee produced an emotional style of advertisement titled ‘help me’, 
as seen in Figure 5.6. Briefly, in this advert, one scene highlighted Lee shedding 
tears whilst he meets working-class people in the market area. In particular, this 
advert is focused on showing Lee’s sympathy through an emotional approach. 
However, it was exactly same form that Rho had used before, as presented in 
Figure 5.5.  
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Figure 5.6. Candidate Lee Myung-bak’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2007 
presidential election: ‘Help me’ 
 
Video Audio 
Various commoners along with marketplace 
scenes are shown to be tired of life.  
 
Then, a commoner’s festering and blistering 
hands are shown to reflect his tough life, and 
backgrounds appear suggesting how tough 
commoners’ lives are.  
 
Elderly people are crying in candidate Lee 
Myung-bak’s arms and the candidate is 
shedding tears in sympathy.  
 
Unsmiling citizens are shown first, and then 
new light is shed on their laughing faces in 
tandem with the audio commentary, ‘I promise 
without fail to give you your smile again by 
reviving the economy for common people.’ 
I have met many people in the marketplace 
and street.  
They constantly talked me ‘Help me. Help me. 
Please help me.’  
 
An elderly woman cried and held me when 
she said to me.  
 
I also cried and everyone who was there cried.  
 
Although we are facing with bad economy 
situation, I can definitely revive it.  
 
I promise without fail to give you your smile 
again by reviving the economy for common 
people. 
 
The practicing president of economy, No. 1 
Lee Myung-bak promises to achieve. 
 
Nonetheless, the GNP’s new attempts received a positive response from the 
voters. As a typical advert that took centre stage, this is ‘the foul-mouthed 
grandma’. In this advertisement, an old, lower-class woman speaks with an 
accent to Lee, asking him to revive the economy, as presented in Figure 5.7. In 
effect, ‘president of economy’ as Lee’s catchphrase somehow gave a heavy 
atmosphere (or image) to Lee; however, his image was changed through 
producing softness and warmth in the scenes to this advert.  
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Figure 5.7. Candidate Lee Myung-bak’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 
2007 presidential election: ‘The foul-mouthed grandma’ 
 
Video Audio 
There is an elderly female owner of a 
Gukbapjip (a kind of Korean restaurant mainly 
serving gukbap, boiled rice served in soup, and 
it is a typical restaurant for working-class 
people) in a deep snowy night. 
 
She gives gukbap to Lee and he eats with a 
healthy appetite.  
 
She shouts at Lee to recover the national 
economy and Lee promises to do it.  
 
What the hell is going on in the middle of 
night huh? 
Hungry? Why you fucking guys fight 
everyday without fruit? 
 
It is very difficult for us to lead a life. 
 
What will you achieve now that you have 
opened Cheong-gyeo-cheon
1
? 
 
Want more? Eat, bastard. 
 
Lee Myung-bak is hungry. The era in which 
anyone can succeed with efforts. 
 
In order to open the era for the people’s 
prosperity, Lee Myung-bak thinks there is no 
time even to have a meal. 
 
Now that you have finished the fucking meal, 
you should revive the economy, got it? 
 
I will revive the economy. The practicing 
president of economy, No. 1 Lee Myung-bak 
promises to achieve. 
1. It was a Restoration Project to improve Seoul’s environment and to make a development in the balance 
between Southern and Northern parts of Seoul when Lee was Mayor of Seoul. Although it was successfully 
completed, there are still many different opinions about cons and pros.  
 
 
Conversely, in the case of the DP, most of their advertisements were 
unwelcomed, unlike during the 2002 presidential election, because the format of 
political TV adverts were similar to those from the 2002 presidential election or 
focused on negative appeals in order to attack Lee. For example, Figure 5.8 
shows one of candidate Jeong Dong-yeong’s political TV adverts. Briefly, ‘hip-
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hop talk’ focused on enumerating the weaknesses of Lee Myung-bak, the GNP’s 
candidate, such as fake employment of his children and the stock manipulation 
scandal. Thus, this advert stresses the fact that Lee was not suitable to be a good 
president whilst Jeong was described as a good president. Although the DP tried 
new methods by using hip-hop music to attract many young voters’ interests, as 
seen in Figure 5.8, it did not lead to increased interest from voters at that time.  
 
Figure 5.8. Candidate Jeong Dong-yeong’s political advertisement (DP) in the 
2007 presidential election: ‘Hip-hop talk’ 
 
Video Audio 
Have you watched the news about disguised 
employment?  
Yes, I do.  
 
Have you heard of stock-in-trade 
manipulation?  
No. No. I do not want to hear these news 
articles anymore.  
 
While he talks about success in front of 
people, he is said to misappropriate taxes in 
the back. 
He is a man of double-dealing. 
 
We never support this kind of person.  
Then, is there a good candidate for presidential 
election? 
Of course. 
Then, Will we are able to have good jobs if we 
elect a good president? 
Of course.  
How many will we have? 
2.5 million good job positions will come. 
We will all escape from unemployment. 
Have you seen disguised employment? 
Have you heard of stock-in-trade 
manipulation? 
 
No. No. Stop. Stop.  
Talking about a success in a person’s 
presence. 
Pocket a tax in the back.  
You are a man of double-dealing. 
No way. Disagreement! 
Is there a good president? Yes. 
Then, does he create more jobs? Yes.  
How many? 250 million. 
Is it for everyone? 
 
He is a high school student.  
He studies very hard.  
 
Abolition of the college enrolment 
examination 
Abandoning the enrolment system? 
Wait, then, who will do all this? 
 
160 
 
 
Video Audio 
This is my younger brother, a high school 
student. 
He is not able to receive private lessons due to 
lack of money, and hence has difficulty 
studying. 
We will get rid of your concern about costs for 
private lessons with the abolition of the current 
college enrolment system. 
Do you believe schooling will be happy if you 
are liberated from the examination hell? 
 
Then, who will be able to do it?  
This is Jeong Dong-yeong here.  
Who again? 
No. 1, the candidate Jeong Dong-yeong. 
 
No. 1, who makes a state of happy families. 
Jeong Dong-yeong, the good president. 
Jeong Dong-yeong. Who? Jeong Dong-
yeong. 
No. 1 happy family 
The good president, Jeong Dong-yeong. 
 
ONE. Keep, keep, keep. ONE 
 
In particular, DP5 explained that all political situations surrounding the DP, such 
as internal discord and Lee’s overwhelming approval rating, actually made the 
DP less motivated in conducting all campaign activities. Accordingly, it did not 
present any marked features than the 2002 presidential election. Therefore, its 
advertising strategy seems to be more de-professionalised than before.   
 
5.3.3.2. TV political debates 
 
It is no doubt that the most important step in election campaigns was the arrival 
of TV debates in the 1997 presidential election. As noted earlier, there were many 
discussions about the necessity of the establishment of joint TV discussions since 
the era of media democracy arrived in the 1992 presidential election due to 
political TV advertising. However, it took a great deal of time to carry on TV 
debates due to several reasons such as immature electoral culture
29
, especially in 
the form of discussion, and the problem of the principle of equity between 
candidates. Nonetheless, the newly revised electoral law finally approved TV 
debates in 1997 and candidates are required to attend more than three joint TV 
                                            
29
 As explained before, South Korea was under a dictatorship until 1987. In the following 
presidential election in 1992, it is actually hard to see that Korean’s electoral culture was fully 
matured compared to the other democratic countries.   
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discussions on public broadcasting (KNEC, 1998). In addition to this, there are a 
total of 30 appearances on TV talk shows and political discussions, e.g. 12 times 
on television broadcasters, six times on radio broadcasters, 11 times in 
newspapers, and once in a media organisation (KNEC, 1998). In effect, it was 
reported that there might be more than 100 discussions if the number of 
discussions that were hosted by civic groups and local newspapers were included 
(Yang, 1997).  
 
Unlike a positive expectation that political discussions give more detailed 
political information to the voters against the phenomenon of intensification of a 
candidate’s image due to the arrival of TV, immoderate numbers of discussions, 
as described above, cause side effects such as losing the public’s interest due to 
repeated questions and the candidates’ formulaic answers (Jeong, 2002). 
Furthermore, there were several major problems, for example, the form and the 
candidates’ attitudes. Although the large numbers of political discussions 
repeatedly dealt with normal subjects, the average interest rate in political TV 
debates was highly measured. According to a research survey (Lee, 2002) and a 
newspaper article from Donga Ilbo (16/Dec/1997), the average viewing rating of 
each debate was over 50% and more than 80% of voters got useful political 
information from joint TV discussions. The most reasonable explanation of why 
TV debates were so popular in South Korea was because of the prohibition of 
traditional campaign activities such as large-scale outdoor speeches (Chun, 2007). 
The second reason might be the fact that the voters wanted to compare definite 
differences of political opinions about the major political issues between 
candidates (Jeong, 2002). Therefore, parties and candidates devoted their time to 
creating a differentiated strategy in order to court the voters, although the first 
attempt of joint political TV debates contained many controversial issues that 
needed to be revised afterwards.  
 
Lee, the GNP’s candidate, aimed vigorously at perfection, as it is expected by the 
public. According to GNP5, the GNP established a committee for political TV 
debates and it was subdivided into two special departments, the policy committee 
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and TV discussion task force (TF), to work smoothly. The policy committee took 
charge of formulating policies through careful discussions with several experts in 
various fields in society like those working in previous presidential elections. 
Whereas, the team called the TV discussion task force (TF) focused on dealing 
with the matters regarding just TV discussion such as developing technical 
knowledge about how a candidate would respond to questions and attack the 
opposition in a proper way. In particular, during the IMF crisis in 1997, the 
policy committee devoted their time to mapping out economic policies more than 
other campaign policies. Unlike the policy committee, the TV discussion task 
force (TF) focused on the candidate’s image consulting on how to lead 
discussions or how to express opinions properly. In addition, they believed that 
Lee would be stronger in debating given he was justice of the Supreme Court and 
projecting confidence was a significant part of political TV discussions.  
 
On the other hand, although the electoral environment surrounding the DP, e.g. a 
bad relationship with the press, was not favourable to them, Kim’s private camp 
clearly knew his strengths and weaknesses and where they could help him. First, 
they expected a political TV discussion would be a decisive battle showing 
Kim’s ability and knowledge. Hence, they aimed to achieve synergy by exposing 
him as many as approximately 80 times in political discussions and creating an 
image like ‘a person who is very knowledgeable about the economy and is a 
prepared president’. In effect, all these ideas tied in closely with the image of the 
rational presidential candidate that the voters wanted at that time because of the 
serious economic crisis in 1997 in South Korea. 
 
On the other hand, CP6, who worked privately and secretly for the GNP, stated 
that they knew that the DP needed to produce as many campaign issues as 
possible due to the inequality of the relationship with the media, especially with 
newspaper companies
30
. Therefore, participation in large numbers of political 
                                            
30
 In South Korea, it is important to make a good relationship with the major newspaper 
companies. In particular, the effect of newspapers as a campaign medium was higher than other 
media forms such as TV until the 1997 presidential election. In particular, the role of newspapers 
as a route of political information source for voters, especially the over 40s was important in the 
1997 presidential election despite the strong effect of TV (Jeong, 2002).  
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discussions might be the best way for the DP to expose their campaign issues to 
the voters. It was clearly explained in the interview with CP6, who said that 
 
‘In 1997, the key success of media campaign strategy was how 
many times we [each party] exposed our campaign issues on 
newspapers or TV. Although many observers mentioned that 
the candidate Kim [DP] succeeded by the dint of TV 
advertising and an efficient strategy of TV discussion, I 
suppose that the reason why he tried to take part in political 
discussion as much as he could was to produce many issues on 
mass media.’ (Interview transcript, CP6) 
 
To be specific, according to DP5, it was revealed that Kim’s attendance in 
political discussions was in excess of 80 times. DP5 also said that they could not 
even count the actual figures of attendance at political discussions at that time. In 
particular, DP5 pointed out that all campaign staffers of the DP recognised the 
fact that the positive outcome of the election in the 1997 presidential election 
would be settled by TV debates. DP5 stated that they believed that they would 
win if Kim could show his knowledge about economic matters through his 
previous political experiences. As Kim was already a well-known politician, with 
a great deal of economic experience, it was a good opportunity for him to urge 
that Lee, the GNP’s candidate, be held accountable for the IMF crisis and a bad 
performance from the government. Therefore, the DP’s principal strategy for TV 
debates focused on the matter of how they can transmit consistent messages and 
show Kim’s ability, some training about the ability of readiness of wits against 
any kinds of circumstances whilst debating on TV, and image training in order to 
avoid appearing brusque as well as cold. This might be important because TV 
debates that were aired live for an hour transmitted all information without any 
editing. Thus, the DP held a TV debate simulation to prepare for the actual 
battles, with several experts in economics as the external campaign professionals 
as well as politicians with an encyclopaedic knowledge of economic areas.  
 
In conclusion, the strategy of the DP as mentioned above is clearly shown in 
Lee’s research (2002) about the rhetorical strategies of candidates in the 1997 TV 
debates. He observes that Kim Dae-joong, the DP’s candidate, pointed out his 
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ability and strengths by offering rational solutions about the problems that South 
Korea was encountering at that time. In addition to this, Kim Dae-joong attacked 
Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP’s candidate, for the bad performance of the government 
of the time, which could be a weakness of Lee’s candidacy. Besides these 
message strategies, Lee (2002) insisted that Kim Dae-joong reinforced the power 
of persuasion by not using too much jargon, in order to help the voters’ 
understanding.  
 
On the other hand, Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP candidate, often attacked Kim Dae-
joong regarding the scandal about illegal political funds and the ‘dustbin’ of 
political history relating to bad political performance, in order to emphasise his 
morality and integrity. Moreover, too much stress on the differentiation against 
the government of the time caused Lee Hoi-chang to fail in building a good 
candidate image. Although Lee Hoi-chang changed his campaign strategy to a 
more positive one, it was not enough to change the voters’ recognition of him. 
Furthermore, the GNP’s campaign strategy emphasising morality and integrity 
was inappropriate due to the exposure of a political corruption scandal regarding 
Lee Hoi-chang’s son’s military service. With regard to his overall strategy for 
political TV debates, many observers pointed out that it was not a good definitive 
strategy given the political situation of Lee Hoi-chang and the GNP (Lee, 2002).  
 
Entering into the 2002 presidential election, the parties realised the effect of 
political TV discussion through their experience of the 1997 presidential election. 
Accordingly, the GNP and DP prepared well at the beginning of the campaign 
period and hired campaign professionals who specialised in designing efficient 
campaign messages for TV discussion (Korean Economic Daily, 11/Dec/2002). 
To be specific, there was a high level of participation by academics due to 
making several scenarios according to different subjects such as economics, 
social issues, and welfare. In addition, both candidates had several simulations 
with political elites and campaign professionals before their attendance at the TV 
discussions. Therefore, unlike the 1997 presidential election, there were not 
many differences between the two parties in the 2002 presidential election.  
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The most remarkable feature of the attendance at the TV discussions was that 
minor parties started to want to participate in joint TV discussions due to the 
medium’s strong effect. DLP1 noted: 
 
‘In spite of our endeavour to attend Political TV debates, it 
was not allowed by the law in 2002. … We [DLP] agree with 
these regulations because there are too many parties that are 
not in existence at the time but form suddenly to participate in 
elections in the election period. Nevertheless, we thought the 
attendance of TV discussion as many as we can was the most 
important campaign activity to exposure our party.’ (Interview 
transcript, DLP1)     
 
Because of the late establishment of the DLP in the early 2000s, their low level 
of awareness compared to both the GNP and DP was a priority task they had to 
deal with in the 2002 presidential election. For this reason, they devoted a lot of 
time to presenting political debates organised by mass media companies, as many 
as they could. Furthermore, minor parties believed that it was the cheapest way 
for them to inform the public of their policies as well as their brands. With regard 
to this, DLP 2 mentioned that the only way they could do it was to attend any 
political debates, whatever their subjects.  
 
Whereas, the candidates in the major parties, GNP and DP, tended to avoid 
political debates (Segye Times, 25/Oct/2002) as they realised it would have a 
more negative effect on them if their candidates could not properly cope with the 
questions being asked. Unlike printed media, on TV it is possible to produce 
vivid appearances such as the candidates’ reaction, attitude, and even ability to 
handle problems in a crisis. Given this, the candidate could make all kinds of 
mistakes they did not expect to make although they had prepared well 
beforehand. In effect, incomplete preparation for TV debate was pointed out as 
the most serious reason for the GNP’s election defeat in the 1997 presidential 
election (Korean Economic Daily, 04/Dec/2002). In addition to this, the interests 
of voters in political TV debates gradually decreased because they could not get 
any good information and hear any answers about questions they really wanted to 
know (Jeon, 2002). It was researched that the viewing rate for TV debates in the 
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2002 presidential election was an average of 5% whilst it had been an average of 
20% in the 1997 presidential election.    
  
This phenomenon of decreasing level of participation in TV discussion of the 
major parties’ candidates was more serious in the 2007 presidential election. Due 
to the reason stated above, candidates did not want to actively participate in TV 
discussion (MBC news, 02/Dec/2007). Furthermore, the interest of voters about 
TV debate decreased because the way in which TV debates proceeded was no 
longer attractive to voters.  
 
Summary of the section 
 
As stated earlier, this section focuses on the alteration of campaign activities 
especially using TV in South Korea - political TV advertising and TV political 
debates – to answer one of the research questions, what and how differences in 
campaign activities were accomplished from the 1997 to 2007 presidential 
election. In addition, this section demonstrates whether the GNP and DP (NMP, 
NMDP, and UNDP) would try to approach their work differently, especially after 
an election defeat. Therefore, the following paragraphs will provide a brief 
summary of the above discussion.  
 
Since the first arrival of political TV advertisements in South Korea in 1992, it is 
no exaggeration to say that parties made remarkable improvements in designing 
political TV adverts in the 1997 presidential election. As discussed above, parties 
started to understand media logic and gradually established a differentiation 
strategy according to the attributes of mass media. Accordingly, from the wider 
perspective of historical changes of political TV advertising, it can be said that 
many TV adverts in the 1997 presidential election used an emotional approach to 
appeal to voters and new attempts like adopting commercial advertising style 
were achieved. In the following presidential elections in 2002 and 2007, this 
trend was continued and the parties’ skills were much developed compared to the 
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1997 presidential election. In particular, the use of an emotional approach was 
seriously intensified due to its popularity, and it eventually led to some criticisms 
because there was no differentiation between parties.  
 
Nonetheless, there is a difference between the GNP and DP (NMP, NMDP and 
UNDP) in the degree of speed of technical improvement in designing political 
TV advertising. First of all, the GNP was a bit slower in the adoption of a new 
style of advertising through lack of understanding of the attributes of mass media, 
compared to the DP in a historical perspective. As explained earlier, TV tends to 
help strengthen intimacy between voters and candidate by providing visual 
content whilst newspapers tend to provide more detailed campaign issues and 
information to voters. Thus, it would be better to stimulate voters’ sensibility by 
using an emotional approach in designing TV advertising. However, the GNP’s 
TV advertisements in the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections were more 
focused on negative appeals and campaign issues rather than on emotional 
appeals. Whereas, the DP’s adverts concentrated on stressing the candidate’s 
good image and this intensified over the 10 years. In addition to this, the DP had 
a clearer target segmentation strategy for political TV advertising, as confirmed 
by the 1997 and the 2002 cases, which could help the DP to transmit consistent 
messages to voters. However, the GNP tended to change their slogans, format, 
and campaign messages across media in the 1997 and the 2002 presidential 
elections.  
 
Despite these differences between the two parties, the parties have two things in 
common. Firstly, from the results of analysis of historical change in TV 
advertising, the matters of party organisation itself such as the outcome of 
election and the custom of political party were pointed out as important reasons 
in producing TV advertising. In addition, it helps to answer the question of why 
they had different styles of TV advertising in the face of the same electoral 
environment. Secondly, it is confirmed that both parties have tended to change 
the style of TV advertising after election defeat or in such a case that a party is 
placed under the state of unfavourable political situations. From this perspective, 
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it can be said that hypothesis 1-1 political parties will try to approach their work 
differently especially after an election defeat is confirmed.     
 
On the other hand, the first arrival of political TV debates in the 1997 
presidential election created a lot of attention because of the expectation that 
voters and candidate can communicate directly as well as that campaign 
expenditure would be reduced. In effect, the GNP and DP (NMP, NMDP, and 
UNDP) attended about 100 TV debates including three official TV debates, 
which were organised by KNEC, in the 1997 presidential election. Moreover, it 
was researched that TV debates were the most effective campaign activities 
when voters made a final decision (Kwon, 1997). However, many problems such 
as the form of TV debate and the method of discussion were pointed out, and, 
therefore, its form has been revised to address these problems over the 10 years. 
As seen in Table 5.4, the time for questions from the host has been reduced and 
the time of mutual discussion between candidates has been increased to improve 
the quality of discussion by asking questions directly between candidates. In 
particular, the 1:1 discussion between candidates was highly esteemed by Korean 
campaign observers (Lee, 2007).  
 
Despite the improvement of the TV debate system, the rate of attendance of 
candidates at the TV debates has decreased due to the reasons of fear of lacking 
preparation ability against negative attacks from candidates of the opposition 
parties and public indifference. In particular, it was confirmed that candidates in 
the parties, who were placed under unfavourable political situations, strongly 
tend to unite against the most promising contender. As a result, TV political 
debates were seriously full of negative comments between candidates and did not 
provide useful information for voters, especially in the 2007 presidential election. 
Therefore, unlike political TV advertising, it cannot be said that there were many 
differences in the preparation process for TV political debate such as hiring 
campaign professionals, between the GNP and DP. Although the TV debate 
system has continued to develop, the quality of political discussions between 
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candidates was rather better in the 1997 presidential election in than the 2007 
presidential election.   
 
Table 5.4. The historical change of the process method of political TV debates for 
presidential election
1
  
Presidential 
Election 
The process method Times 
1997 
Keynote speech (all participants) 1 min. per candidate 
Answering the host’s questions The host’s question 30 sec. 
Answering 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Counterarguments 1 min. 
Mutual discussion between candidates Questioning 1 min. 
Answering 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Counterarguments 1 min. 
Answering the host’s questions Questioning 1 min. 
Answering 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Counterarguments 1 min. 
Closing speech 2 min. per candidate 
2002 
Keynote speech (all participants) 1 min. per candidate 
Answering the host’s questions The host’s question 30 sec. 
Answering 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Counterarguments 1 min. 
A three-way discussion between 
candidates 
Questioning 1 min. 
Answering 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Counterarguments 1 min. 
1:1 discussion between candidates Questioning 1 min. 
Answering 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Counterarguments 1 min. 
Closing speech 2 min. per candidate 
2007 
Keynote speech (all participants) 1 min. per candidate 
Answering the host’s questions The host’s question 30 sec. 
Answering 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Counterarguments 1 min. 
Mutual discussion between candidates Questioning 1 min. and 30 sec. 
Answering 1 min. 
Counterarguments 1 min. and 30 sec 
Common questions and answering  1 min. and 30 sec. per candidate 
Closing speech 2 min. per candidate 
1Source: Jeon, 2007 
 
5.3.4. The discussion of labour-intensive and capital-intensive campaigning 
 
This section will demonstrate the results of the discussion about the alteration of 
election campaign style, especially focusing on the change from labour-intensive 
to capital-intensive campaign style. It is also to examine whether hypothesis 3, a 
new campaign styles caused by the attempts of adoption of media and technology 
developments will become more capital-intensive, will be accepted. To 
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demonstrate it, this section will present the results of tracing campaign 
expenditure of political parties in each presidential year and the results from the 
interviews.  
 
The 1997- 2007 presidential election: the increase of campaign expenditure  
 
There are many arguments that modern election campaigning tends to be capital-
intensive campaigning, which is characterised by some important television-
centralised as well as highly money-centralised features (Farrell, 1996, Plasser 
and Plasser, 2002). As Farrell and Webb (2000) commented, tracing party 
expenditure is one of the important factors in understanding the dynamic change 
in election campaigning. It also can be helpful to trace the historical records of a 
party’s finance such as which campaign activities have been invested in more, 
and what historical differences have existed between parties in their expenses 
through the comparison. Moreover, it is good evidence of whether the style of 
election campaigning approach has changed from labour-intensive campaigning 
to capital-intensive campaigning.  
 
However, in South Korea, it is hard to estimate accurate information of a 
political party’s expenditure because they are unwilling to share this even though 
they are requested to inform KNEC of the details. According to the election 
campaign regulation in South Korea, almost all political parties should give 
details of their expenditure to KNEC within 40 days after the election is finished, 
in order to receive a government subsidy (KNEC, 2008). However, the 
information is not allowed to be viewed by the public and only political parties 
can access it. Furthermore, DP2 points out that it is generally admitted that this 
information reported by political parties is not accurate.  
 
‘It is well known that political parties do not want to report 
actual expenditures to the KNEC
31. … In particular, we might 
                                            
31
 When looking into the history of election management of South Korea, it was found that the 
composition of the election management agencies was grounded on individual election laws from 
the US Military Government in the First Republic. In the Second Republic, the National Election 
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spend more than 10 times as much money as that regulated by 
election regulation rules for election campaigning.’ (Interview 
transcript, DP2) 
 
In fact, the Public Office Election Act, called the Integrated Election Law in 
South Korea, was revised in 1994 because of the increase in election expenditure. 
For this reason, mass public meetings and mass mobilisation of outdoor speeches, 
which encouraged parties or candidates to spend a large amount of money on 
their campaigning, were severely restricted by new election regulation. In reality, 
the official amount of election expenses authorised by law for election 
campaigning in the 1997 presidential election decreased by 15% compared to the 
1992 presidential election. To be more precise, in 1997, it was 31,040,000,000 
Korean won (= £17 million) compared to 36,700,787,000 Korean won (≒ £21 
million) in the 1992 presidential election. In effect, there were several reasons 
why it decreased, e.g. the reduction of the length of official campaigning period 
from 23 days to 21 days and of the number of office workers in an electioneering 
office from 59,058 to 4,155, the reduction of the number of outdoor speeches, 
and the increase of the National Treasury (KNEC, 1998). Furthermore, the 
government believed that the modern style of election campaigning using mass 
media and new communication technologies might cost less than the traditional 
way. Ironically, it is reported that the rate of total campaign expenditure in the 
1997 presidential election increased by 2.7% against a limited amount of election 
expenses compared to the 1992 presidential election (KNEC, 1998). It cannot be 
said for sure, but the utilisation of media-centred campaigning might not be as 
cheap as expected. In particular, Korean parties have to pay for all campaign 
                                                                                                                      
Commission (afterwards KNEC) became a legitimate agency to guarantee fairness of election 
management for the first time in the history of South Korea. In 1960, the National Election 
Commission Act was enacted and proclaimed as an individual law. On December 26, 1962, the 
KNEC was designated as a constitutional institution at the fifth amendment of the Third Republic, 
and the KNEC was established on January 21, 1963.It is composed of nine members (three 
appointed by the president, three elected by the National Assembly, and three appointed by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), and the tenure of members is six years. The members of the 
KNEC are not allowed to join political parties or to engage in politics. Their major authority is to 
make rules. In other words, the KNEC can enact rules regarding election and referendum 
management or regarding party operation within laws and can enact internal rules unless these 
violate existing laws.  
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activities until the end of the official campaign period, and then parties which 
win the election or receive over fifteen hundredths of the total votes can get a 
national subsidy after the election (KNEC, 2008)
32
. However, this national 
subsidy covers campaign activities using mass media such as the expense of 
posters, political newspaper and TV advertising, the outdoor speeches, and pay 
of campaign staffers of an electioneering office.   
 
To be more specific, there were many differences on the list of parties’ campaign 
expenditure compared to previous elections although the emergence of media-
centralised campaigning had been forced by the revision of official election law. 
In the 1992 presidential election, focused investment was made on traditional 
campaign activities such as canvassing, mass rallies, which were needed for mass 
mobilisation, and the support for campaign activities of party members or 
volunteers, all of which are mentioned as the main features of the labour-
intensive (Farrell, 1996) or pre-modern campaign style (Norris, 2000). 
Accordingly, it is reported that each party invested over 50% of the total 
campaign budget on these traditional campaign activities whilst the expenditure 
for media-centralised campaigns was less than 30%.  
 
Whereas, there was a huge amount of investment in media campaign activities in 
the 1997 presidential election. To be more specific, as seen in Table 5.5, in the 
1997 presidential election, each party spent an average of 7,538,000,000 KRW 
(≒ £4,188,000) on political TV debates, approximately 1,000,000,000 KRW (≒ 
£556,000) on political TV advertising, and around 4,000,000,000 KRW (≒ 
                                            
32
 National Subsidy in South Korea means that the government gives the funds necessary for the 
operation of parties according to the provisions regulating their protection and cultivation of 
parties. In the subsidy, there are party subsidy (ordinary subsidy) and election subsidy for 
elections. National subsidy is calculated by multiplying 800 to the number of qualified voters of 
the parliamentary election and is provided quarterly. Such national subsidy is distributed 
according to the number of parliamentary seats, rate of obtaining votes and whether there is a 
'parliamentary negotiation group'. First of all, the party with a 'parliamentary negotiation group' 
will take 50% of the national subsidy. Next, the party with 5~19 seats takes 5%, and parties with 
less than five seats will have 2%. In the case of election subsidy, the amount resulting from 
multiplying the total number of qualified voters to 800 in the year of election - such as 
presidential election, parliamentary election and local government elections to which parties can 
nominate their candidates - is arrived at and then the amount is distributed to parties according to 
parliamentary seats and the rate of obtaining votes. 
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£2,223,000) on political adverts in newspapers (Kim, 2000). In Kim’s research, it 
is explained that major parties spent over 50% of the total of their limited amount 
of election expenses for just campaign activities using mass media.   
 
Table 5.5. The details of parties’ campaign expenditure for media campaign activities in 
the 1997 presidential election
1
 
 TV speeches
2
 TV adverts Newspapers 
adverts 
Personnel 
expenses 
Total 
Lee Hoi-
Chang 
(GNP) 
￦7.3 billion  
(≒ £4,056,000) 
￦1 billion  
 (≒£556,000) 
￦4 billion 
(≒ £2,223,000) 
￦1 billion  
(≒£556,000) 
Around  
￦13.5 billion  
(≒ £7,495,000) 
Kim Dae-
Joong 
(DP) 
￦7.6 billion  
(≒ £4,270,000) 
￦1 billion (≒
£556,000) 
￦4 billion 
 (≒£2,223,000) 
￦1 billion  
(≒£556,000) 
Around  
￦13.7 billion  
(≒ £7,661,000) 
1 Source: Kim, 2000   
2 This includes all type of speeches on TV such as supporting speeches, candidate speeches, and TV debates. 
 
Even though these official figures may not fully explain the argument that South 
Korean campaigning has leant towards a modern campaign style, it will be 
enough to put forward objective evidence to support the argument that the 1997 
election was in the transition period between labour- and capital-intensive 
campaigning. In particular, given that many interviewees commented that 
traditional campaign activities such as mass rallies, building on personal 
networks, and visiting local areas were still very important in the 1997 
presidential election despite less party investment compared to the 1992 
presidential election, the above-mentioned argument is completely supported. 
Although there are still many different opinions about the question of which one 
of the two, traditional campaigning or modern campaigning, is more expensive, it 
is true that the emergence of media-centralised elections has somehow increased 
parties’ expenditure since the 1997 presidential election.  
 
From the 2002 presidential election, it can be clearly seen that each party 
invested more money in publicity activities than in the 1997 presidential election. 
In particular, the government officially announced the provision of subsidies for 
campaign activities using mass media in 2002; parties’ campaign activities via 
mass media have became highly invigorated. The government subsidy for 
election expenses, in general, is provided to parties where the candidate is elected 
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or the rate of total turnout of the candidate is over a hundredth of a percent of the 
number of valid votes. For this reason, there were big differences between the 
GNP and DP, especially considering that they have a similar finance condition 
(KNEC, 2003; see Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6. The government subsidy for election expense in the 2002 presidential 
election
1 
Candidate  
and Party 
Outdoor 
speeches 
TV speeches TV adverts 
Newspapers  
adverts 
Internet 
Lee 
Hoi-chang 
(GNP) 
￦568,2352 
(≒ £334,255) 
￦4,201,661 
(≒ £2,538,353) 
￦632,854 
(≒£382,326) 
￦3,113,333 
(≒ £1,880,861) 
 
- 
Rho 
Mu-hyun 
(DP) 
￦557,132 
(≒ £327,724) 
￦4,201,661 
(≒ £2,538,353) 
￦635,288 
(≒£382,326) 
￦3,113,333 
(≒£1,880,861) 
￦4,677 
(≒£556,000) 
1 Source: KNEC 2003  
2 Unit: ￦1,000 (Korean won) 
 
The most interesting thing to note from Table 5.6 is that the GNP did not receive 
any subsidy for Internet activities, unlike the DP. Although it is mentioned that 
the cost is just related to the expenditure to manage Internet websites, it cannot 
be denied that the GNP invested less money in Internet campaigning than the DP 
did. In relation to this issue, GNP5 explained that they focused on publicity 
activities in traditional media such as newspapers and TV rather than the Internet, 
and, therefore, naturally, they had neither money nor time to invest in any kind of 
Internet campaigning, in effect.  
 
To be specific, the GNP spent 66.1% (￦22,603,205,000 ≒ £13,655,297) of the 
limited amount of election expenses provided in the Public Official Election Act 
whilst the DP spent 78% (￦26,651,408,000 ≒  £16,100,943). For example, 
according to an article in Hankuk Ilbo (20/Dec/2002), in the case of the DP, the 
largest campaign activity expenditure was on publicity activities using mass 
media, which was estimated to be around ￦18,879,000,000 (≒ £11,405,390). 
That is, the DP spent approximately 70% of the total campaign expenditure on 
mass media publicity. Whereas, it is reported that the DP spent hardly any of the 
money on labour-intensive campaign activities especially the need to mobilise 
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people, compared to the 1997 presidential election. This point also applies to the 
GNP in the 2002 presidential election. On the other hand, in the 2007 
presidential election, it was shown that both parties spent a similar amount of 
their election expenses. As is to be expected, publicity activities via mass media 
were the highest costs and the second was canvassing. For instance, the GNP 
spent ￦23,000,000,000 (≒ £13,895,014) on just publicity, which was 60% of 
the total amount of their election expense (Na, 2007).  
 
Even though these official figures may not fully explain the argument that South 
Korean campaigning has been more towards a capital-intensive campaign style, 
it will be enough to put forward objective evidence to support the argument that 
there are signs that Korean campaigning has been moving towards a capital-
intensive style from a labour-intensive one since the 1997 presidential election. 
To be more precise, South Korean election campaigning is in the transition 
period between two styles. In particular, given that many interviewees (DP1, 
DP5, DP7, GNP2, GNP5, CP2, CP3, CP5, and CP6) commented that traditional 
campaign activities such as mass rallies, building on personal networks, and 
visiting local areas were still very important in South Korea despite the lower 
degree of parties’ investment compared to the 1992 presidential election, the 
above-mentioned argument is completely supported. It is also argued in Plasser 
and Plasser’s research (2002). They argued that ‘capital- and labour- intensive 
styles are not contradictory’ (pp.84); most of the electoral democracies they 
researched have a combination of styles. Therefore, they argued that ‘we have to 
be cautious about prematurely announcing the replacement of traditional 
personal forms of campaigning by distant mediated modes of appealing to voters’ 
(pp.84). However, it is true that the emergence of media-centralised election has 
somehow increased parties’ expenditures since the 1997 presidential election, 
although there are still many different opinions about the question of which one 
of the two, traditional campaigning or modern campaigning, is more expensive 
(Interviews with DP1, DP5, GNP2, and CP5).  
 
 
176 
 
 
Summary of this section  
 
Given all the above discussion, it can be inferred that South Korea’s campaign 
style is a combined style between labour- and capital-intensive campaigning, 
especially from the 1997 presidential election due to the intensification of 
political TV advertising and the first emergence of political TV joint discussion. 
Although the style of capital-intensive campaign has been strongly emphasised, 
it cannot be denied that traditional campaign activities such as whistle-stop tour, 
local public meeting, and spread of information from mouth to mouth (Mouth 
advertising) were still decisive factors until the 2007 presidential election. In 
particular, DP1 explained that there are some differences between rural and 
metropolitan areas. That is, the style of labour-intensive campaigning is strongly 
important in local areas whilst the capital-intensive campaign is more focused on 
the areas around the capital. Furthermore, DP1 argued that parties have 
continued to need to conduct different campaign strategies to appeal to different 
generations since the emergence of the Internet. Thus, campaign strategy in 
South Korea has been specialised according to different characteristics of the 
voters, such as ages, areas and the preference for mass media; and, therefore, it 
has finally led parties to invest a huge amount of money into election 
campaigning to improve their campaign skills. 
 
The argument that the style of election campaigning in South Korea has been 
more towards the form of capital-intensive campaigning is clearly shown in the 
difference of the amount of election expense and of the number of campaign 
activities between major and minor parties. For example, the finance of the DLP, 
as a typical minor party in Korea, was not as plentiful (or good) as that of the 
major parties, GNP and DP, in the 2002 presidential election, which was the peak 
age of media-centralised election. DLP2 noted that they did not conduct all 
election campaigning that they were officially allowed to by the Public Official 
Election Act due to a finance matter. This means that, although the DLP used the 
Internet as the cheapest campaign medium than other media forms in the 2002 
presidential election, it was not enough to promote them to voters against the two 
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major parties, GNP and DP. As mentioned by Farrell and Webb’s research 
(2000), no modern campaign practices are cheap. In particular, the Korean 
electoral market has led minor parties to engage less in modern campaign 
activities. For example, Korean parties have to buy the airtime to broadcast their 
advertising from newspaper and broadcasting companies and the price tends to 
more than double especially in the official electioneering period compared to an 
ordinary day (Schafferer, 2006). DLP2 noted: 
 
‘In fact, it is very hard to conduct media campaigning if parties 
are not rich. Buying advertising space of newspaper or a prime 
time of TV for TV adverts is extremely expensive especially in 
the official election campaign period. … The price of these 
might be as large as two or three times than ordinary cost.’ 
(Interview transcript, DLP2) 
 
Related to this, DLP1 also indicated that the lack of party’s finance is an obstacle 
to adopting new media and new campaign technologies. However, DLP1 and 
DLP2 pointed out that the problem of finance is not just related to minor parties, 
but also affects major parties. As mentioned above, the newly revised Political 
Fund Law in 2004 strictly prohibits illegal political funds of parties coming from 
major companies, especially conglomerates, called cheabol in South Korea. 
Since then, major parties are also struggling to raise funds, and they have to find 
a way to distribute their resources within a limited budget. Therefore, whether or 
not they are a major party, election campaign strategy has been designed to 
create maximised effects in efficient distribution of campaign budgets, and it has 
eventually led them to manage their campaign practices in a more professional 
way, especially in using mass media and campaign technology. Taking all the 
above-mentioned points into consideration, it can be said that the Korean election 
campaign has slowly followed some characteristics of a capital-intensive form of 
campaigning such as being money-driven, television centralised and specialised 
in style although it also cannot be denied that the labour-intensive campaigning 
style is still important in South Korea. Therefore, this result supports hypothesis 
2, new campaign styles caused by media and campaign technology developments 
will therefore become more capital-intensive.  
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5.4. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning  
 
In this section, the results of the internal dimension of professionalisation of 
election campaigns, the influx of campaign professionals and the alteration of 
political parties as campaign organisation are presented. In this sub-section, the 
research will present the results of these main features: 1) the influx of campaign 
professionals and the discussion about their role and influence in a historical 
context, 2) the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals 
from ambiguous to conflict, and 3) the centralisation of party organisation caused 
by the efficient management of campaign activities. The cases of the GNP and 
DP (NMP, NMDP and UNDP) will be compared to examine whether the two 
parties had any differences over the 10-year period. Unlike the results for the 
external dimension, the internal dimension is perhaps more influenced by party-
specific variables such as political elite culture, party ideology, and hierarchical 
system and so on. Nonetheless, it can help investigate the general trend of the 
alteration in the use of campaign professionals, and, further, explore how the 
relationship between parties and campaign professionals has altered in a 
historical context. Given that there are limited sources and research focusing on 
this relationship in South Korea, those results, demonstrated here, will be 
valuable in providing information for future research.     
 
5.4.1. The influx of campaign professionals: the role and power  
 
The 1997 presidential election 
 
In the two previous presidential elections, 1987 and 1992, there was little 
evidence of the use of campaign professionals. Although there were some cases 
where major parties had campaign professionals, their roles and scope were very 
limited. For instance, according to Jeong (2002), major parties employed a few 
advertisers outside the party in the production of political newspaper advertising, 
such as Lee Dae-woo and Kim Yeom-je in the 1987 presidential election. In 
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addition, there was the participation of commercial companies. In addition to this, 
parties asked for some advice from experienced campaign professionals in the 
USA (Schafferer, 2006; interview transcript with DP5). This may be because the 
process of elections before the 1997 presidential election had been similar to the 
style of labour-intensive campaign mentioned by Farrell (1996) although 
political TV advertising began in the 1992 presidential election. In those days, 
parties believed that the mobilisation of party members, the management of 
personal relationships, and whistle-stop tours were the most important instrument 
of election campaigns. Therefore, there were only a few campaigns using TV. 
For this reason, campaign activities were limited to just two areas, political 
advertising and public opinion, although there were increased numbers of 
campaign professionals participating compared to the 1987 presidential election, 
which was the first democratic election in South Korea. In particular, the 
opposition parties found it difficult to get support from commercial companies to 
produce election advertising due to the political situations which were explained 
in Chapter 3 (Jeong, 2002). Therefore, for the DP it was hard to find commercial 
companies to help them.  
 
Unlike previous elections, in the 1997 presidential election, parties started to 
believe that they needed campaign professionals’ help more than before due to 
the intensification of media-centralised campaign activities by the revision of 
official campaign regulations in 1994. Given this, it transpired that the two main 
parties tried to employ campaign professionals, especially those who could deal 
with mass media and understand their logic, such as highly experienced 
broadcasters and journalists (interview transcripts of GNP2, GNP4, CP6, DP4 
and DP5).  
 
In the case of the GNP, they created a new planning committee to prepare for a 
media-centralised election campaign one month before the actual election date 
(Kim, 1997). It was not an official election emergency organisation inside the 
party, but a specialised group which was comprised of a cadre of highly 
experienced politicians and a few broadcasters as external campaign 
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professionals. In effect, it was reported that there were internal conflicts between 
politicians close to candidate Lee Hoi-chang and the other politicians due to the 
loss of authority of central organisation by the weakening of Lee’s leadership 
(Hankuk Ilbo, 01/Sep/1997). For this reason, the GNP established a new planning 
committee to quell internal conflicts and to cope with difficulties they 
encountered, and they held the decisive authority in the management of 
campaign activities.  
 
As typical external campaign professionals, commercial companies were 
involved in producing political adverts for TV as well as newspapers. Mostly, 
these commercial companies were selected through official presentation 
competitions. In addition to this, there was an increase in the involvement of 
private opinion poll companies. In addition, there were many advisors who were 
close to candidates, although they cannot be viewed as campaign professionals in 
the terms of Medivic’s (2003) classification of campaign professionals. The 
biggest feature of the creation of the central organisation for election campaign in 
the 1997 presidential election is that the cadre of professionals were politicians 
rather than campaign professionals. The role of campaign professionals was a 
kind of assistant to help conduct campaign activities that the GNP did not 
manage. Accordingly, they cannot be viewed as a type of political consultants 
who has a strong influence on overall campaign strategy by contributing their 
skills and knowledge like US political consultants. That is, they were just 
technical specialists who provided their skills to parties.  
 
This phenomenon was clearly shown in the DP case as well. The DP formed 
their election polling committee based on politicians and external campaign 
professionals close to candidate Kim. In particular, the cadre of politicians who 
were engaged on this committee were highly experienced people in the media 
industry. For example, as key members, Jeong Dong-yeong was a famous 
newsreader and You Jea-kun was a TV anchor, while Yoon Heung-ryeol was a 
famous CF director. However, the DP encountered many difficulties in the 
employment of campaign professionals. As mentioned above, it was because 
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commercial companies were unwilling to do the work for the DP due to political 
pressure. Nonetheless, unlike the GNP, it turned out that there was cooperation 
between the official party organisation and the private camp of the candidate due 
to strong leadership by Kim, the party candidate (interview transcripts with DP2 
and DP7).  
 
Furthermore, the DP tried to employ paid external campaign professionals to 
prepare for media-centralised campaign activities, especially for joint political 
TV debates. CP3 said that  
 
‘1997 was a remarkable year in the way that scientific 
campaign techniques such as opinion polls and joint political 
TV debates have been first adopted. For this reason, the DP 
needed to hire professionals who could deal with this 
matter. … It might be the first time to hire paid professionals 
from outside the party.’ (Interview transcript, CP3)  
 
It means that there were more unpaid advisors and volunteers rather than paid 
professionals in the 1997 presidential election. In addition, it was revealed that 
the DP tried to form the central committee with members who were 
knowledgeable about TV, and therefore, the committee was made up of people 
who were TV programme producers. Besides this, for the production of TV 
advertisements, the DP employed three commercial companies and positioned 
Yoon Heung-ryeol, who was a famous CF director and has his own advertising 
production company, as the head of team publicity. Given he is one of the 
members of the central campaign organisation, this demonstrates that the DP 
tried to monitor the work of external campaign professionals. 
 
In conclusion, there were no differences between the two parties in the use of 
external campaign professionals, apart from the fact the GNP hired external 
professionals from the press industry whilst DP employed TV producers. This 
may be as a result of the closer relationship between the GNP and the press 
companies compared with that of the DP, as explained in Chapter 3, the case 
study. As typical external professionals, there was the involvement of 
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commercial advertising companies in the production of political TV advertising 
and polling companies. Unlike advertising companies, parties outsourced all 
polling work to private poll companies. In addition, according to Schafferer’s 
research (2006) about the degree of professionalism, it turned out that parties that 
used external campaign professionals had some problems. His research found 
that the GNP and the DP commonly indicated these three problems: ‘1) lack of 
identification with the political parties, 2) lack of knowledge about current issues 
and political trends, and 3) superficiality of advice offered by the consultants’ 
(pp.130). It meant that their work was not professional in accordance with the 
political situation, although commercial companies started to join the political 
process in the 1987 presidential election. In other words, all external campaign 
professionals were kinds of technical specialists who were not familiar with 
politics, but could contribute their skills to the parties. Therefore, it can be said 
that the scope of their work and their role was simple as well as quite limited in 
the 1997 presidential election, although there was an increase in the number of 
external campaign professionals to deal with TV debates, political advertising, 
and opinion polling.  
 
The 2002-2007 presidential election 
 
Following a sudden change in the electoral environment caused by the 
emergence of the Internet as a new medium in the 2002 presidential election, 
there was extensive use of external campaign professionals by political parties. 
As mentioned earlier, the 1997 presidential election was a transition period in 
media-democracy, and there is no doubt that the 2002 presidential election was 
the year that media-centralised campaign activities became more intensified, 
particularly in comparison with the 1997 presidential election. Furthermore, 
parties and candidates had to consider a new way to promote the participation of 
voters due to the adoption of the primary election system. For this reason, parties 
needed to court voters ever more than before, and this led to the extensive use of 
external campaign professionals to design efficient campaign strategies. 
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Although there was an expectation that there would be an increase in the use of 
external campaign professionals in relation to Internet campaigning in the 2002 
and 2007 presidential elections, the level of external campaign professionals was 
similar to that in the 1997 presidential election. In other words, political elites 
who could deal with mass media still had control over the main campaign 
activities and external campaign professionals helped with some campaign 
activities that parties could not deliver. The work in relation to polls was also 
outsourced as in the 1997 presidential election; however, the most remarkable 
change from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential elections was that pollsters had 
become staff in the candidate’s camp. It meant that parties recognised the 
importance of polls. This was understandable because polls were actually utilised 
the most due to the emergence of primary elections which reflected the results of 
polls conducted with non-members. In relation to this issue, CP2 explained that 
there was no one who could deal with polls in the private camp or in the party 
organisation, as in the 1997 presidential election. That is, CP2 noted that it is 
hard to say that political elites had a high level of knowledge about campaign 
technology whilst they had a better understanding of how to deal with mass 
media. CP2 commented:  
 
‘When I joined private camp in the 2002 presidential election, 
my job was to publish the result of opinion polling based on a 
professional perspective and to forecast the result of the 
election. At that time, I could express my opinion in relation to 
my work although I belonged to a private opinion polling 
company and I was not in the office 24 hours. … This work for 
me was a kind of extra project. … However, there was no one 
who could deal with the work related to polls.’ (Interview 
transcript, CP2) 
 
Like this, the use of external campaign professionals by political parties has been 
slowly expanding since the 1997 presidential election. There are many private 
companies for opinion polling, political advertising, PR, and image-making 
consultants in the camp. Since the intensification of campaign activities using TV, 
the role of media consultants has expanded, and, incidentally, there was the 
participation of image-trainers and coordinators who could help improve a 
candidate’s image on TV. Furthermore, their role seemed to have expanded more 
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since candidates started to appear on entertainment shows such as talk shows. In 
addition to this, many newspaper articles increasingly began to report about the 
candidates’ dress sense so therefore candidates had to pay attention to their 
image. That is, the importance of visual elements had increased. However, it 
transpired that the role of external campaign professionals as independent 
political consultants was very limited, especially in the presidential election. CP2 
and CP3 noted: 
 
‘The engagement of independent campaign professionals 
happened from the 2002 presidential election. … Perhaps there 
will be a few cases in South Korea where independent 
campaign professionals who are not specialised in one 
particular area such as TV advertising, polling are joined in the 
camp.’ (Interview transcript, CP2) 
 
‘… In fact, our role is much more limited in the presidential 
election campaign than the local election. In the case of the 
local election, we [external campaign professionals] control all 
the resources and the candidate follows our decision, whatever 
we do. However, it is different in the presidential election. 
Even though a few political consultants engage in the camp, I 
must say that it was hard that independent campaign 
professionals were engaged in camp as camp staff. This is 
because politicians play an important role in the management 
of election campaigns instead of campaign professionals.’ 
(Interview transcript, CP3) 
 
 
From these interview transcripts, it can be interpreted that the position of external 
campaign professionals in the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections was still at a 
kind of advisor and assistant level because political elites still played a key role 
in the management of election campaigns, although the power of private camp 
had increased more than party official organisation compared to the 1997 
presidential election.  
 
In conclusion, there were no remarkable differences in the employment of the 
other external campaign professionals between the GNP and the DP. The GNP 
hired three advertising companies and the DP had two companies. In addition, 
they outsourced polling work to highly qualified private companies, although 
pollsters have become to be recognised as one of the members of a candidate’s 
private camp since the 2002 presidential election. Their power has not increased 
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nor can they participate in the final decision-making process; however, it can be 
said that candidates and parties have acknowledged their importance. Besides 
this, there were a huge number of advisory panels that were composed of 
academics and renowned people in many different areas. It was reported that the 
GNP had more than 800 people, and the DP officially had 80 people in the 2002 
presidential election. However, the real figure within the DP was thought to be 
more than 1,800 because they had implemented the cyber advisory panel group 
in the beginning period of the election campaign (Kim, 2002; Cho, 2002). To 
give more evidence, CP2 said that  
  
‘… In general, when the candidate is finally confirmed, each 
party starts to conduct polls by not party officers inside party, 
but pollsters outside party organisation. … There were some 
cases in which pollsters who worked for party organisation 
were in charge in the overall process. However, in these cases, 
it is hard to say that they are kind of party officers because 
they joined in private camp after leaving parties and engaged 
in private poll company.’ (Interview transcript, CP2) 
 
It means that parties wanted to hire external professionals who know the 
dynamics of the political party although they had left the party organisation. In 
the other words, in the involvement of external professionals, the type of 
‘Traditional Politico’ as stated in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s research (2001) 
- political consultants who are in this group have their own companies after 
leaving their job in government and political parties - increased in the 2002 and 
2007 presidential elections. Perhaps it would be of benefit to parties to control 
and communicate with them rather than with external professionals who 
understand political sectors to a much lesser extent. Furthermore, the decision-
making process of parties would be much easier and efficient by assigning 
campaign professionals like the traditional politico type to the main patricians in 
communicating with the other campaign professionals and even inside party 
campaign management. Overall, although there were many vendor and market 
types of campaign professionals such as advertising companies, the most 
remarkable difference between the 1997 and the 2007 presidential elections is the 
extensive use of campaign professionals like the type of traditional politico. 
Besides this, it is revealed that there were a huge number of advisory panels 
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comprised of academics and renowned people in many different areas. From 
discussions explained above, it can be said that hypothesis 2, political parties will 
try to increase the engagement of campaign professionals to improve their 
campaign strategies, especially in the adoption of new campaign skills and 
electoral environment, is confirmed.  
 
Summary of the section  
 
In general, campaign professionals are broadly divided into three groups in South 
Korea: commercial companies, independent political consultants, and advisors on 
a voluntary basis. In effect, there is a limitation in applying Medvic’s 
classification (2003) to the South Korean case. This is because in his view people 
who give advice to political parties as a close friend cannot be seen as political 
consultants. However, party finances are not sufficient to pay for all kinds of 
campaign professionals in South Korea. For this reason, there are still many 
unpaid campaign professionals within party organisations. Furthermore, unlike in 
other countries where there are concerns about the decline of political parties 
caused by the influx of campaign professionals to the party organisations, Korean 
parties, especially political elites, still hold more power than campaign 
professionals.   
 
The biggest difference between previous and current campaign professionals is 
that the current campaign professionals want to be independent from the political 
parties. In addition, it is confirmed from the interview results that this tendency 
become more and more significant. Until the 1990s, the people who could be 
called campaign professionals were people who came from PR teams in the party 
organisation or worked for the mass media industry. For this reason, it is clearly 
shown that campaign professionals who have been employed in the previous 
presidential elections have a deep personal relationship with political parties. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that they were campaign professionals who had 
political consulting work as their main job like the current campaign 
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professionals, although their role was the same as that of the current campaign 
professionals. In relation to this issue, CP1 stated: 
 
‘The biggest difference in political consultants from the 1997 
to the 2007 presidential election is their change in identity. In 
1997, campaign staffers inside party organisation and political 
elites did not think that campaign professionals are the people 
who has specialised in election campaigns. Also campaign 
professionals did not think of themselves as experts in dealing 
with mass media.’ (Interview transcript, CP1)  
 
For example, Lee Dae-yub, who worked for the 1997 presidential election, was 
Project Director in the Korea Broadcasting System before he joined the camp. In 
addition, Jeon Byong-min, who was one of the first generation of political 
consultants in South Korea, was a not professional campaign expert but a kind of 
politician. That is to say, they were not campaign professionals for the election 
campaign.  
 
Entering into the 2002 presidential election, the increased use of campaign 
professionals was noticed compared to the 1997 presidential election. As a good 
example, candidate Rho Mu-hyun had to push forward a single candidacy 
agreement with Jeong Mong-jun, candidate of Kukmintonghap 21, another 
opposition party. The two parties reached an agreement about the method of 
candidate selection using political TV discussion and the result of opinion polls. 
For this reason, they had to hire two private poll companies, Research & 
Research and World Research. However, it is reported that the director of 
planning and coordination for the election campaign was a professional pollster 
rather than an internal staff member inside the party organisation (Weekly 
Chosun, 12/Nov/2012). According to this article, Hong Seok-gi, as a 
representative pollster of the DP, an important role in designing survey 
questionnaires and creating sampling methods than the two private companies 
did. In other words, these two private poll companies just conducted polls and 
informed the parties of the results, whilst Hong Seok-gi was charged with the 
creation of a basic campaign framework. This is meaningful in two different 
aspects: first, it would show that the power of campaign professionals had 
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increased from the 1997 presidential election. Although polls were also 
outsourced to commercial companies and any members of political elites 
engaged in polls in the 1997 presidential election, the fact that parties hired an 
independent pollster in their private camp meant that they had started to consider 
the importance of the adoption of campaign technology. Second, the degree of 
the participation of campaign professionals was more clearly classified according 
to the role they took. For instance, independent political consultants had a high 
level of responsibility compared to campaign professionals who came from 
commercial companies. From the 2002 case of the DP, Hong Seok-gi had more 
responsibility than private poll companies. That is to say, even though they can 
be called campaign professionals in general, the level of influence between 
campaign professionals differs based on their role. On the other hand, campaign 
professionals in the 2007 presidential election had their own specialised skills 
such as designing of campaign strategy like political consultants in the USA, 
advertising and polling, and provided their skills to political parties or candidates. 
There were more independent political consultants who did not have a 
government or party background, but mainly focused on just political 
consultancy works.    
 
Therefore, applying these historical alterations into the typology of Farrell, 
Kolodny, and Medvic’s research (2001), it can be interpreted that many 
campaign professionals in the 1997 and the 2002 presidential election were the 
traditional politico type, which is defined as political consultants who have their 
own companies after leaving their job in government and political parties. By 
contrast, since the 2002 presidential election, external professionals greatly seem 
to be like a mixed type between the type of marketers and the type of vendor. 
This is because they mainly work with parties and candidates although they come 
from a non-government background. CP1 and CP2 noted:  
 
‘I think my job is just to establish the campaign message 
strategy for the election campaign. Therefore I do not care 
about how the strategy will be practiced in the period of the 
election campaign. The accountability for the campaign 
strategy’s success is not my work but paid party executives’ 
work. It is the limitation of the role of political consultants in 
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South Korea, it will be much better to keep the relationship 
between political parties and professional experts because we 
never request any special consideration for a job position.’ 
(Interview transcript, CP2) 
 
‘We do not want to get involved in the area of politics as well 
as of party organisation. Accordingly, we do not want to know 
about their finances and the relationship between politicians 
etc. We have our own specialised skills and know how to use 
them in an election campaign.’ (Interview transcript, CP2) 
 
Along with the alteration of the type of campaign professionals, CP2 explained 
that the scope of campaign professionals in South Korea has been divided into 
two types. One is a type of campaign professionals who deals with all campaign 
matters, such as independent political consultants, whilst the other is a type of 
campaign professionals who has a specialised knowledge of one particular area 
such as advertising and polling company. The former type manages all campaign 
activities from electoral market survey to designing campaign strategy including 
polling and advertising services. Accordingly, they run, in general, local 
elections rather than presidential elections. On the other hand, the latter type of 
campaign professionals has their own specialised skills, for instance, how to 
develop campaign messages or how to interact with voters. In general, political 
consultants in this type greatly tend to participate in private camps. Taking all 
things into consideration, it can be said that the most significant feature between 
the 1997 and 2007 presidential election is the alteration of campaign 
professionals’ identity with the increase of their power and role caused by the 
enlargement of the industry of political consultancy. However, it should be noted 
that these alterations happened to independent political consultants rather than 
commercial companies as another part of the group of campaign professionals. 
As a result, hypothesis 2-2, the hierarchy in decision-making for election 
campaigns will change from a top-down structure to a more flat hierarchy 
because of the growing influx of campaign professionals, seems to be partly 
accepted in South Korea; however, it cannot be said that it will definitely happen 
in the future. 
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5.4.2. The relationship between campaign professionals and political parties  
 
As discussed above, it has been shown that the use of campaign professionals has 
increased and, therefore, their role has also been varied and specific. It means 
that South Korean parties have responded to the on-going changes in the 
electoral environments, and the proper use of mass media and campaign 
technology, and have deployed the parties’ resources efficiently; factors which 
have been decisive in designing a campaign strategy. On the other hand, the 
reason why parties are hiring many campaign professionals is that they do not 
know how to manage this development themselves: the adaptation of 
telecommunications for election campaigning is happening too rapidly for parties 
to manage it themselves (Sun, 2009).  
 
As Kolodny and Logan (1998) explained, there are two different types to define 
the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals. Briefly, 
there is the business relationship defined as ‘adversarial view’. It mainly occurs 
at the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals such as 
private companies which provide specialised skills - opinion polling, political 
advertising, and image marketing company- to political parties or candidates. 
Thus, campaign professionals in the case of the ‘adversarial view’ concentrate on 
examining the value of their products (candidates) and the electoral market, and 
consider how to make their products appeal to the voters. Conversely, in the case 
of the ‘allied view’, political parties, in general, employ campaign professionals 
and have total control over all campaign activities performed by them. Therefore, 
campaign professionals respect the aim of political parties and the relationship 
between parties and campaign professionals is much closer than in the 
adversarial view.  
 
Perhaps analysing their relationship into just two perspectives will cause 
oversimplification of the issue. Despite this, given that the industry of political 
consultancy in South Korea is in the initial phrase and there is still a huge 
number of advisors working as volunteers rather than paid campaign 
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professionals, this typology is worth applying to the South Korea case. Therefore, 
this section will address how to change the relationship between parties and 
campaign professionals using Kolodny and Logan’s typology (1998) in a 
historical context.      
 
The 1997 presidential election  
 
As noted earlier in the explanation of the role of campaign professionals, there 
were many commercial companies that participated in the production of political 
TV and newspaper advertising. Although it was officially announced that there 
would be selection via fair competitions, it has turned out that parties and 
commercial companies have maintained a long-term relationship (Interviews 
with CP2, CP5, and CP6). First of all, the GNP hired total two big commercial 
companies, HANCOME of Hanhwa Group and KOREAD of Haetae Group, 
which were subsidiary companies of major companies, which is called chaebol in 
South Korea, for the 1997 presidential election. Related to this issue, CP6 
mentioned that  
 
‘They there was not fair competition between companies. They 
were all companies close to parties or candidates in many 
aspects. …. Furthermore, they [campaign professionals] knew 
already about which party would be of more benefit to them’ 
(Interview transcript, CP6).  
 
From this perspective, it can be inferred that the relationship between parties and 
campaign professionals was strongly correlated, although it looked like an 
independent rather than a supportive role on the surface. Regardless of the fact 
that commercial companies, as one group of campaign professionals, work 
closely with the leader’s office or the central party organisation, it is true that 
they were selected by parties and connected to candidates through the party 
organisation. In other words, they were viewed as party networks, and, therefore, 
it can be said that their relationship is interpreted in the context of the allied view 
rather than the adversarial view, in terms of Kolodny and Logan (1998).  
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On the other hand, the DP also employed commercial companies for the 
production of political adverts. The commercial companies that they selected had 
a special relationship with the DP or a candidate because they had worked with 
them before. Although they were not big commercial companies, unlike those 
working with the GNP, they were more successful in managing their role. This 
was because the DP’s candidate, Kim Dae-joong, held a strong leadership in 
leading the different organisations, and, therefore, the conflicts between party 
organisation and campaign professionals in the candidate’s private camp were 
minimised in the 1997 presidential election. Most importantly, according to DP7, 
the power between party organisation and private camp was balanced and they 
worked together to have the candidate elected. Perhaps it was because Korean 
parties were established centring around a few particular politicians, like a type 
of boss system as explained before, and candidate Kim Dae-joong was the last 
politician amongst the three Kims who strongly influenced Korean politics. Thus, 
the DP could be efficiently organised by Kim’s strong leadership in the 1997 
presidential election. Except for the difference in managing the party 
organisation as described above, there was no difference between the GNP and 
the DP in the perspective of the relationship between parties and campaign 
professionals.  
 
The 2002 presidential election  
 
As stated earlier, the emergence of the adoption of primary election first by the 
DP has caused a weakening of the authority of the party organisation at the same 
time as increased the power of each candidate’s private camp. This is because the 
central election committee of the party organisation is newly structured after the 
final candidate is selected in the primary election. In general, the candidate’s 
private camp and party official organisation are officially combined into a 
committee to prepare the election campaign. In this process, naturally, there was 
friction between the members of the private camp and the members inside the 
party.  
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In effect, since the 2002 presidential election, the power of the private camp has 
increased more than that of the official PR teams inside the party organisation. 
CP2 commented that  
 
‘In effect, camp becomes a head to control over all campaign 
activities. … For instance, if there are some people in charge 
of polling work inside party organisation and private camp, a 
person from private camp in general has control over all 
polling works’ (Interview transcript, CP2).  
 
Although there are many reasons for this, the most important one is the high 
degree of the candidate’s trust in the private camp. CP1 explained that there is a 
different purpose in the creation of campaign strategy between internal party 
campaign staffers and the people from the candidate’s private camp. This is 
because party officers tend to be more concerned about their party than they are 
about the candidate whilst the people in the private camp consider candidates as 
the most important factor when designing campaign strategy.  
 
This problem was also pointed out in the interview with GNP2. GNP2 
commented on the fact that campaign managers inside the party organisation 
agree over the importance of the role of campaign professionals, and they believe 
that external campaign professionals are more knowledgeable in dealing with 
mass media and campaign technology. However, the main problem is that 
campaign professionals are, in general, lacking in understanding about the 
characteristics of politics. In other words, they need political savvy. In relation to 
this issue, GNP2 emphasised that it is highly possible to fail in the creation of a 
campaign strategy without cooperation between the two groups, campaign 
staffers inside party organisation and campaign professionals.  
 
With a similar opinion, DP1 indicated that campaign professionals are not the 
people who know and understand political situations and party ideology. In 
particular, a few campaign professionals, who come from the non-government 
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sector or do not have any experience about elections, did not know well about 
even campaign regulations in the 2002 presidential election. Accordingly, DP1 
stated that parties needed highly experienced external professionals rather than 
just technical specialists and, therefore, they employed campaign professionals 
who had worked for the party organisation before, as well as having special 
campaign skills. 
 
This is a good example of the different style of party organisation between the 
GNP and DP. According to Kwon (2003), there were some conflicts between the 
official PR team inside the party organisation and the PR team that was specially 
organised by campaign professionals who helped candidate Lee Hoi-chang to 
produce political TV advertising in the 2002 presidential election. It was because 
the role allocations between the two groups were not clear and, further, there 
were conflicts of attribution between them (Kim, 2003). Moreover, the two teams 
had very different opinions about the production of TV adverts, as stated in the 
section about the explanation of political TV advertising. The PR team inside the 
party organisation wanted to change Lee’s image, e.g. make him look cool and 
straightforward, through fun and emotional adverts based on their previous 
experiences. However, campaign professionals wanted to maintain his original 
image. With relation to this issue, Kim (2003) explains that there was not any 
chief manager who could deal with these internal discords in the GNP. Although 
the reason about why they had different opinions on the production of TV 
advertising is not explained in Kwon’s book (2003), it can be inferred from the 
interview transcript of GNP2. GNP2 noted that they realised that they need to 
change somehow Lee’s negative image that voters had in the 1997 presidential 
election. From this perspective, perhaps internal party campaign staffers wanted 
to focus on showing friendly, warm and funny emotional pictures rather than 
rational and logical images due to the experiences from previous elections. 
According to Kim (2003), campaign professionals in the GNP who came from 
commercial areas did not have any experience of electioneering and, therefore, 
they greatly tended to emphasis Lee’s advantages no matter what these were. In 
particular, they might expect that Lee’s rational image - he was a justice of the 
Supreme Court in his previous career - was the best for the situation that voters 
195 
 
 
were disappointed in the corruption of the government in the 1997 presidential 
election. Naturally, such continued conflicts led to failure in designing constant 
PR campaign strategy and, finally, it was criticised as one of the GNP’s big 
mistakes (interview transcripts with GNP2; Hangyore, 06/Dec/2002).  
 
The DP, however, employed experienced external campaign professionals. In 
particular, they established a new PR team, called PMI (Press, Media, Internet)
33
, 
with highly experienced senior politicians (Kwon, 2003; Kim, 2003). With 
priority given to these senior politicians, 30 advertising experts were involved as 
volunteers. That is, the DP placed senior political elites, who have much 
experience in elections and have good knowledge in dealing with mass media, as 
the head of the two PR teams, publicity and media team, and campaign 
professionals who are familiar with these senior politicians were assigned to their 
team, unlike what the GNP did. Consequently, this led to efficiency at work and 
in the decision-making process. DP5 said that the decision that senior politicians 
who participated in the 1997 presidential election were assigned to the head of 
the main PR teams consequently led to clarification as to where the responsibility 
lies between party organisation and campaign professionals, although there was 
no strong leadership from the candidate and the cooperation that had existed 
between camp and PR team inside the party organisation in the 1997 presidential 
election was not in evidence in 2002. 
 
Above all, the greatest difference between the 1997 and the 2002 presidential 
elections is the process of the involvement of external campaign professionals. 
To be specific, in the 1997 presidential election, the employment of campaign 
professionals was mainly done by political parties. Although the candidate camp 
also existed in the 1997 presidential election, it cannot be said that the power of 
the private camp was higher than that of the party organisation. But rather, the 
power of the party organisation was higher than that of the private camp because 
parties elected a representative of the party organisation as the final candidate for 
election in the 1997 presidential election whilst parties elected a final candidate 
                                            
33
 This will be discussed in the result section on the alteration of party structure.  
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of presidency to face the other parties regardless of their intention in the 2002 
presidential election. That is to say, the function of parties seems to have 
changed since the difference of political ideologies between them has become 
less distinct. As a result, parties started to consider such exciting (stimulating) 
political events such as primary election in the 2002 presidential election to court 
voters, and this led to the increased need for campaign professionals.  
 
Accordingly, this led to many alterations in the process of preparation of 
electioneering, such as increased influx of campaign professionals and the 
relationship between the parties and those campaign professionals. In the influx 
process, campaign professionals joined the candidate’s private camp at first to 
prepare the primary election, and then the members in the candidate’s private 
camp and party officers in the PR team inside the party organisation were 
combined after the end of the primary election. That is to say, campaign 
professionals had more personal relationships with candidates rather than with 
the party organisation. Thus, there was a tension between internal party 
campaign staffers and campaign professionals in the 2002 presidential election.  
 
The 2007 presidential election  
 
Although there were no huge differences in the use of external campaign 
professionals quantitatively compared to the 2002 presidential election, the 
relationship between political consultants and political parties has been 
permanent since the arrival of TV in the political process, and, thus, a kind of 
long-term period of preparation of election has arisen, like in the US. CP1 noted: 
 
‘It is true that the relationship between one particular politician 
and one particular political consultant tends to have a long-
term relationship. … It is because of cooperation between 
politicians and political consultants. For example, if there are 
politicians who want to run for any kinds of elections, they 
should need to control mass media at first. Naturally, they need 
political consultants who have already a deep relationship with 
journalists. … Once the triangle relationship between a 
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politician, a political consultant and a journalist has been 
established, it is hard to break.’ (Interview transcript, CP1)  
 
Accordingly, parties and candidates wanted to make a long-term relationship 
with campaign professionals, especially independent political consultants who 
understand their organisation and have the same political ideology. Related to 
this matter, DP1 noted that campaign professionals who are engaged in their 
organisation are people who have the same political ideologies or at least 
political orientation. Thus, politicians and independent political consultants who 
help them have only a long-term relationship under this situation in South Korea. 
In addition to this, CP2 explained that keeping a secret about campaign strategy 
is a common manner in the political consultancy industry. In that sense, the long-
term period of relationship may be not a recent phenomenon caused by the 
arrival of new media and new campaign technology, but a natural situation in 
South Korea.  
 
However, it has turned out that the case of commercial companies such as image 
marketing and political advertising is different. Unlike independent political 
consultants, these companies are normally connected to one particular party, to 
which they provide their skills. Although they normally work with one particular 
party, they try to stay neutral. In particular, this tendency strongly tends to be 
present in poll companies. As explained earlier, they have been more 
independent than the others - although they have engaged in private camps since 
the 2002 presidential election - because no one in the party organisations can 
intervene in carrying out polls. Moreover, parties want to show the results of 
reputable poll companies to voters and, therefore, this has led to poll companies 
being more independent. Even though their service has been more expanded than 
before, e.g. from simply surveys about the approval rating of candidates to 
providing prediction investigations based on objective figures from polls, it 
cannot be said that they have a deep relationship with parties and candidates, like 
independent political consultants have.   
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CP4 as a pollster commented that it is important to remain neutral between 
political parties because the poll companies work for all political parties 
whenever the parties need them. However, there are some poll companies that 
have a deep relationship with a particular party due to their political orientation. 
However, CP4 explained that poll companies have a huge amount of work in 
relation to other industries and, especially, working with political parties does not 
bring a fair margin of profit to poll companies. Nevertheless, they still maintain a 
good relationship with the parties due to their personal relationship with them, 
although there are no big margins for poll companies from a business perspective. 
 
On the other hand, ironically, it has turned out that there are different opinions 
between internal party campaign staffers and external campaign professionals in 
looking at their relationship. Almost all interviewees agreed on their 
uncomfortable relationship, and even that they were cynical about each other. 
CP1 said that  
 
‘The tension between internal party campaign staffers and 
external campaign professionals is a bit weird. It is because of 
the stereotype about campaign professionals. … Sometimes 
internal party campaign staffers do not think that they need 
some helps from campaign professionals because they think 
their campaign skills are good enough compared to us 
[campaign professionals].’ (Interview transcript, CP1) 
 
As stated earlier, internal party campaign staffers seem to believe that external 
campaign professionals do not know much about electioneering and political 
process. That is, the role of campaign professionals is just to provide their skills 
on a temporary basis, especially when there are special circumstances such as 
election periods, and, therefore, they will not affect anything concerned with 
party organisation. For this reason, internal party campaign staffers normally 
have a high level of expectation of the role of campaign professionals. This is 
clearly shown in an interview with CP2.     
 
‘They [internal party campaign staffers] have a cynical attitude 
to external campaign professionals. Also they always 
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anticipate that we have super-high technical campaign skills 
and will conduct dramatic campaign strategy like a magic.’ 
(Interview transcript, CP2) 
 
By contrast, campaign professionals think that internal party campaign staffers 
need to learn about media logic. When questioned whether they think internal 
party campaign staffers need media training, campaign professionals answered 
that internal party campaign staffers need to update their skills. CP2 explained 
that  
 
‘Especially from the 2007 presidential election, the high level 
of a party’s competence in dealing with digital media has 
become important because parties have to upload and transmit 
their news continually through these new forms. Nonetheless, 
parties will not hire any campaign professionals on a 
permanent basis because of their limited budget. Therefore, 
internal party campaign staffers should improve their skills, 
even if it is not an election period.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)  
 
Although the relationship between internal party campaign staffers and campaign 
professionals does not represent the relationship between party organisation and 
campaign professionals, it cannot be denied that the relationship between internal 
party campaign staffers and campaign professionals in the 2007 presidential 
election became a source of increasing conflict since campaign professionals 
wanted to be more independent from the parties compared to the past, and they 
started to see their relationship from a business viewpoint. In particular, under 
the Korean situation that all final decisions are generally made by candidates, it 
has been more serious since candidates have become more reliant on campaign 
professionals. Thus, it can be interpreted that the relationship between candidates 
and campaign professionals, especially in the case of independent political 
consultants, has been personally as well as officially closer than before whilst the 
relationship between internal party campaign staffers and campaign professionals 
has been somewhat less close (or has become estranged). Nonetheless, in general, 
it is true that the relationship between political parties and campaign 
professionals from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential election in both parties 
seems to have changed from an allied view to an adversarial view.   
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Summary of this section 
 
As discussed above, it turns out that the relationship between parties and 
campaign professionals has slowly been altered over a 10-year period from an 
allied to an adversarial view in the context of Kolodny and Logan’s research 
(1998), depending on campaign professionals’ particular roles. To be specific, as 
campaign professionals, individual political consultants tend to have deeper 
personal relationships with candidates. However, some campaign professionals 
who help parties in dealing with modern campaign technologies and specific 
campaign activities such as political advertising and political TV debates seem to 
have business relationships with political parties. Thus, it can be said that the 
increased use of campaign professionals by political parties since the 1997 and 
up to the 2007 presidential election has led to a subdivision in campaign 
professionals’ roles, which as a result has produced different outcomes in 
shaping relationships with political parties according to what they (campaign 
professionals) do.  
 
5.4.3. The alteration of the management of party organisation  
 
This section will present the result of how Korean parties have managed their 
organisation over the 10 years. Therefore, this section will focus on answering 
one of the research questions and confirming whether or not hypothesis 3-1, 
political parties will be centralised to manage their resources efficiently as well 
as effectively, will be accepted. In addition, this section will present the answer 
of whether hypothesis 3-3, political parties will expand their organisation to deal 
with mass media and new technology, and will therefore concentrate investment 
on developing these departments within their organisation, will be accepted. 
However, this section will not present the results of the difference between the 
GNP and DP due to lack of information, especially in the DP case. As stated in 
Chapter 3, the DP was split into different parties several times from the 1997 to 
the 2007 presidential election. Therefore, the DP did not keep any specific 
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information about their organisation. Given this limitation, this section will 
explain the general alteration of party organisation based on the interview results. 
 
It is noticeable that every election campaign is based on the party organisation 
and on the use of their internal resources, even if their strategies have changed 
according to the current political environment and their current needs. As 
mentioned previously, the party, whether or not it is weaker than before, still 
exists at the centre of the Korean political process, and it has to adapt to changing 
circumstances. So, alterations in campaign practices can be seen as one of the 
signs that parties are adapting to changed political environments (Katz, Müller 
and Plasser, 2004) under the assumption that parties continually review and 
reformulate their practices to meet different circumstances (Katz and Mair, 1995). 
Therefore, the matter of whether party organisation is centralised is important in 
the management of efficient campaign strategy.  
 
Unlike the 1997 presidential election, the 2002 presidential election has many 
politically remarkable events such as the emergence of primary election and 
internal discord within parties. In effect, it caused a conflict between party 
official organisation and candidate’s private camp. Furthermore, a kind of boss 
system in political parties authorises more power to key politicians, e.g. the three 
Kims, and parties have followed this old custom. In particular, the first 
establishment of people participatory primary election has led to the 
intensification of the power of candidates rather than parties. Of course, this is 
not to say that the establishment of primary election is just one reason for the 
intensification of candidate-focused election campaign. There are more distinct 
reasons such as the decline of party attachment. However, it cannot be denied 
that the emergence of primary election has decreased the authority of party 
organisation, and, therefore, it has sometimes caused internal discord in party 
organisation and conflicts between party organisation and private camp, 
especially election campaign periods.  
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For example, in the case of the GNP, they created a new election planning 
committee to prepare for a media-centralised election campaign one month 
before the actual election date in the 1997 presidential election. It was not an 
official election emergency organisation inside the party, but a specialised group, 
called the candidate’s private camp, which was composed of a cadre of highly 
experienced politicians and a few broadcasters as campaign professionals. In 
effect, it was reported that there were internal conflicts between politicians close 
to candidate Lee Hoi-chang and the other politicians due to the loss of authority 
of the central organisation by the weakening of Lee’s leadership (Hankuk Ilbo, 
01/Sep/1997). For this reason, Lee relied more on campaign professionals in his 
camp rather than on campaign organisation although the GNP established a new 
election-planning committee to quell internal conflicts and to cope with 
difficulties they encountered. However, in the 1997 presidential election, the 
parties rather than the candidate’s camps held the decision-making authority for 
the management of campaign activities. 
 
After the 1997 presidential election, it is true that the power of party organisation 
slightly decreased although the phenomenon of centralisation of party 
organisation was maintained until the 2007 presidential election. Since the 
adoption of people participatory primary election in the 2002 presidential 
election, party members and political elites have been no longer able to elect the 
candidate they wanted, and this has consequently led to a conflict between 
candidate and party organisation. For this reason, candidates have relied on their 
private camp rather than on the party organisation, although it was clearly shown 
in the DP’s case in the 2002 presidential election, due to serious disagreement 
between the political elites about Rho My-hyun’s victory in the DP’s primary 
election, that GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang also tended to rely on the private 
camp. CP6 and CP1 stated that 
 
 ‘… It is true that the opinion of camp has more power than 
party organisation because of the different level of candidate’s 
reliability’ (Interview transcript, CP6) 
 
 
203 
 
 
 ‘When the election campaign started, the main body of 
campaign organisation is the candidate’s camp rather than the 
political party office. In general, the people, who make the 
final decision for the election campaign, are all in the camp. … 
The candidate tends to be reliant on some particular campaign 
professionals who have a deep personal relationship with the 
candidate (Interview transcript, CP1)’  
 
Even though the power of the party organisation has decreased relatively 
compared to the increased power of the private camp, it is true that they 
cooperate in conducting election campaigns under the candidate’s command, and 
this has led to the centralisation of the party organisation. Accordingly, under the 
Korean system, the centralisation of the party organisation may be an inevitable 
consequence in South Korea. 
 
Although there are no direct changes to the centralisation of party organisation, 
political parties in South Korea seem to change their organisation in accordance 
with the current electoral environment and especially after a defeat in election. 
For instance, parties have tried to establish new departments for PR and invest 
their budgets into these departments. According to GNP5 and GNP7, the GNP 
tried to invest more money into expanding departments related to PR and 
campaign activities. Thus, it turned out that the GNP expanded PR departments 
and the Internet department has strengthened since a defeat in the 1997 
presidential election.  
 
In addition, this organisational change also occurred to DP. DP has strengthened 
the power of departments related to media and publicity. In particular, the DP 
employed Kim Hun-tae, who is a practicing independent campaign professional, 
as a chair of strategic planning on August in 2011. From this case, it can be seen 
that it would be possible to transform the structure of Korean parties to the 
electoral-professionals party type, as stated in Panebianco’s research (1988). 
However, it may be a hasty generalisation in looking at the change of party 
organisation in South Korea, because there are still stereotypes when looking at 
campaign professionals because it has turned out that internal party campaign 
staffers tend to think that campaign professionals are just outsiders. Accordingly, 
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they think that there are two different individual positions between external 
campaign professionals and campaign staffers inside party organisation in the 
management of election campaigns. GNP1 and GNP3 noted  
 
‘It is obvious that everyone who is in political parties should 
know politics as well as the mass media in order to manage 
political parties well in response to the current electoral 
environment. Although it is a bit biased, we assume that it 
takes more time to learn what politics is than learning about 
how to deal with mass media.’ (Interview transcript, GNP1) 
 
‘Internal party campaign staffers know more about what kind 
of party activities we need rather than campaign professionals. 
In fact, campaign professionals have much wider perspectives 
in the management of election campaigns. Conversely, we 
[internal party campaign staffers] know party matters more 
than campaign professionals.’ (Interview transcript, GNP3) 
 
From these interviews, it is clear that the phenomenon of internal party campaign 
staffers replacing campaign professionals – which is mentioned as one 
hypothesis of the electoral-professional party type – will not really happen in 
South Korea, although it is true that political parties employ many more 
campaign professionals in the many areas to deal with the current electoral 
environment compared to the past.  
 
Some scholars include how many campaign professionals have been engaged 
into a political party’s activities to measure the degree of professionalisation of 
election campaigning. However, it could not be said that this is directly 
connected to the result of the degree of professionalisation in a given country. It 
can be accepted as a natural response in the utilisation of mass media and new 
technology in election campaigns. Especially in South Korea’s case, the reason 
political parties hire campaign professionals for their election campaign is that 
they want the best people who can deal with these technical issues well and have 
a special knowledge about how to manage mass media issues. In fact, parties do 
not want to hire too many campaign professionals because they believe that they 
are better than campaign professionals. Accordingly, it will be highly possible 
for Korean parties to separate their role properly and cooperate with campaign 
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professionals rather than replacing the position of the current internal party 
campaign staffers with campaign professionals. Therefore, parties may desire to 
employ the people in a special area they might not know well or do not want to 
learn about in any depth.  
 
Summary of the section 
 
Given South Korea has many elections every year, it is true that political parties 
in South Korea need help from campaign professionals continually. In addition, 
they devoted much time to changing their campaign strategies and organisation 
structure such as the establishment of a digital PR team, the increased power and 
number of PR teams. In related to this issue, it is obvious that parties are trying 
to respond to cope with the ever-changing electoral environment. CP1 said that  
 
‘As far as I know, it is few cases that independent political 
consultants could manage the election campaign by themselves 
rather than politicians until 2005. It was possible to give some 
advices to political parties as one member of private company, 
not as independent political consultant. However, it is true that 
parties have been changed their organisation in accordance 
with the ever-changing electoral environment.’ (Interview 
transcript, CP1) 
 
In particular, it is turned out that organisational changes are often happened after 
a defeat in elections. That is, it is proved that parties have tended to be more 
professionalised in the utilisation of media and technology as well as structuring 
efficient party organisation after huge election defeats. 
 
Moreover, CP2 noted that candidates intend to hire campaign professionals, 
especially independent political consultants, as permanent staffers, after the 
2007 presidential election. However, CP2 pointed out that this would not easily 
happen in the case of Korean parties due to the problem of party finance. 
Therefore, this cannot guarantee that South Korean parties have been 
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transforming into Western model of party type such as electoral-professional 
party.  
 
5.5. Discussion about media-intensified campaign style in South Korea 
 
This section presents the common arguments of interviewees about the alteration 
of election campaigns in South Korea. As noted earlier, one interviewee insisted 
that Korean election campaigning is just a media-intensified campaign style 
rather than a scientific campaign using sophisticated data. From this perspective, 
this section discusses why Korean parties have become devoted to the utilisation 
of mass media. Furthermore, Korean election campaigns often tend to be 
characterised as ‘Americanisation’ despite many differences in political, media, 
and electoral systems, as stated in the literature review chapter. Accordingly, this 
section will discuss why the concept of professionalisation would be preferable 
to the term of ‘Americanisation’ to explain the alteration of election campaigning 
in South Korea.   
 
The serious competition between parties  
 
As a decisive factor in the growth of use of mass media by Korean parties in 
election campaigns, some interviewees stated a serious competition between 
parties resulting from the current government aid for parties. As mentioned 
earlier, the current party system has stemmed from the negotiations between 
political elites who had an inclination towards conservatism in 1987 (Kim, 2008). 
Since then Korean parties are generally divided into two political camps – 
Conservative and Democratic – according to their inclination. However, many 
studies have reported that there are actually no distinct differences in their 
policies and this has been more serious since the resignation of the three Kims, 
who had predominated political achievements and political careers. As a result, 
parties have received less support from the voters, which has eventually led to 
the decline of party loyalty and party attachment.  
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Following this, Korean parties have relied more on gathering politicians who are 
well known to the voters or have good publicity in order to receive a benefit from 
the government subsidy for a party. According to the National Assembly Law 
article 33, ‘any party which has more than 20 members of the National Assembly 
can be a floor negotiation group.’ (Republic of Korea, The National Assembly 
Act article 11456). In the Political Fund Law, article 11376 mentioned that the 
‘only party that forms a floor negotiation group can get a subsidy from the 
government’. Consequently these legalisations and serious party competition 
caused by a collapse of strong party ideology have led Korean parties to devote a 
lot of time to seeking popular politicians and celebrities who are often exposed in 
mass media. This is because parties have to aim to gain more votes from swing 
voters, especially in the 20-30 age group, since they have engaged in a similar 
policy line. In general, the 20-30 group is sensitive to new trends and tend to vote 
too. 
 
One interview phrase explained this situation well:  
 
‘Korean parties are highly dependent on government subsidy 
to maintain their parties. … They are desperate to win 
elections because subsidy is given to political parties 
according to the number of members of the National Assembly. 
In order to get more subsidies, each party has to publicise their 
candidates mobilising the best resources they have. … In the 
past, there were different target groups between parties. … 
Since the definite differences in political policies between 
parties have blurred, almost all parties are on target to gain 
many voters from swing voters, especially in the 20-30 
generation. As a result, parties have to invest more money to 
adopt new media given the characteristics of the young 
generation.’ (Interview transcript, DP)  
 
In fact, this is not the only matter belonging to the period of election 
campaigning. However, one fact is obvious: that parties cannot get rid of the 
great help they receive from mass media since the era of media democracy has 
emerged.  
 
The attitude of candidates and the mood of the party 
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The attitude of candidates is commonly listed by almost all interviewees as one 
of the main elements in growth of the use of mass media in an election campaign. 
In fact, this has been confirmed through the DP’s successful use of the Internet as 
a new medium in the 16
th
 election campaign in 2002. When asked a question 
about the background to the adoption of the Internet, DP 5 pointed out it was an 
actual candidate, Rho, who had the idea. DP 5 stressed the final decision about 
the management of the election campaign is totally up to the candidates in Korea. 
Continually he said, ‘although there are many campaign professionals from 
various fields and it is true that the candidates are more reliant on them nowadays, 
they are all just advisors.’ Thus, DP 5 mentioned that it is an important factor 
whether the candidate keeps an open mind and has up-to-date ideas. With regard 
to this, one of the campaign professionals described candidate Rho: 
 
‘The candidate Rho is widely known amongst politicians as a 
person who deals well online and has even ran his website by 
himself in 2002. As far as I know, there might be no politicians 
who believed the effect of the Internet at that time. Conversely 
there were many politicians who believed the strong effect of 
traditional media. Nonetheless I have heard that he had wide 
knowledge about the application of the Internet before he was 
elected as a president candidate.’ (Interview transcript, CP1)   
 
On the other hand, the GNP was in a very different situation compared to the DP. 
There is no doubt that the GNP is treated as the richest party in Korea and 
accordingly the GNP’s resources are better than those of the other parties. In fact 
at the beginning of the 2002 election campaign, many people expected the GNP 
would win the presidential election. However, the result was clearly exceptional. 
Many reasons have been cited for the GNP’s failure; many scholars have 
commented on a late response to Internet campaigning as the most fundamental 
reason. Related to this, almost all interviewees as internal party campaign staffers 
of the GNP stated that it might be a different attitude in looking at mass media. It 
was obvious that the GNP had a better relationship with traditional media 
companies, especially in the field of newspapers, than the other parties did. 
Accordingly, they would possibly be more heavily reliant on traditional media as 
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a main communication channel, which consequently could lead them to not 
having any interest in other media platforms or strategies. The case below would 
be a good example to explain a widespread problem for the GNP.  
 
‘We had a meeting after the first TV advertisement was 
broadcast in 1997. In fact, some paid party executives realised 
we would lose the election because the DP’s one was much 
better than us. While we were busy trying to show Lee’s 
tenacity and leadership, DP focused on making a friendly 
mood using a K-pop titled ‘the dance with DJDOC’ with the 
slogan of  ‘we could pass through a national crisis together’. 
When we told Lee and the other politicians, they could not 
understand why it was a matter and who was DJ DOC
34
 at that 
time. … It was the unpalatable truth.’ (Interview transcript, 
GNP2) 
 
Like this, the attitude of the candidate seems to be an important factor when 
trying something new in election campaigning. CP5, an interview participant in 
the group of campaign professionals, also stressed the importance of the 
candidate’s attitude. Also, CP5 emphasised that ‘an election campaign is a battle 
against time. Thus, a matter of who preoccupies the latest campaign techniques 
and new media in advance is a sensitive issue nowadays.’ 
 
 Along with this, party culture is also mentioned as a significant element in the 
adoption of new media. According to the interview materials, the final campaign 
strategy is determined through considerable discussions with politicians, paid 
party executives, campaign professionals, and advisors, although the candidate 
has the final decision. This is because the winning of elections is regarded by the 
party itself as a value victory from a tough fight between parties that want to 
assume the reins of government in the wide perspective. Thus, some interviewees 
mentioned that it would be difficult in the management of professionalised 
election campaigning if the current politicians ignored the effect of new media 
and were lazy about improving their knowledge about these new developments.  
                                            
34
 DJ DOC is a Korean trio pop group and they were popular to young people in 1997. The song 
named ‘The dance with DJ DOC’ is one of the most famous songs and candidate Kim used the 
song in his TV advertisement after changing the lyrics.  
210 
 
 
As a good example, GNP 4 indicated that the candidates and politicians who are 
in the major parties sometimes tend to overlook the importance of adapting to 
new media and new campaigns because they too believe the profile of each 
political party and the loyalty of party members. This seems to be a factor for the 
GNP more rather than for the other parties due to the close relationship between 
the GNP and major newspaper companies. Although it is not limited to the 
Korean case, it has been treated as a prominent problem in Korean politics. The 
big three major newspaper companies, known as Chosun/Joongang/Donga in 
South Korea, are very biased in favour of the GNP and, besides, the approval 
rating for the GNP is generally expected to be about 35% of the total vote
 35
. 
Thus, GNP4 is a bit more flexible in seeking out the other communication 
channels. As a result, these attitudes of politicians and candidates could be one of 
the reasons why the GNP invested less in Internet campaigning than the DP did, 
although they were in an advantageous position for the 16
th
 presidential election 
in 2002.  
 
However, this case does not only apply to the GNP. Almost all DP interviewees 
mentioned that they are less conservative than the GNP, but the characteristics of 
politicians seem to be not very different, whether they are in the GNP or in DP. 
Despite the success of the DP’s Internet campaigning in 2002, it is revealed that 
a principal agent of the Internet campaigning was a fan club of candidate Rho, 
known as ‘Rhosamo’. That is, the DP recognised the Internet would be utilised 
more than before, but they did not have a specific strategy about it. DP5 said, 
 
 ‘We did not expect Rho Mu-hyun to be elected as a final 
candidate at that time. Therefore we actually did not know 
how to publicise him. However the activities of Rhosamo 
based on the Internet was better than any other campaign 
activity. … In my opinion, it is no exaggeration to say that 
Rhosamo left a way open for activating the Internet 
campaigning.’ (Interview transcript, DP5)  
 
                                            
35
 Although there are different perspectives about the actual figure of the approval rating for each 
party, it is generally thought that for the GNP it is around 35% of population and for the DP it is 
around 32%. This is commonly mentioned by each of the GNP and DP interviewees.  
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It cannot be said that in 2002 the DP knew nothing of the effect of the Internet, 
but at least it is understood that the DP also seemed to take a passive role in the 
adoption of new media, like the GNP did.  
 
From a wider perspective, this may be understood with the concept of culture of 
political organisation. Hofstede (1984) mentioned culture as being the expression 
of a set of values. To be exact, culture is understood to be ‘the collective 
programming of the minds which distinguishes the members of one human group 
from another.’ (21) From this perspective, politicians as a bigger group in the 
field of politics could share the same values as each other even though their 
propensity could be changeable later according to each political organisation’s 
ideology. Consequently, they might share core values at least and it will not be 
easy to change their attitudes, which adhere to traditional values. Related to this 
issue, one interviewee stated: 
 
‘I sometimes feel that almost all politicians tend to resist the 
certain kind of changes in dealing with new media and 
technologies and are lazy in improving their knowledge. … 
We ran a workshop about social media for their election 
campaign one year ago. Some politicians asked me why they 
should learn this and even they doubted the effect of social 
media. … Even though they are just a few politicians, it is the 
real world.’ (Interview transcript, DP1) 
 
 
The change of election campaign paradigm  
 
Almost all interviewees agreed that the alteration of election campaign paradigm 
had been caused by technical developments especially in the area of media and 
new technology. It is obvious that political parties need different kinds of media 
to communicate with voters and try to utilise these in response to a changing 
society. As a result, parties have to give careful attention to these developments 
and continue to improve their campaign strategies with them. With regard to 
these changes in parties, all interviewees said that it is not surprising news but 
just a natural phenomenon. In particular, they indicated that efficient use of mass 
212 
 
 
media in election campaigning has a decisive effect on the outcome of elections 
in Korea since campaign activities using face-to-face communication strategies 
such as canvassing and outdoor speeches were restricted by revised electoral law 
in 2004. In relation to this, CP5 indicated that  
 
‘It is obvious that Korean parties have conducted various kinds 
of campaign activities using media although doubts still 
remain about which one is a dependent variable in diffusion of 
media democracy between a revised campaign regulation 
focused on mass media activities and party’s various use of 
mass media’ (Interview transcript, CP5).  
 
Under the changing electoral environment, Korean parties have no choice but to 
adapt to these changes without any consideration. DP1 said  
 
‘We do not actually have much time to consider whether we 
have to adopt new media in our campaign if voters use it well 
in their current life. No matter what it is and how we deal with 
at the beginning of adoption, what we can do is to utilise it 
immediately not to keep up with the others’ (Interview 
transcript, DP1).  
 
In fact, Korean parties have accomplished various kinds of campaign activities 
by the utilisation of new media and communication technologies in each election 
from 1997 to 2007, especially since the arrival of TV in the election campaign in 
the early 1990s
36
 (Kwon, 1992; You, 1997). For example, the first political 
discussion on TV was introduced in 1997 (Kim, 2002), and, in the following 
presidential election in 2002, the Internet was utilised (Kang, 2011). Moreover, 
in 2007, a mobile vote was conducted by the DP
37
 (Lee, 2007). Accordingly, it is 
needless to say that Korean parties have made every endeavour to adopt new 
media and communication technology during these periods despite the short and 
turbulent development in media and communication technology.  
                                            
36
  In fact, in Korea, TV was introduced into election campaigning in the 13th presidential 
election in 1987, as mentioned in Chapter 3. However, its effect was not strong at that time 
because of a low rate of distribution. Therefore, Korean scholars explain the time when media 
politics started as being from the 14
th
 presidential election in 1992 (Jeong 2002, Kim and Kim 
2005).  
37
 As explained earlier, DP is abbreviation of United New Democratic Party. It is formed in 2008. 
(See historical party changes in Chapter 3 for more details about it.) 
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Although this could possibly cause an argument as to which one takes place first 
between a party’s efforts and the change of voters’ media use pattern in the field 
of politics, internal party campaign staffers generally understood it as the result 
in the change of campaign paradigm caused by the advent of new media. 
 
‘Even though the surrounding electoral environment 
includes such things as a bad relationship with media 
companies, a less friendly assessment of the previous 
government in 2002 had a bad influence on the DP, the 
reason DP could win the election was because campaign 
paradigm had been totally changed at that time because of 
the arrival of the Internet.’ (Interview transcripts, DP5)  
 
‘Since Political TV advertising was introduced for election 
campaigning in 1987, the arrival of television in election 
campaigning has totally altered the election campaign 
paradigm. Following this, the Internet in 2002 performed a 
similar role to TV in 1987.’ (Interview transcripts, GNP2) 
 
As apparent in interviews and campaign regulations, it is obvious that the level of 
reliance on mass media in spreading out campaign news is of a high standard. 
More specifically, DP5 used a good phrase to evidence it: ‘In my opinion, this is 
the hardest time for parties especially when no new media is introduced’ 
(Interview transcript, DP5). According to DP5, it was not that difficult to use the 
new medium of the Internet in the 2002 election campaigns. This is because the 
Internet is popular with everyone and any kind of Internet activity is enough to 
draw voters’ attention at that time. In particular, DP5 mentions that nobody cares 
about whether the party has a high standard of skill in the management of new 
media, especially in the initial step, and the judgment of a successful campaign is 
just determined according to whether the party appeals to the voter’s taste.  
 
On the other hand, DP5 states that formulating a media strategy in 2007 was a 
big issue for the DP because the Internet was no longer a new medium to 
Koreans and every party had utilised it since 2002. To make matters worse, the 
public’s aspirations to change a party in government were highly serious due to a 
bad assessment of the previous DP’s achievements whilst in office. Naturally, 
election agendas focused on candidate Lee of the GNP and his approval rating 
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increased. In particular, his career as a successful businessman was strongly 
emphasised in the worst economic situation in Korea in 2007. For this reason, the 
election campaign accomplished by the utilisation of mass media in the 17
th
 
presidential election in 2007 did not seem to work. Consequently, it could imply 
that taking great advantage of new media in election campaigns is highly related 
to two issues: 1) proper timing- that is, when the new media is first introduced; 2) 
the time when candidates are equal in competition with no differences in election 
pledges.  
 
The Korean culture 
 
In this changing electoral environment, Korean parties have to show different 
campaign strategies to draw voters’ attention whenever a new election is 
declared and this is revealed as a main burden of Korean parties when 
conducting an election campaign. All interviewees agreed with the strong 
influence and the importance of strategic use of mass media. However, they point 
out how difficult it is for parties because of Korean characteristics and culture.  
 
GNP2 supposed the meaning of adoption of new media is like a passing fad to 
parties. As a good phrase about Korean culture, Jeon mention that the reason the 
IT industry has spread out into Korean society is because of a Korean 
characteristic called the fast fast culture, known as 8282 culture in South Korea 
(cited from Kang, 2012). He points out that Korean are not afraid of 
accommodating new changes, but, rather, they really enjoy it. Consequently, it 
has become a chance to make Korea a driving force of IT power, but, on the 
other hand, it has destroyed a traditional culture.  
 
When applying the fast fast culture into election campaigns, it could be deemed a 
positive side in the aspect of driving voters’ interests using new media. From this 
perspective, political parties in Korea might be easy targets in the utilisation of 
new media especially if it appeals to the interests of any targeted voter groups. 
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For instance, the Internet campaign conducted by the DP in 2002 is a good 
example. In contrast, this unique culture could rather lead parties to de-
professionalisation in many aspects such as a lack of unified campaign strategies, 
efficient distribution of party resources and so on. It is because parties might rush 
to adopt any kinds of campaign activities without deep consideration. This is 
clearly expressed in the interviews. Typically, CP5 said, ‘Korean election 
campaigning cannot be said to be a well-prepared campaign. The most important 
thing is to cope with difficult situations whenever it happens’ (Interview 
transcript, CP5). The election campaign conducted by GNP in 2002 would be a 
good example for this. DP3 said,  
 
‘We know it is important to communicate with voters via mass 
media nowadays. However, actually, we do not want to try to 
invest huge sums of money to improve media campaign skills 
due to a sudden change in using mass media.’ (Interview 
transcript, DP3)  
 
According to the interviews with DLP internal party campaign staffers, the 
Internet in South Korea is being treated an old medium already and people do not 
feel it is an attractive medium anymore. Besides, he points out that the Internet 
may not be considered as an up-and-coming medium for the 18
th
 presidential 
election in 2012 in Korea even though it will differ depending on how parties 
utilise it strategically. To sum up, the Korean characteristic could encourage 
parties to adopt new media quickly into their campaign, but then, it could hamper 
the qualitative growth in management of mass media. Of course, this might apply 
to every democratic country. However, it could be part of the supplemental 
evidences for why Korean parties have struggled with this issue.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation aimed to investigate the phenomenon of professionalisation of 
election campaigning, which has been vigorously debated between academic 
scholars, by taking South Korea as a case study. Thus, this research focused on 
exploring the question of how each party has managed its party organisation and 
campaign practices with campaign professionals in response to continual changes 
in the electoral environment in the context of professionalisation of election 
campaigning. As mentioned Chapter 2, the concept of professionalisation is 
defined as a continuous review process by each party to design competitive 
campaigns in response to the alteration of socio-political environments and the 
party’s unceasing efforts to deal with new mass media and campaign technology, 
and campaign professionals. Therefore, it can be said that ‘professionalisation 
expresses itself in more conscious and sophisticated use of campaign practices’ 
(Plasser and Plasser, 2002, pp.248) and efficient management of party 
organisation. 
 
In order to examine professionalisation of election campaigning in South Korea, 
this research divided it into two dimensions: external and internal alteration, 
consisting of three main features respectively. To be specific, the external 
dimension is composed of three main features: 1) the utilisation of mass media 
and campaign technology, 2) the alteration of campaign activities, and 3) the 
alteration of campaign style. On the other hand, the internal dimension consists 
of three features: 1) the role of campaign professionals, 2) the relationship 
between campaign professionals and political parties, and 3) the alteration of 
management of party organisation. The comprehensive findings of this research 
have revealed that South Korean political parties showed in general a high level 
of professionalisation by fast adoption of new campaign technology and the 
increased use of the mass media in their election campaigns, although there were 
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some differences in terms of speed between the parties. However, the role and 
the authority of campaign professionals are low in spite of their increased use as 
well as the growing level of reliability on them. In addition, there is no influence 
on the alteration of party organisation resulting from the increased use of 
campaign professionals although it is found that the role and the great importance 
of PR departments has been stronger than before. On the basis of the results 
presented in each chapter, this concluding chapter will present a comprehensive 
summary of this research and results according to two different dimensions. 
Finally, the limitations of this research and the suggestions for future studies will 
be mentioned in this chapter. 
 
6.2. The summary of the research 
 
The purpose of this research was to test whether the theory of professionalisation 
of election campaigning that has been argued to exist in the West could be 
applied for the South Korean case as well. Given this theory is still vague and an 
on-going subject of discussion even in the West, this research tries to explain 
historical alterations of election campaign which have been made by two typical 
political parties – GNP and DP – in South Korea over the 10 years in question.  
 
As stated earlier, there are many different approaches when looking at historical 
changes of election campaigning and measuring the extent to which election 
campaigning has been professionalised. Nonetheless, there are three factors that 
are commonly mentioned by previous scholars when examining 
professionalisation of election campaigning in the technical perspective as an 
external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning: sophisticated 
use of media and campaign technology, the alteration of campaign activities 
through the intensification of new and existing campaign practices, and the 
alteration of style of election campaigning from labour-intensive to capital-
intensive. On the other hand, from an internal dimension viewpoint, there are 
three different aspects: the influx of campaign professionals, the change of 
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relationship between political parties and campaign professionals from 
ambiguous to conflict by the increased use of the latter, and the centralisation of 
party organisation in order to manage campaign practices efficiently. Thus, this 
research can give a broad sense of understanding about how and by how much 
political parties have adopted and adapted new media and new technologies in 
order to win elections.  
 
Chapter 1 as the introduction to this study provided a general overview of this 
research. Therefore, the purpose of this research and the research questions as 
well as hypotheses through appropriate academic discussions in relation to the 
evolution of election campaign literature especially focusing on the phenomenon 
of professionalisation was presented. In particular, given that this study focuses 
on the South Korea case to investigate the phenomenon of professionalisation of 
election campaigning, a brief explanation of why the South Korean case has been 
chosen for this study has been explained. Finally, a brief explanation of chapter 
structure has been outlined in this chapter.  
 
In Chapter 2, this research tried to conceptualise the phenomenon of 
professionalisation of election campaigning in the context of campaign literature. 
As mentioned before, the overall national campaign may be more orchestrated 
and better organised, more ‘professional’ to use the language of political 
communication, but it is a form of professionalism that is constantly changing 
and redefining itself (Negrine, 2002). In particular, the co re question of what 
professionalisation means is related to the possibility of distinguishing between 
‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ campaigns (Mancini, 1999). In fact, whenever 
argument about professionalisation is made, many academics point out what the 
difference between amateurish and professional campaign is. If 
professionalisation is defined as a response of political parties to make their 
campaign practices better or to adapt more technical campaign skills to mobilise 
more volatile voters than before, it is actually meaningless to argue between the 
terms amateurish and professional. In fact, no amateurish campaign strategy 
exists because campaigners always try to use the best materials whenever 
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elections are held. Thus, Negrine (2007) insists that the theory of 
professionalisation could be used for analysis of the development of ‘what went 
on before’ rather than using a standard to distinguish amateurish campaigns. 
Given that election campaigning, as one of the key activities of political parties, 
is a typical way to recognise these changes, professionalisation of election 
campaigning is an on-going process made by political parties to review their old 
campaign practices to make new ones much better in accordance with the ever-
changing electoral environment. In addition, it means the term 
professionalisation can be directly connected to the level of competence of 
management of election campaigning (Nord, 2007) because political parties have 
tried to utilise all kinds of campaign resources regardless of whether they are old 
or new. To give a concrete example, it is true that the newspaper seems to be 
regarded as outdated medium compared to TV or the Internet. However, political 
parties have still used it as one of the main mediums even though the working 
methods used by political parties have differed. Accordingly, it is important to 
demonstrate what kinds of media have been used for presidential elections over 
the 10 years in question and how they have been used differently in designing 
election campaign strategies in the context of competence in election 
campaigning.  
 
On the other hand, some scholars indicate that the level of professionalisation 
could differ between political parties even if every political party went through 
the process of professionalisation of election campaigning (Gibson and Römmele, 
2002). This is because parties generally devote themselves to re-designing their 
campaign strategies based on their previous experiences as well as knowledge 
(Scammell, 1997; Negrine, 2007).  
 
In the third chapter, this study explained about the South Korean case in order to 
provide detailed information that will help understand the research results. 
Therefore, political system, electoral system, and media system were explained, 
and, further, a brief explanation of the style of previous election campaigning in 
South Korea was described. The fourth chapter provided an explanation of the 
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research methodology. Accordingly, this chapter provides valuable information 
about the procedures of semi-structured interview, the list of interviewees, the 
research period and schedule, and further ethical consideration.  
 
In the fifth chapter, the research questions and hypotheses were examined 
throughout the South Korean case. To recap, the research questions and 
hypotheses are as follows:  
 
The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning  
 
Q1. The adoption of new tools and intensification of existing methods: 
What and how were differences in campaign activities accomplished by the 
utilisation of mass media and new campaign technology in each presidential 
election? Has it finally led to the alteration of campaign style? How have the 
Korean parties responded to these new tools of communication? 
 
H1-1: Political parties will try to approach their work differently especially after 
an election defeat, including using contemporary communication technologies 
and campaigning practices. 
 
H1-2: New campaign styles caused by media and campaign technology 
developments will therefore become more capital-intensive.  
 
The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning  
 
Q2. The influx of campaign professionals: 
What kind of campaign activities have campaign professionals performed in the 
presidential election campaigns between 1997 and 2007? How has the 
relationship between party personnel and campaign professionals changed? 
 
H2: Political parties will try to increase the engagement of campaign 
professionals to improve their campaign strategies especially in the adoption of 
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new campaign skills and electoral environment.  
 
H2-1: The hierarchy in decision-making for election campaigns will change from 
a top-down structure to a more flat hierarchy because of the growing influx of 
external campaign professionals.  
 
Q3. The alteration of political parties as campaign organisations:  
Does the increased influx of professional consultants into the party organisation 
result in centralisation of the party organisation? How have parties changed their 
organisation since the introduction of campaign professionals?  
 
H3-1: Political parties will be centralised to manage their resources efficiently as 
well as effectively.   
 
H3-2: Political parties will be focused on training their party personnel to be 
more ‘professional (or skilful)’ in the efficient management of mass media and 
new technology. 
 
H3-3: Political parties will expand their organisation to deal with mass media and 
new technology, and will therefore concentrate investment on developing these 
departments within their organisation.  
 
6.3. The summary of the results of this study 
 
It might be true that, from a broader perspective, the changing role of the mass 
media in election campaigns in South Korea is not distinct from the role it has in 
Western countries, but two things are worthy of note: 1) the fact that the adoption 
of mass media has been quickly accomplished by parties in response to the rapid 
development and distribution of mass media;
38
 and 2) political parties seem to be 
                                            
38
 There were more negative than positive issues when televised political debates began in 1997, 
such as inexperienced presenters, the format of TV debates and the perception of the candidates, 
because of the lack of preparation. In fact, there were more than 100 televised discussions in 
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flexible in their initial attempts at dealing with new communication technology, 
despite severe campaign regulations. It cannot be denied that political 
developments such as regime transition and constitutional reform have created a 
new sphere of election campaigning amounting to a growth of the notion of the 
professionalisation of election campaigns. In addition to this, since the 
government allowed the liberalisation of mass media around the time of the 1987 
presidential election, the election campaign strategies produced by political 
parties have been more professional than before. In other words, the alterations 
undergone by the socio-political environment, such as the high level of intense 
party competition caused by electoral reform, the extensive use of mass media by 
political parties, and the development of campaign technology, have accelerated 
the professionalisation of election campaigns in South Korea. 
 
From a wider perspective and looking at a general trend among recent election 
campaigns, each party’s campaign strategies regarding the use of mass media 
seem to be similar. This may be because of the strict campaign regulations in 
Korea. In addition, it is becoming harder to discern differences between party 
campaign strategies, since the ultimate goal of every party is winning elections. 
Yet the process of creating a campaign is not similar among parties due to the 
many differences between them, such as party size, the mood of the party, 
historical achievements and party ideology. Moreover, it has been confirmed that 
the differences between parties regarding adoption of the Internet existed as far 
back as the 2002 presidential election. In the next sub-section, the results of two 
different dimensions of the professionalisation of election campaigns are 
presented in order to draw a conclusion and to lead to an in-depth discussion 
about the South Korean case. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
1997 and, consequently, this had a negative effect on political parties. Afterwards, in 2002, 
candidates participated less in TV debates and, as a result, TV’s effect has decreased from when 
it was first introduced (You, 1997; Jeong, 2002). 
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6.3.1. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning 
 
There is no doubt that all parties address the problem of decline of party 
members and party support and try to find a new method of communication 
through which to interact with the voters. Moreover, it is true that parties are 
struggling more in dealing with modern technology, due to the lack of finance, 
especially in the election campaign period. Different from the past, the 2000 
general election was the starting point of election campaigns using the Internet in 
earnest. Going beyond the simple opening of websites, political parties and 
candidates executed activities promoting voter participation including the 
operation of Internet broadcasting stations and the recruitment of Internet 
supporters and cyber press corps. This phenomenon is understood to be one of 
the attempts by the parties to increase the turnout of young voters, who are 
becoming increasingly uninterested in politics. Therefore, the emergence of the 
Internet in the 2002 presidential election as the best option for the parties has 
been very welcomed by them in terms of the enlargement of party 
communication methods at a lower price than the other methods.  
 
As presented earlier, there is no doubt that the accelerated pace of technological 
advances in recent years has benefited parties in South Korea: the use of opinion 
polls, computerised systems and direct mail marketing has become standard 
practice. Similarly, these advances have also empowered voters by making 
possible the utilisation of a wide variety of communication channels through 
which to receive and transmit information according to their preferences. For 
these reasons, the parties and candidates at the centre of election campaigns have 
had to become experts in these sophisticated techniques and have also had to call 
on the assistance of professionals more and more (Agranoff, 1976; Butler and 
Ranney, 1992; Kavanagh, 1995; Mayhew, 1997; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Farrell 
and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Plasser, 2002). The parties and candidates have been 
required to create competitive strategies within limited budgets, to mount 
campaigns that will successfully woo voters, and to use scientific approaches that 
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maximise resources as efficiently as possible in order to gain advantage 
(Agranoff, 1974), all of which require professional assistance. 
 
Nonetheless, it is hard to say that the increased use of modern campaign 
technology and new media utilised by political parties has led to the alteration of 
party structure in South Korea. In addition, it is doubtful whether the endeavours 
of parties to adopt these modern campaign skills have consequently contributed 
to the revitalisation of voter political participation, as mentioned in many studies 
(Heinderyckx, 2010). That is, these attempts by the parties seem to stimulate the 
voters’ curiosity about something new, but it is still questionable whether they 
are connected to a gradual increase in political participation in Korea. This has 
been proven already through the comparison between the 1997 and 2007 
presidential elections.  
 
Taking all things presented in previous chapters into consideration, it can be 
surmised that there are differences in the speed of adoption of new media and 
campaign technology and the method of utilisation between the GNP and DP, 
although both parties seem to be similar in its adoption. In particular, it is true 
that GNP is a bit slower than DP in its adoption. As presented several times in 
interview transcripts, it turned out that the political elite’s culture in the DP has 
achieved the fast adoption of modern technology, although the GNP was in a 
better electoral environment such as having abundant party resources and good 
relationships with offline media especially newspaper companies, than the DP. In 
other words, although the GNP had adopted modern technology, their already 
good electoral environment meant that they did not show radical progress in the 
1997 and 2002 presidential elections than DP.  
 
After two failures in the presidential elections, the GNP has started to alter its 
party organisation and redefined its campaign strategy. In particular, since the 
2002 presidential election, it turned out that the GNP has conducted a deep 
investigation about the reason for the failures and has thrown away its old 
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campaign style. This process is easy to find in other countries’ cases (see the UK 
case in Denver et al.’s research (2003)). As a result, it turned out that the GNP 
conducted a new style of campaigning in the 2007 presidential election compared 
to previous presidential elections, 1997 and 2002, although there is some 
criticism that the GNP’s campaign strategy seems to be similar to the DP’s 
campaigning in the 2002 presidential election, especially in the case of political 
TV advertising.  
 
As indicated earlier, given that professionalisation of election campaigning can 
be defined as a continuous reviewing (learning) process of political parties 
reflecting on socio-political environments in order to create competitive election 
campaigning through the use of efficient campaign practices, it can be interpreted 
that the GNP’s campaigning has slowly professionalised whilst the DP’s one has 
tended to be de-professionalised. In the case of the DP, they built the best 
strategy by the adoption of new media and showed a new style of campaigning in 
the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections. However, it cannot be denied that they 
conducted a less successful campaign strategy in the strategic aspect and the 
utilisation of mass media in the 2007 presidential election compared to 2002, 
even though they were in a less favourable political situation than the GNP, as 
stated in the interview transcripts. Therefore, it can be said that the GNP has 
gradually been professionalised despite the slow speed whilst the DP has been 
de-professionalised in conducting election campaigns in the context of 
professionalisation of election campaigning. To be more precise, both parties 
have conducted media-intensified campaigns rather than scientific campaigns.  
 
CP5 (campaign professional) agreed about the above and explained that the 2002 
and the 2007 presidential election campaigns were ones that were solely focused 
on mass media. Continually, CP5 insisted that the establishment of a scientific 
campaign strategy cannot be measured by some kinds of criteria such as the 
question of the extent to which mass media was utilised more than before. In 
other words, scientific campaign styles should be accompanied by careful target 
segmentation through FGI (Focus Group Interview) and a market analysis. From 
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this point, CP5 argued that Korean campaigns tend to concentrate only on mass 
media strategy, such as which party adopts new media first, rather than on 
sophisticated campaign strategies through in-depth investigation, even though it 
would be possible to develop their campaign style with a scientific approach 
based on the great improvement of mass media and technology from the 1997 to 
the 2007 presidential election.  
 
It is clear that Korean election campaign strategy has been transformed by heavy 
reliance on especially mass media and campaign technologies and increased 
employment of campaign professionals and specialist advisors by political 
parties. However, this seems to lead to a serious gap between major and minor 
parties rather than between GNP and DP. In addition to this, it is true that Korean 
election campaigns have been capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive. 
Strictly speaking, there seems to be a transition period from capital-intensive to 
labour-intensive. Although the Public Official Election Law has been revised 
with the purpose of preventing parties spending huge budgets on their campaigns 
in order to mobilise people, this has led parties to spend more money on the 
creation of effective campaign strategies using new technology. Since Korean 
parties think that the fundamental initiative in designing campaign strategy is to 
find out how to mobilise people and to encourage them to vote, they seem to 
adopt more methods in order to maximise voter engagement. This also means 
that parties should invest their budgets into sectors that they had not considered 
previously, such as the employment of campaign professionals and the more 
frequent use of opinion polls. In other words, they have only to spend their 
money when rallying great support for their campaigning.  
 
Taking all things into consideration, it can be said that professionalisation of 
Korean election campaigns is on-going because each party has tried to adopt new 
campaign practices in a more efficient way. However, due to strict campaign 
regulations in South Korea, this finally led to the situation that parties cannot 
invest money into designing competitive campaign strategies through the liberal 
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use of mass media and campaign technology. Secondly, the labour market 
industry, especially with regard to campaign professionals, has not yet stabilised 
in South Korea like in the USA. For this reason, some campaign activities should 
rely on commercial companies that are not in the political arena.  
 
6.3.2. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning 
 
It is revealed that parties have increased the number of campaign professionals to 
adopt new campaign practices. Korean elections, especially major ones such as 
the presidential election, have been heavily dominated by political elites inside 
party organisations, no matter how many campaign professionals have been 
engaged or how much political parties need their help. Although their 
relationship might be better based on a party’s growing recognition of the 
essential needs of campaign professionals, party elites still seem to think of them 
as part-time campaign assistants who give technical help in designing election 
campaigns. Furthermore, it turns out that the relationship between campaign 
staffers in party organisations as insiders and campaign professionals as outsiders 
is more sensitive than the relationship between political elites and campaign 
professionals. 
 
To be specific, political elites played important roles in controlling all campaign 
activities in the 1997 presidential election. It cannot be denied that there have 
been high numbers of external campaign professionals employed since the first 
establishment of political TV advertising and the beginning era of media-
centralised democracy. However, there were some differences in the formation of 
election camp and party official organisation. In the case of the DP (MDP), they 
formed campaign organisations with key politicians, relatives, and campaign 
professionals who have a deep and lasting relationship with a candidate. On the 
other hand, the GNP hired campaign professionals who have a deep relationship 
with the candidate rather than with the party organisation. Although it is true that 
both parties hired campaign professionals in the same manner, the major 
difference is that candidate Kim Dae-joong of the MDP controlled the party 
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organisation and his private camp at the same time whilst candidate Lee Hoi-
chang of the GNP could not control his party organisation efficiently due to 
internal discord (Kwon, 2003). Accordingly, the relationship between Lee’s 
private camp and his party’s official organisation was not good, and this finally 
led to a failure in the election at that time. Perhaps these side effects in the 1997 
presidential election would be understood as happening due to the transition 
period from a labour-intensive campaign style, which concentrates on 
mobilisation of voters, to a capital-intensive campaign style, which focused on 
the utilisation of mass media and new technology. In addition to this, two main 
factors, e.g. political elite’s low level of knowledge of media logic and campaign 
professionals’ low level of understanding of political issues, produced these 
results. 
 
Moving onto the 2002 presidential election, the significant feature is that there 
was a high degree of participation of voters to help campaigning for candidate 
Rho of the DP, although there were no differences in the use of campaign 
professionals between the two parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 
increased use of campaign professionals in the 2002 and the 2007 presidential 
elections compared to the 1997 presidential election led to election success. 
Nonetheless, it is true that the role and scope of campaign professionals has 
gradually expanded more than in previous presidential elections. Furthermore, 
the main reason why parties are hiring many campaign professionals is because 
they do not know how to manage this development themselves: the adaptation of 
telecommunications for election campaigning is happening too rapidly for parties 
to manage it themselves (Sun, 2009).  
 
Related to the alteration of the relationship between parties and campaign 
professionals, Kolodny and Logan’s study (1998), as explained earlier, concludes 
that the relationship between parties and campaign professionals, especially 
campaign consultants in the USA, has changed from allied view to adversarial 
view through the analysis of surveys and interviews with 341 political 
consultants. In the case of South Korea, it can be said that the relationship 
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between parties and campaign professionals has differed according to type and 
role of campaign professionals. For example, it is researched that the relationship 
with some campaign professionals who engage in production of political 
advertising and polls has altered from allied view to adversarial view. In 
particular, the relationship with campaign professionals who take charge of polls 
has clearly transformed from allied to adversarial view given that parties have 
continued to contract poll work to reputable poll companies and parties have 
wanted to utilise the results of polls to comprehend their actual position, like a 
market survey in commercial industry. 
 
Unlike the work related to polls, in the case of production of political 
advertisements, it turns out that the role of internal party campaign staffers was 
limited in the 2007 election compared to the 1997 election. Although these 
changes in the role of internal party campaign staffers are clearly shown on the 
surface, it is true that the role of campaign professionals has increased more than 
that of internal party campaign staffers. That is, internal party campaign staffers 
give advice related to political matters, such as campaign regulations, campaign 
professionals who come from commercial industry do not know whilst campaign 
professionals concentrate on the production of political advertising. Perhaps it is 
because parties need modernistic as well as sophisticated skills to court voters 
since political advertising has had a more image-centralised than issue-
centralised focus from the 2002 election onwards. Given this, it may imply that 
the relationship with campaign professionals who engage in the production of 
political advertising has continued to change from allied view to adversarial view.  
 
In particular, political elites who take charge of important PR tasks have become 
professionalised in dealing with mass media through their experiences. In 
addition to this, it has turned out that the power of political elites in Korean 
parties is still higher than that of campaign professionals. Interestingly, the 
numbers of political elites who have experienced elections or have deep 
knowledge in dealing with mass media and campaign technology have increased, 
rather than there being an increased number of campaign professionals 
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participating in elections. In effect, until the 1997 presidential election, key 
members amongst party elites were composed of a few politicians who had a 
high reputation with voters or had built a good career in the field of politics. 
However, since the 2002 presidential election, they are considered as key 
members of the campaign committee if they have good skills in managing 
election campaigns, regardless of their age and political career.   
 
On the other hand, in the case of minor parties, almost all campaign professionals 
were volunteers or the parties got some help from their party members. What is 
more, the definition of campaign professionals seems to differ between the major 
and minor parties. Major parties have paid campaign professionals, even if some 
campaign professionals, such as academics and advisers who have high-ranking 
positions in the commercial area, are not paid. 
 
Last but not least, it is hard to say that Korean parties have transformed their 
structure into the type of political party such as electoral-professional party due 
to the increase in the influx of campaign professionals into party organisations. 
Although there was some alteration of party organisation such as establishment 
of new PR teams and expansion of the role of PR teams, it cannot be seen that 
Korean party structure has altered to a new form. CP4 noted:  
 
‘It may be possible that the engagements of campaign 
professionals and commercial companies will continue to 
increase in the future because it cannot be denied that parties 
cannot deal with all campaign activities especially in modern 
society. However, I do not think that those external campaign 
professionals will take over the role that internal party 
campaign staffers have done. … However, rather, it may be 
highly possible that internal party campaign staffers do their 
job such as mobilisation of voters and we [campaign 
professionals] do our job such as providing technical supports.’ 
(Interview transcript, CP4)  
 
In addition to this, CP4 insist that Korean parties are not campaign parties 
because the level of internal party campaign staffers’ knowledge about media 
logic is not as high as or at least the same as external campaign professionals’. 
231 
 
 
Accordingly, it might be possible for Korean parties to change into a new form, 
but this may take a long time.  
 
6.4. Limitations and suggestions for future studies 
 
This research has investigated the phenomenon of professionalisation of election 
campaigning in South Korea over 10 years. To do this, the study was divided into 
two dimensions of professionalisation of election campaigning- the external and 
the internal. Although this thesis has tried to deal with the historical alteration of 
election campaigning in South Korea in the perspective of professionalisation, it 
is not enough to cover all matters related to election campaigning. Therefore, in 
presenting limitations and some suggestions for future studies it will be worth 
developing the concept of professionalisation of election campaign studies.  
 
6.4.1. Limitations of semi-structured interviews  
 
First of all, this research has a general limitation that many qualitative studies 
explain. As stated earlier, the results that were analysed and explained in this 
study were obtained from the interview materials from many in-depth interviews. 
Given two facts - that the time of the interviews was at the end of 2011 and the 
targeted elections for this research were 1997, 2002, and 2007 - it cannot be 
denied that almost all of the interviewees had limited memories of previous 
election campaigns. Although interviewees could remember some important 
matters and could offer an explanation of the general trends about election 
campaigns in a broad sense, this research may omit some important matters that 
need to be analysed for the South Korean case.  
 
Secondly, this research investigated the relationship between internal party 
campaign staffers and the campaign professionals. As explained in chapter 5 and 
earlier in this one, politicians have more authority in the management of election 
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campaigns than do campaign professionals in South Korea. Although an attempt 
was made to interview politicians who were official members of campaign 
organisations of political parties between the 1997 and 2007 presidential election, 
they all rejected the opportunity. Alternatively, their aides (politicians’ 
secretaries) were interviewed. Thus, there are some limitations to gaining a fuller 
picture of the inside story that can support the results of this research.   
 
Thirdly, there is also a limit to the amount of information interviewees gave. As 
noted earlier by one of the interviewees, Korean political parties tend to be 
reluctant to expose their political matters. Naturally, interviewees were sensitive 
about being asked some questions related to political or party matters and they 
avoided answering. 
 
6.4.2. Suggestions for future studies  
 
The structure of party organisation and party elites’ culture 
 
As explained throughout this thesis, factors such as political elites’ culture and 
the structure of party organisation are important elements of investigating the 
professionalisation of election campaigning. For instance, despite the GNP’s 
abundant party resources and the stability of their organisation structure in the 
1997 and the 2002 presidential election, they were unable to win the presidential 
elections in these years. Conversely, inferiority of the DP’s electoral environment 
compared to that of the GNP led to strong strengthening of party organisation 
until the 2002 presidential election, and finally, it led to DP’s success in 1997 
and 2002 presidential election.  
 
It is difficult to say with certainty that the changes in campaign strategies of the 
major South Korean parties were driven by changes in the media environment 
and the rise of new communication technologies. As stated in chapter 5, there is 
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evidence that changing media environments and the emergence of new 
communication technologies are in themselves not sufficient to understand 
processes of professionalisation in election campaign. Instead, we have to pay 
attention to the culture of party organisation, especially the culture of political 
elites who interpret the changing environment and play a key role in determining 
how to respond to these change. Thus, it is important to consider party 
organisation factors for further studies in analysing the notion of 
professionalisation of election campaigns.   
 
Moreover, contrary to the assumption that major parties, especially those with 
abundant party resources, would display a higher degree of professionalisation 
than minor parties because the utilisation of new media and new campaign 
technology is expensive (Gibson and Römmele, 2009), this research showed that 
minor parties tend to be professionalised more quickly than major parties in the 
utilisation of new campaign communications, especially digital media. As an 
interviewee of the DLP1 noted, the lack of party finance has led to a situation 
where internal party campaign staffers have become professionals in dealing with 
new campaign technologies because they have to consider how to conduct their 
campaign strategy efficiently within limited budgets. In addition, a small number 
of party campaign staffers and political elites seem to find it easy to achieve 
agreement in designing election campaigning due to the simplification of the 
decision process in smaller parties. Accordingly, if the concept of 
professionalisation is defined as a party process to review and redefine campaign 
strategies to achieve the final aim of winning electoral majorities, as proposed by 
this thesis’s conceptualisation of professionalisation of election campaign, minor 
parties would have a high level of professionalisation of election campaigning 
although their ability to utilise cutting-edge technology is restricted compared to 
major parties. This underlines the assumption that political parties with a more 
progressive party culture would tend to responsive to the changing electoral 
environment. Therefore, future scholarship is encouraged to compare minor and 
major parties, and the specific role of party organisational factors in the choice of 
campaign strategies.  
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Suggestions for comparative studies  
 
As stated earlier, many scholars have suggested that similar changes to election 
campaigns take place around the world, in spite of differences in political and 
electoral systems (Mancini and Swanson, 1994; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004; 
Schafferer, 2006). It is true that many countries demonstrate similar features and 
common concerns in the evolution of their election campaigns, although the 
extent and pace of this evolution varies widely. So far, the focus of comparative 
studies has been mainly on investigating the similarities and differences of 
campaign practices caused by fundamental changes in social and technical 
developments.  
 
In addition, according to the burgeoning literature on new trends in election 
campaigning, there have been many cross-national studies that investigate the 
changes in campaign practices associated with the theories of Americanisation, 
Modernisation, Political Marketing and Professionalisation in Western countries. 
However, analysis of these theories focuses almost exclusively on Western rather 
than Asian countries.  
 
Conversely, there are only a few comparative studies on election campaign in the 
Asian region, and even less attention has been paid to the effect of 
professionalised election campaigning on party organisation in this region. As 
noted earlier, Schafferer’s (2006) work is the only recent monograph on the 
subject. For instance, his work focuses mainly on identifying and describing the 
general changes shown in the election campaigns of seven selected Asian 
countries – Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. However, his approach is based on the issue of standardising 
campaign practices, as exemplified in the works of Plasser and Plasser (2002), 
rather than identifying the differences that exist between parties within each of 
these countries in analysing professionalisation of election campaigns.  
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In fact, the main aim of comparative studies on Asian countries is to test the 
applicability of Western campaign models in non-Western contexts, assuming 
that Western countries that are undergoing social and technological changes have 
already formulated effective strategies to deal with these changes, ahead of those 
in Asia. However, this approach fails to take into account the economic, cultural 
and political differences between the West and Asia. Therefore, future 
comparative research should investigate election campaigning in Asia as cases I 
their own right, rather than as variations of, or deviations from, a pre-existing 
Western model.  
 
In particular, according to many scholars (Bartels, 1992; Norris, 2000), economic 
level is closely related to the development of technology and social systems, and 
political and electoral systems directly influence election campaign strategy 
styles and even the degree of professionalisation in each country's campaigns 
(Schafferer, 2006). Moreover, as highlighted in many previous studies regarding 
the evolution of election campaign practices, the spread of new media is taken 
into account because the pattern of change in campaigns is closely associated 
with the advance of media and technologies, with the Internet being highlighted 
as a major medium for campaigns. Moreover, the range of campaign activities is 
one of main factors that activate a professionalised campaign. Therefore, 
considering economic levels, political and electoral systems, new media systems 
and the current levels of communication technologies, this research suggests the 
Taiwan case is especially shown to amongst all other countries to have a similar 
system as that of South Korea as can be seen in table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1. The comparison of electoral system in Asian countries
1 
 The use of 
skilled experts
 
Campaign 
activities
 
New media 
system 
Political System 
Parliament Presidential 
Taiwan Yes
 
(Internal and 
external) 
Opinion 
polling 
TV Ads 
TV, The 
Internet 
Unicameral Plurality 
(5 years) 
South 
Korea 
Yes 
(Internal and 
external) 
Opinion 
polling 
TV Ads 
TV, The 
Internet 
Unicameral Plurality 
(4 years) 
¹ Source from Schafferer (2006) 
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For example, both South Korea and Taiwan have similar historical records, 
which the ruling parties have changed twice times between the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
century. This is indicative of the similar changes in party organisation needed for 
overcoming historical electoral defeat from the perspective of the party-centred 
professionalised campaign. In addition, both countries have presented resembling 
political issues such as military issues and in the long-term, one party control in 
politics (Wang, 1994). Given this, comparative studies between Asian countries 
that have had similar historical changes in electoral systems, as well as the 
development of mass media and technology, will be worth using in the 
development of professionalisation theory by providing pertinent cases.  
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APPENDIX A. Campaign regulation in South Korea 
 
Provision Contents of amendment 
Article 8 and 8-5 
Internet newspapers under the Act on the Guarantee of Freedom and 
Functions of Newspapers, etc. are included in Internet media 
companies under the Public Office Election Law, and Internet media 
companies are regulated to be fair in reporting and criticizing 
political parties’ platforms, policies, etc. 
Article 8-6 
Internet Election News Deliberation Commission investigates the 
fairness of election news carried by Internet media companies, and 
may order the insertion of corrected news if the contents of news are 
considered unfair. 
Article 64 The poster used in election campaigns should contain 
picture/name/number/name of the party/career of the candidate. 
Article 65 Candidates can publish a booklet with not more than 16 pages for 
the campaign. 
Article 70 
(Advertisement) 
For the campaign, the candidate can make election advertisement 
regarding policies of the party and opinions of the candidate about 
specific issues using television and radio. Each advertisement, 
however, cannot exceed one minute. 
Article 71 
(Candidates’ and 
Others’ Speech) 
It is allowed within 11 times per television and radio respectively. 
The candidate or supporters that the candidate appoints can make 
speeches on TV or radio within 20 minutes per time. 
Article 73 
(Candidates’ 
Career) 
KBS should broadcast picture/name/number/age/the political party, 
job and other major career of the candidate that election committee 
of the electorate provides up to twice per candidate during election 
campaign period. More than 8 times in presidential election 
Article 82-6 
When an Internet media company provides bulletin boards, chatting 
rooms, etc. on its Internet website during an election campaign 
period so that site visitors may post articles supporting or opposing 
specific political parties or candidates, it should verify the real name 
of the writers by a real name verification method provided by the 
Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs, and 
delete articles without the mark of ‘real name verification.’ 
Article 82-7 
A candidate who wants to do Internet advertising should report the 
Election Management Committee in the corresponding election 
district of the name of the Internet media company, the period of 
advertising, the cost of advertising, etc. in writing including the 
advertisement manuscript and a copy of the advertisement contract 
before the date of advertising. 
Article 108 
No Internet media company is allowed to announce, quote or report 
the process and results of opinion polls forecasting support to a 
political party or the successful candidate from 6 days before the 
election day until the voting is over on the election day. 
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APPENDIX B. The historical changes of political advertising legislation 
 
Presidential 
election 
Contents of laws related to political advertising 
13
th
 (1987) 
 · A political party (or candidate) (can advertise political views, the 
political party’s platforms and policies, etc. in daily newspapers 3 
times or less / the regulation on the number of daily newspapers in 
each advertisement was removed.) 
 
 · The size of advertisement is width 37cm×height 17cm (full-size 
advertisement allowed) 
14
th
 (1992) 
 · Newspaper advertisement (A political party or candidate can 
advertise in each newspaper 4 times or less during the election 
campaign period) 
 
 The size of broadcasting advertisement is width 37cm× height 17 
cm (full-size advertisement allowed) 
 
 · Broadcasting advertisement (5 times or less in each television and 
radio station during the election campaign period) 
 
· The length of each advertisement time cannot exceed a minute. 
15
th
 (1997)~ 
Present 
 · Newspaper advertisement of election campaign (Article 69 of the 
Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of 
Election Malpractices) 
 
 · A political party or candidate can advertise 70 times or less after 
candidate registration until 2 days before the election day. 
 
· The size of advertisement width 37 cm× height 17 cm (full-size 
advertisement allowed) 
 
 · One advertisement in a daily newspaper is counted as one 
advertisement. 
 
 · Broadcasting advertisement of election campaign (Article 70 of 
the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of 
Election Malpractices) 
 
 A political party or candidate can advertise 30 times or less in each 
television and radio station. 
 
 The length of each advertisement time cannot exceed a minute / 
Rebroadcasting is also included in counting. 
 
 · (Restriction of) newspaper advertisement of platforms and policies 
(Article 137 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the 
Prevention of Election Malpractices) 
 
 In case of an election resulting from the expiration of term, a total 
of 50 or less advertisements can be made in daily newspapers from 
120 days before the election day to the day starting the election 
period / Contents of election campaign cannot be included. 
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APPENDIX C. Semi-structured Interview guide 
 
1. General questions about the changes in election campaigning in South Korea:  
Number Questions Variable 
1 Which year did you participate in 
presidential election campaigning? And 
which party were you in? What was 
your role?  
 
What kinds of campaigning activities 
did you take charge of while in election 
campaign commission (camp)? 
General information about an 
interviewee 
2 It is often mentioned that media is the 
most important factor in the 
management of election campaigning 
nowadays, how much do you agree 
with it or how do think about this? 
              (According to an answer) Can 
you give me any examples of this? 
 
Which ones do you think are a main 
factor in influencing the change of 
election campaigning strategy in each 
of the presidential elections? 
Media-oriented election 
campaigning 
 
2. The external dimension – the use of mass media and campaign communication 
technology: 
Number Questions Variable 
1 1.1 What kinds of media have been 
used for election campaign over 10 
years?  
- Any changes? Any differences 
in its use  
1.2 How do parties use new media such 
as the Internet?  
- How has it changed? 
- What are the biggest 
differences between each election?  
- What do you think the 
advantages/disadvantages of the use of 
these new media during election 
campaign? 
 
 
The use of media and new 
media  
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Number Questions Variable 
2 
2.1 What kinds of activities using ‘new’ 
communication technologies have been 
performed in each of the presidential 
elections? 
- Which area (ex. Media or 
campaign strategies or technical 
support or advertising or public 
opinion, telemarketing, direct mail) 
- Why has it adopted? Who 
made the decision of adoption?  
-  If a party used it in a different 
way, how? And why? 
 
2.2 How many times do you send e-
mail subscription newsletters 
(telemarketing/direct mails) to voters? 
-   (If parties send e-mail 
newsletter and direct mails/ conduct 
telemarketing), how many times did 
the party do? How has it performed?  
- Do you think it is effective to 
send party information in e-mail or 
newsletters, whatever, to voters?  
 
2.3 Do you have a computerised 
database? 
- How often do you use it? 
(Frequent/occasional use/none) 
- Do you refer to it for target 
segmentation? 
- How do you manage or 
develop it? 
 
2.4 How does the party use the results 
of opinion polls?  
- Have the polls been conducted 
by external professionals from a 
private poll company?  
- Do you have a campaign 
professional who can conduct polls in 
the party organisation or private camp? 
 
2.5 Does the party have an internal 
intranet communication system? 
-  Since when? How has it 
operated?  
The use of campaign technology 
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Number Questions Variable 
3 
3.1 What kinds of campaign activities 
were performed in each of the 
presidential elections?     
- Which area (ex. media or 
campaign strategies or technical 
support or advertising or public 
opinion) 
- How many people were 
mobilised for that? (ex. Amount of 
political consultants and party staff) 
- Degree of investment 
- Differences (if an interviewee 
participated in two or three 
campaigning management), if yes, 
why? 
- The most effective area 
amongst campaign activities in which 
the party invested. Why? 
- The less effective area, why? 
- How the party managed 
professional groups if they had to? 
The alteration of campaign 
activities 
4 4.1 Has party expenditure increased in 
presidential election campaigning?  
-    If yes, why? 
-    How much did the party 
spend in utilising mass media and new 
technology? 
-    The level of effectiveness in 
the consideration of parties’ investment 
4.2 What was the parties’ main 
consideration when spending their 
budget in presidential election 
campaigning? Any differences? If yes, 
why? 
The alteration of campaign style  
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3. The internal dimension - the influx of campaign professionals and the alteration of 
campaign organisation  
Number Questions Variable 
1 1.1 What is the role of campaign 
professionals in each presidential election 
campaigns?  
- What area 
 
The degree of power of campaign 
professionals to decide campaign activities 
Who has the final decision of control over 
all campaign activities? 
  
Any differences between each election? 
 
In general, when did you join private camp? 
 
1.2 What was your previous work 
experience in relation to election 
campaigning? (Just ask for campaign 
professionals) 
 
If an interviewee worked for a party, which 
department were you in?  
 
What role has this experience played in your 
current career?  
 
If an interviewee did not work for a party, 
what was your role? (Political affiliations, 
government, communication or journalism, 
private sector, public sector, other etc.) 
 
1.3 In general, it is often argued that 
political parties are employing more 
campaign professionals to deal with the on-
going electoral environment. Do you agree? 
 
The role of campaign 
professionals 
2 2.1 How was the relationship between party 
staff and external staff such as campaign 
professionals?  
 
How does the organisation of parties 
transformed in response? 
 
Do you think the power relationship 
between party and campaign professionals 
has been changed go through each 
presidential election from 1997 to 2007?  
The relationship between 
campaign professionals and 
political parties 
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Degree of change (increasing/ as same as/ 
decreasing) 
- Any examples? 
 
2.2 What do you think how much you are 
familiar with (or have a deep relationship 
with) party organisation? (Just ask for 
campaign professionals)  
 
What functions do political parties perform 
better than campaign professionals? (Just 
ask for campaign professionals) 
 
What functions do campaign professionals 
perform better than political parties? (Just 
ask for internal party campaign staffers) 
 
2.3 What is the role of party staff inside the 
party organisation in presidential election 
campaigns? Any differences between each 
election? 
 
2.4 Do you have any training courses about 
how to deal with mass media and campaign 
technology for internal party campaign 
staffers to make them more ‘professional’? 
 
(If yes)  
What kind of training, what is the purpose of 
such training 
Effectiveness? 
Benefits 
 
(If no)  
Why? Future plan? 
3 3.1 How do party organisations manage to 
prepare presidential election campaigning? 
 
- Any differences over the last 10 
years? 
 
- How was the relationship between 
central party (headquarters) and the local 
party during the presidential elections? Do 
you think there is a clear boundary between 
them (asking about his opinion of it)? 
 
 
The alteration of management of 
party organisation 
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- In general, political parties in South 
Korea are especially characterised by a 
propensity of local party according to the 
party leader’s native place. So were there 
any differences in the management of the 
local party over 10 years? 
 
3.2 What kinds of activities does the local 
party normally participate in during a 
presidential election campaign? 
  
- How was the list of local party 
membership managed? 
 
- Since the revision of electoral law 
(electoral reform) in 2004, what are the 
advantages and disadvantage for political 
parties? Since then, how has the party 
managed their local party? What has been 
the biggest difference compared to before?  
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Appendix D. Method of analysis of interview data set 
 
The use of media and campaign communication technologies (DMCT) 
Analysis Unit Coding  Number 
1) Use of media  DMCT-UM  
1-2) Use of campaign technologies DMCT-ACT  
     Opinion polling DMCT-OP  
     Telemarketing  DMCT-TELE  
     Direct mail DMCT-DM  
     Intranet system DMCT-INTRA  
     E-mail subscription newsletter DMCT-EMAIL  
     Outside of campaign headquarters DMCT-HEADQ  
     Continuous campaign  DMCT-CONTINUE  
     Computerised databases DMCT-
DATABASE 
 
     Opposition research  DMCT-OR  
3) Labour vs. Capital intensive DMCT-LC  
     Labour  DMCT-LI  
     Capital DMCT-LC  
     Party Finance DMCT-PF  
The use of campaign professionals in election campaign (UCP) 
 1) Role of campaign professionals UCP-ROLE CP  
 2) The relationship between CP/PARTY UCP-RCP  
The alteration of party organisation (APO) 
 1) The role of political party as 
Campaign organisation 
APO-ROLE PARTY  
      Staff education APO-SE  
 2) Centralisation vs. Decentralisation APO-PEP  
 3) Professional electoral party APO-EC  
Additional unit for further discussions 
 1) Campaign regulations CR  
 2) Discussion of Professionalised 
election campaign 
DPROF  
 3) Party final aim PFA  
 4) Useful discussions  UD  
 
